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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this Petition for 
Review pursuant to it's order of October 24, 1989 granting 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari under Section 78-2-2(5), Utah 
Code Annotated, as amended and Rule 42 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, as amended. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Petitioner petitioned for review of a final order of the 
Industrial Commission of the State of Utah. This Court granted 
Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari following an adverse 
ruling by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
POINT I: Did the Industrial Commission err in giving deference 
to the medical panel report? 
POINT II: Did the Industrial Commission err in reopening the 
issue of liability, previously accepted by the employer and 
it's insurance carrier, on petitioner's accident of October 
29, 1984? 
POINT III: Did the commission abdicate it's responsibilities to 
the medical panel? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This was a claim before the Industrial Commission of the 
State of Utah for permanent total disability benefits and medical 
payments for impairments arising out of a heart attack sustained 
or arising out of the Claimant's employment. 
Petitioner seeks review of the Administrative Law 
Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of 
February 26, 1988 as adopted by the Industrial Commission. A 
Motion for Review was filed March 30, 1988, pursuant to Section 
35-1-82.53 UCA, annotated, as amended, after adverse findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and order by the administrative law 
judge . The Industrial Commission entered it's order denying the 
Motion for Review and upholding the Administrative Law Judge's 
Order on June 1, 1988. The administrative law judge's order thus 
became the order of the Commission. Petitioner filed a timely 
Petition for Review by the Utah Court of Appeals. That Court 
sustained the decision of the Industrial Commission. A timely 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari was filed and granted by this 
Court c 
FACTS 
Petitioner, who had experienced no prior indication of heart 
disease (transcript, page 83, lines 17-24; record page 132), was 
employed as night foreman of the maintenance crew for Tyger 
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Construction at the Stillwater Dam project. This required that 
he work from eight to twelve hours a night (transcript, page 53, 
lines 13-15). When Petitioner started work on October 29, 1984 
he, and his crew found one of the portable welding machines was 
frozen to the ground (transcript, page 55, lines 18-25 and page 
56, lines 1-2). The Petitioner and two other workers took hold 
of the tongue of the trailer which carried the welding machine 
and 
"had to lift heavy. In other words like reef it 
loose, to break it out of the ground that it was frozen 
in." (transcript, page 56 lines 2-6). 
The Petitioner then went and rested in a pickup. After 
approximately five minutes (transcript, page 56, lines 17-19) he 
experienced pain and pressure in his left chest (transcript, page 
56, lines 6-25). His left arm started to hurt and he noted he 
was getting sweaty and clammy (transcript, page 57, lines 11-14). 
He was diagnosed as having had an acute anterior wall 
myocardial infarction and was found to have a severe occlusion of 
the proximal left anterior descending artery (record, page 139). 
He underwent angioplasty of that vessel (transcript, page 61, 
lines 18-19) and remained off work until December 3, 1984 
(transcript, page 63, lines 5-9). 
The Employer's Worker's Compensation Insurance Carrier 
accepted liability for the accident, paid all medicals and 
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compensation for temporary total disability through December 2, 
1984 (Record, page 8). 
When he returned to work, he worked as a crane operator for 
a period of time and then was placed in charge of three on-site 
ready-mix concrete plants in June, 1985 (transcript page 65, 
lines 16-25 and page 66, lines 1-5). By November, 1985 he was 
working seven days a week, 16 to 18 hours a day and, on occasion, 
as much as 20 to 22 hours a day (transcript, page 67, lines 19-25 
and page 68, lines 1-9). 
The concrete plant complex consisted of three separate 
mixing plants with a conveyor belt which was a thousand feet in 
length to move materials from the crushing operation to the 
mixing plants. In addition their were three conveyor belts 
approximately 6,000 feet in length to move the concrete to the 
dam site (transcript page 69, lines 1-12). The mixing plants, 
themselves were as high as three stories in places and were 
accessed by a series of ladders and catwalks (transcript page 69, 
lines 6-8). The slope from the mixing plants to the dam site was 
at a seven degree angle (transcript page 69, lines 19-21). (The 
grade thus dropped 7 feet in each 100 feet of length. He, of 
necessity, therefore, elevated himself over 400 feet each time he 
climbed back up the belts.) In the course of his work Mr. Olsen 
was required to cover this entire operation (from belts to three 
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story mixing plants) some five to seven times a day (transcript 
page 69, lines 13-15). 
While* walking up these belts in September, 1984 Petitioner 
began to experience pain in his low chest area (transcript page 
70, lines 1-17). As time went on the pains became more frequent 
(transcript page 72, lines 3-7), but only occurred while walking 
the conveyor belt (transcript page 70, lines 19-25 and page 71, 
lines 1-15). The Medical Panel Doctor concluded, in retrospect, 
this probably represented angina pectoris (record page 280) 
As the project went into November the long hours, seven days 
a week continued and Mr. Olsen and his crew were "awful, awful 
tired" and getting only five to six hours of sleep a night 
(transcript page 72, lines 11-25). 
The entire project was finally shut down on November 22, 
1985 (transcript page 73, lines 11-12). Petitioner then took his 
trailer to Ignatio, Colorado to relax and rest up on a friend's 
farm (transcript page 73, lines 22-25 and page 74 lines 6-7). 
Ten days after the project was shut down, he suffered an acute 
inferior myocardial infarction (transcript page 74, lines 10-20). 
He has not returned to work and has been determined to be 
permanently and totally disabled by his condition (transcript 
page 80, lines 7-22). The Employer's Worker's Compensation 
Carrier denied further liability for the October 29, 1984 
incident and denied any liability for the December 2, 1985 heart 
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attack (record pages 20-21 and page 30). Petitioner applied for 
a hearing before the Industrial Commission. 
After hearing, the matter was referred to a medical panel. 
The medical panel chairman first appointed, subsequently deter-
mined he was unable to serve. Several other Physicians were 
approached and finally Dr. Michael J. Preece was appointed by 
letter dated November 16, 1987 (record pages 276 and 277). There 
is no indication in the record that Dr. Preece had ever served on 
a medical panel prior to this appointmentf that he was told the 
nature of his responsibilities, the purpose or the effect of his 
evaluation and report. 
Dr. Preece received the appointment, reviewed the records, 
examined the Applicant and made his written report by November 
19, 1987 (see Dr. Preece's report beginning on page 279 of the 
record). He expressed doubt as to his understanding of two of 
the five questions submitted but answered them anyway without 
obtaining clarification (Dr. Preece's report, record page 281). 
Dr. Preece stated the Petitioner had no impairment of his 
heart muscle prior to the MI in October, 1984, although he did 
have pre-existing extensive and progressive coronary atheroscler-
osis. Dr. Preece concluded there was no causal relationship 
between the two Mis, and further stated there was no relationship 
between the work activities and either of the Mis. His con-
clusion as stated, is that there is no causal relationship 
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between exertion and stress and the occurrence of any myocardial 
infarction (record pages 279-282). 
With the exception of the Petitioner's condition prior to 
the October, 1984 MI, Dr. Preece's conclusions were contradicted 
in all cases by one or more of Mr. Olsen's treating physicians 
(record page 244 and 287-288). None of the treating or evaluat-
ing physicians, including the physician who evaluated Mr. Olsen's 
medical records for the Employer, took the position that there is 
no causal relationship between exertion and stress and the 
occurrence of a myocardial infarction. 
Petitioner filed a timely objection to the medical panel 
report. The Administrative Law Judge specifically found 
"legal causation" (record page 306), but adopted the medical 
panel report and found that 
"The applicant has not sustained his burden of 
proving that his heart condition was medically caused 
by his work activities of October 29, 1984". (e.a.), 
(record page 306). 
Petitioner filed a timely Motion for Review which was denied 
by the Industrial Commission. In It's denial of the Motion for 
Review the Commission stated: 
"In cases where medical opinion controverting that 
of the medical panel is submitted, the Commission has 
in the past maintained a fairly consistent practice of 
deferring to the medical panel absent good reason shown 
why the medical panel report is insufficient or 
biased." (record page 339). 
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Petition for Review by the Utah Court of Appeals resulted in 
that Court sustaining the denial of benefits. Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari was then filed and granted by this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Commission's stated policy of giving deference to the 
opinions of the Medical Panel, as opposed to the opinions of an 
injured worker's treating physicians, violates the Petitioner's 
right to a fair and impartial hearing. This policy automatically 
resolves doubt in the instant case in favor of the employer, not 
the employee as so often mandated by this Court. The findings 
and opinions of the medical panel are another source of evidence 
only and may not be given more weight or credence than other 
competent medical evidence. 
Without a showing of change in circumstances, the Industrial 
Commission erred in reopening the issue of liability, accepted by 
the Employer and It's Insurance Carrier, for the accident of 
October 29, 1984. The Commission's continuing jurisdiction under 
35-1-78 UCA, as amended, is not without limitations and must rely 
on changes in circumstances. The settlement of an existing claim 
is an enforceable contract, and one who leads another to rely on 
representations or actions to the detriment of the other is 
estopped from asserting a position to the contrary. 
The Industrial Commission is the final fact finder and 
cannot abdicate that responsibility to the medical panel. The 
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Commission has the responsibility of applying the law to the 
facts, as found by the Commission and not by the medical panel. 
The Commission must submit medical issues and the question of 
medical causation to the medical panel on the basis of the facts, 
as found by the Commission. 
In the present case the Industrial Commission found that 
there was legal causation on the accident of October 29, 1984, 
but failed to make a finding on the work related stress in 
November of 1985. The Commission further failed to make a 
finding that the accident of the October 29, 1984 was a compen-
sable accident. Not only were the findings not made and sub-
mitted to the Medical Panel, but even those findings actually 
made, were made after the Medical Panel had acted and thus were 
not available to assist and guide the Panel. 
When the Commission defers it's fact finding authority to 
the medical panel it abdicates it's responsibilities. This is 
what it has done in the present case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN GIVING DEFERENCE 
TO THE MEDICAL REPORT 
In denying the Motion for Review the Industrial Commission 
stated at page 339 of the record: 
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"In cases where medical opinion controverting that 
of the medical panel is submitted, the Commission has 
in the past maintained a fairly consistent practice of 
deferring to the medical panel absent good reason shown 
why the medical panel report is insufficient or 
biased." 
In Rushton v. Gelco Express,. 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1986), the 
Utah Supreme Court ruled there is no presumption in favor of the 
opinions of an applicant's treating physician, stating, at page 
111, that: 
"(S)uch a rule would restrict the fact-finding 
role of the Commission, as that role has been defined 
by statute and case lawf..." 
The Commission's stated policy of giving deference to the 
opinions of the Medical Panel, as opposed to the opinions of an 
injured worker's treating physiciansf is violative of an appli-
cant's right to a fair and impartial hearing. The findings and 
opinions of the medical panel are another source of evidence and 
may not be given more weight or credence than other competent 
medical evidence. 
As stated by the Court in Rushton at page 112: 
"The source of medical opinion, and any potential for 
bias inherent in the sourcef should of course be a 
factor in the process of weighing the evidence, but we 
see no reason for creating a presumption in favor of 
particular evidence."(e.a.) 
The applicant is entitled to a fair and unbiased consider-
ation of all evidence presented. Any thing less is clearly 
violative of the frequent admonitions of this Court that ques-
tions of doubt be resolved in favor of the employee. This Court 
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had been prolific in stating and restating this rule of construc-
tion for the protection of the employee. Kaiser Steel Corporation 
v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981); Mcphie v. Industrial 
Commission^ 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977); Barber Asphalt Corporation 
v. Industrial Commission, 135 P.2d 266 (Utah 1943); Park Utah 
Consol. Mines Co, v. Industrial Commission, 36 P.2d 979 (Utah 
1934); Ogden City v. Industrial Commission, 193 pac, 833 (Utah 
1920); Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 184 Pac. 1020 Utah 
1919). 
Though statements have been made by this Court that "We must 
pay great respect to a panel of medical experts,....", the Court 
has been quick to add that "...they are not the ultimate fact 
finders." See Redman Warehousing Corporation v. Industrial 
Commission. 454 P.2d 283f (Utah 1969) and argument under point 
III herein. 
In any event, however, the substance of such statements an-
ticipates a multiple panel of experts. Where, as here, there is 
only one physician on the medical panel, there can be no valid 
argument in favor granting deference to that single expert over 
the experts actually treating the employee. 
An unfortunate practice has developed in that the Commis-
sion, having had substantial difficulties in finding qualified 
physicians willing to serve on medical panels, has found it 
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necessary to encourage service by granting those, who are willing 
to serve, a deference to sustain their opinions. 
In the present case the medical panel report states: "We 
would not attribute any causative role to any physical work which 
he was doing at the time." This statement is preceded by a brief 
explanation of the mechanics of the cause of a myocardial 
infarction. The report then states that the effective cause of 
an infarct "...usually occurs while the patient is at rest and 
not usually during exertion." (See the medical panel report at 
page 281 of the record.) 
Dr. A. Marie Davidson stated unequivocally that Mr. Olsen's 
myocardial infarction of October 29, 1984 was related to his 
stress and exertion at work and that the second MI was related to 
the first. (See Dr. Davidson's report at page 287 of the record.) 
Dr. Richard R. Heuser was so incensed at the employers insurance 
carrier's denial of the claim he wrote a scathing letter to the 
Insurance Company and noted he was sending a copy to the Insur-
ance Commission (See his letter at page 139 of the record.) 
Where, as here, the medical panel opinion is not only out of 
the mainstream of contemporary medical opinion, but pushes 
upstream against the current of accepted medical thought, a 
substantial doubt is raised concerning the medical panel's 
conclusions. Where, as here, the medical panel chairman is new 
to his responsibilities and expresses doubt as to whether or not 
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he understands the questions to which he responds, the doubts 
raised as to his conclusions are compounded. Such doubts should 
have been resolved in Mr. Olsen's favor. 
The Applicant did not receive the benefit of the doubt as 
required by the numerous mandates of the Utah Courts. Instead 
those doubts were turned against him by an inappropriate prefer-
ence given to the medical panel by the Commission. 
To give deference to a highly suspect medical panel opinion 
the Administrative Law Judge clearly applied the wrong test in 
arriving at his conclusions. In the Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Order at page 306 of the record the ALJ 
stated: 
"The applicant has not sustained his burden of 
proving that his heart condition was medically caused 
by his work activities of October 29, 1984."(e.a.) 
No one claims the pre-existing atherosclerosis was caused by 
Mr. Olsen's work activities. The claim is that this pre-existing 
condition was acted upon by stress of employment thus triggering 
the heart attacks. 
A better statement of the proper test is given by the same 
ALJ in his Order on Remand following the Supreme Court's opinion 
in Price River Coal, supra page 13. (The text of the Order on 
Remand is included in the addendum.) On page three the ALJ 
states: 
"The act does not require that the death of an 
individual be the result of a necessary precipitating 
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factor, rather the Workers Compensation Act would 
appear to only require that the work activity were a 
sufficient precipitating factor resulting in the death 
of the employee•"(e.a.) 
The only real difference between the present case and the 
facts of the Price River Coal case, supra page and the Workers' 
Compensation Fund case, supra page is that in those two cases 
the employees did not survive their heart attacks. Here Mr. 
Olsen survived. Surely survival does not void the claim. 
Deterioration of a condition caused by an Industrial 
accident is also compensable. Mecham v. Industrial Commission, 
692 P.2d 783 (Utah 1984). Mr. Olsen's treating physicians were 
of the opinion that the second MI was related to the first. Dr. 
Heuser stated in his letter of March 12f 1986 (record page 244): 
"All of these medical problems have certainly related to the 
first problem from 1984.H Dr. Davidson states (record page 280): 
"...(T)he second event was directly related, in fact a recur-
rence, of the myocardial infarction that took place October 29, 
1984." 
No one appears to question that Mr. Olsen is permanently, 
totally disabled, and yet Mr. Olsen is denied compensation 
because of deference to a questionable medical panel conclusion 
as opposed to those conclusions of his equally qualified treating 
physicians. 
In the present case there was obvious stress and unusual 
exertion on the job. It was during such stress that symptoms 
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began to appear. Equity would dictate consideration by this 
Court to assure a fair and equitable result. The lapse of time 
between the conclusion of the work in November and the MI is not 
unprecedented. In Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller,, 657 
P.2d 979 (Utah 1983), the heart attack occurred four days after 
the work related stress. One of the considerations was the 
experience of pain during the stress. Here we have the same type 
history with pain developing while walking the conveyor belts on 
the job during periods of excessive hours and stress. 
Granting deference to the opinion of the medical panel 
clearly violates the humane objects of the workers compensation 
statutes so often reiterated by this Court. 
This Court's decision in the case of Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) changed the approach of the 
Courts in defining "accident", it did not change the humane 
objectives of the Worker's Compensation Statutes. 
The Worker's Compensation statutes must be liberally 
construed with the purpose of effectuating its humane objectives. 
In the present case the Commission did not interpret the worker's 
compensation statutes liberally as required. 
Under the Allen decision, in absence of "pre-existing 
conditions,f, any exertion connected with the injury as a matter 
of medical fact is compensable. Where "pre-existing conditions" 
exist the work exertion must be greater than that of nonemploy-
15 
ment life. Mr. Olsen had no pre-existing impairment, only a 
predisposition. Although the term "pre-existing conditions" 
remains to be defined, such definition is not relevant here, 
since the Commission specifically found legal causation. Thus 
only medical causation was at issue. 
The Allen decision did not change the standards of medical 
causation. Earlier cases dealing with pre-existing conditions, 
in both back cases and heart cases, are still relevant. (See for 
example: Miera v. Industrial Commission, 728 P.2d 1023 (Utah 
1986) and Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 
1980)(both back cases) and Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. 
Keller, supra page 15; Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction & Mining 
Corporation, 565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977); Robertson v. Industrial 
Commission,, 163 P.2d 331 (Utah 1945) (All three are heart cases 
and all deal with the issue of stress.) 
The pre-Allen cases have been buttressed by post-Allen cases 
dealing with medical causation. (see Workers' Compensation Fund 
v. Industrial Commission, 761 P.2d 572 (Utah 1988) and Price 
River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d 1079 (Utah 
1986). 
That Worker's Compensation statutes must be liberally 
construed with the purpose of effectuating their humane objects 
is still the law of this State, as that concept has been reiter-
ated in so many Utah decisions. Kaiser Steel Corporation v. 
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Monfredi, supra page 11; Mcphie v. Industrial Commission, supra 
page 11; Maryland Casualty Company v. Industrial Commission, 364 
P.2d 1020 (Utah 1961); Barber Asphalt Corporation v. Industrial 
Commission, supra page 11; Park Utah Consol. Mines Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, supra page 11; Oqden City v. Industrial 
Commission, supra page 11; Chandler v. Industrial Commission,, 
supra page 11. 
Since the Industrial Commission did not interpret the 
Worker's Compensation Statutes liberally so as to effect the 
humane objects of those statutes in the present case, it falls to 
this Court to protect Mr. Olsen's rights and effect those humane 
purposes and objectives. 
In I G A Food Fair v. John N. Martin, 584 P.2d 828 (Utah 
1978) the medical panel concluded thatf though it was "possible" 
the activities at work were a contributing factor, the panel did 
"not feel that there were was any unusual work activities on that 
particular day". In spite of this conclusion by the panel the 
Industrial Commissions finding in favor of the employee was 
upheld by this Court. 
Againf in Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller, supra 
page 15, this Court upheld the Industrial Commission's award of 
benefits based on the opinion of the Applicant's physician 
although in direct conflict with the medical panel. The 
medical panel in "Pittsburgh" felt "the experience was 
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at most a minor stress event and not a substantial contributing 
cause" of the Applicant's Myocardial infarction, while the 
Applicant's physician stated "...(T)here was in fact a causal 
link between the stress event at the Special Events Center and 
the heart attack which occurred 4 days later." The Utah Court 
held, at page 1371: 
"In view of the competent and comprehensive 
medical evidence in the record upon which the Commis-
sion relied in arriving at its conclusions, despite the 
contrary findings of the medical panel, we conclude 
that the Commission's finding that there was a causal 
connection between Mr. Keller's distress in the Special 
Events Center and his subsequent heart attack four days 
later is neither 'arbitrary or capricious' nor 'without 
any substantial evidence to support it. '" 
There is, thus, clear authority to support a finding 
contrary to the medical panel report. 
By giving deference to the medical panel in the present case 
Mr. Olsen was denied his right to a fair and impartial determina-
tion of his claim. This is particularly so where, as here, the 
"medical panel" consisted of one physician, who had apparently 
never served as a medical panel chairman prior to this appoint-
ment, did not understand the questions ask, and stated an opinion 
in direct conflict with the main stream of medical thought. 
A case such as this is not decided in a vacuum. The fact 
finder must bring to bear common knowledge at its command. In 
the circumstances of this case, if any deference is to be given 
at all, it should not be to the medical panel or the treating 
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physicians, for that matter, but to the clearly recognized trends 
of medical thought i.e. that stress is a recognized, contributor 
to heart trauma. 
This medical fact has always been recognized in the Utah 
cases and has in fact been the focal point of almost every heart 
case considered by the Utah Courts. (See, for example the case 
of Price River Coal v. Industrial Commission of Utah, supra page 
16, where the case was remanded for further findings on whether 
or not the deceased had been involved in "extraordinary exertion" 
on the job prior to his death* See also Workers' Compensation 
Fund v. Industrial Commission, supra page 16, where this Court 
upheld benefits on the Commissions findings of specific "work 
related stress factors" without a referral to a medical panel. 
It would be incredible to conclude that Mr. Steward's heart 
attack in Workers' Compensation Fund v. Industrial Commission, 
supra was contributed to by his employment based on one sleepless 
night, 12 hours of driving and a 5 hour layover, and that Mr. 
Mabbutt's heart attack in Price River Coal v. Industrial Commis-
sion
 r supra page 16, was contributed to by his employment based 
upon his one day of agitation and frustration which included 
carrying muck buckets 60 to 70 feet up a 7% grade (the same grade 
Mr. Olsen was required to climb in the present case)(See Order on 
Remand in that case attached in the addendum.), and yet conclude 
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Mr. Olsen's heart attack was not contributed to by his employment 
on the record here before us. 
In such a case and where the Commission gave a presumption 
to the medical panel and applied an improper test to a ques-
tionable medical panel opinion, this Court has the authority to 
rule on the evidence that Mr. Olsen suffered a compensable 
accident on October 29, 1984. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN REOPENING THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY 
ON THE OCTOBER 29, 1984 ACCIDENT 
Section 35-1-78 Utah Code Annotated, as amended grants the 
Industrial Commission continuing jurisdiction of an industrial 
claim. This continuing jurisdiction is not, however, without 
limitations and must be based on changes in circumstances. 
Mollerup Van Lines v. Adams, 398 P. 2d 882 (Utah 1965); Barber 
Asphalt Corporation v. Industrial Commission, supra page 11; 
Ferguson v. Industrial Commission, 221 Pac. 1099 (Utah 1923); 
Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 215 Pac. 1047 (Utah 
1923); Mecham v. Industrial Commission, supra page 14; Buxton v. 
Industrial Commission, 587 P.2d 121 (Utah 1978); Kennecott Copper 
Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 427 P.2d 952 (Utah 1967). 
Only a relatively small number of injuries sustained in 
industry reach the stage of hearing and fact resolution before 
the Industrial Commission. Most injuries are recognized, 
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accepted by the employer's insurance carrier and paid as required 
by the Worker's Compensation Statutes without a hearing. Mr. 
Olsen's first heart attack in October, 1984 was accepted and 
benefits paid, after investigation and evaluation, by his employ-
er's insurance carrier. 
The Employer and It's Insurance Carrier accepted liability 
for Mr. Olsen's October 29, 1984 heart attack. If there had been 
a question, memories were fresh, witnesses were available and Mr. 
Olsen was entitled to a resolution of such questions. No 
questions were raised. The claim was accepted. No change in 
circumstances occurred, nor could they occur, which would bear on 
the issue of liability. The only issue that could be reopened is 
the issue in this case: i.e. Did Mr. Olsen's condition and status 
change. It did, and his treating physicians are of the opinion 
those changes related directly to the original injury and condi-
tion. 
The assumption and payment of liability is tightly control-
led by the Industrial Commission and must fall within the same 
category as a settlement or order. In such circumstances the 
settlement of an existing claim is no different than a stipula-
tion and is an enforceable contract, and where the employer and 
it's insurance carrier have led Mr. Olsen to rely on that 
settlement and the representations of a compensable claim to his 
detriment they are estopped from asserting a position to the 
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contrary. In Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d 170 (Utah 1985), this Court 
said: 
"We have previously stated that [p]arties are 
bound by their stipulations unless relieved therefrom 
by the court, which has the power to set aside a 
stipulation entered into inadvertently or for justifi-
able cause." First of Denver Mortgage Investers v. 
Zundel, Utah, 600 P.2d 521, 527 (1979) It is 
unlikely that a stipulation signed by counsel and filed 
with the court was entered into inadvertently....[or-
dinarily, courts are bound by stipulations between 
parties." 
In the present case it is unlikely that a sophisticated 
insurance company, staffed with qualified and trained adjusters 
and equipped with the latest in modern computer technology which 
had ample time to investigate and evaluate the claim made 
payments inadvertently. 
Each of the three cases cited by the Court of Appeals Olsen 
v. Industrial Commission,, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. (Utah CA 1989) on 
the issue of estoppel, with the questionable exception of Harding 
v. Industrial Commission, 28 P.2d 182 (Utah 1934), is distin-
guishable from the present case. Harding, in turn, cites Taggart 
v. Industrial Commission, 12 P.2d 356 (Utah 1932) which did not 
even deal with the issue in either the present case or the 
Harding case which purported to rely on it, but then rules in a 
manner which would benefit, not defeat, Mr. Olsen's claim. 
Obviously a brief discussion of each of the three cases relied on 
by the Court of Appeals is warranted. 
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To understand the first case of Taggart v. Industrial 
Commission, supra page 22, it is first necessary to discuss 
briefly the case it followed, Hailing v. Industrial Commission, 
71 Utah 112, 263 P. 78 (1927). In Hailing this Court ruled 
simply that the claim of the survivors of an injured employee was 
separate and distinct from the rights of the employee. Thus a 
finding by the commission on application of the employee before 
his death, that he did not suffer a compensable industrial 
accident, was not binding on the survivors. They were, there-
fore, not estopped from filing a claim for death benefits based 
upon the same facts. 
In the Taggart case, supra, Mr. Taggart died April 27, 1931 
from a heart condition brought on by a nose hemorrhage. The 
Commission found no accident and denied benefits to the surviving 
widow. 
The widow claimed that payment of compensation by the 
insurance company for 29 days of temporary total disability 
estopped it from denying liability on the widow's claim. 
The Supreme Court sustained the Commission, citing the 
"doctrine of the case of Hailing v. Industrial Commission." 
supra, as it's only authority. The rule of the case is clearly 
that if the survivors are not bound by a prior unfavorable 
decision, as in Hailing, then the insurance carrier would not be 
bound by a prior favorable decision or, as here, action. The 
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Court did not even reach the issue of whether or not the payments 
would have constituted an estoppel under the facts presented or 
under any facts. 
The principle case relied on by the Court of Appeals was 
Harding v. Industrial, supra page 22. This is only one of the 
three cases, cited in the decision of the Court of Appeals, which 
deals with the question raised in the present case. The ruling 
and decision of the Harding case was that the employee had, in 
fact, been prejudiced by the actions of the insurance carrier and 
the carrier was therefore estopped from denying coverage. It 
thus supports the position put forth by Mr. Olsen herein. 
Harding does indeed say what the Court of Appeals quotes it 
as saying, but cites Taggart v. Industrial Commission,, supra page 
22, as the only Utah authority for the rule and Taggart, as noted 
above does not support that premise. No other Utah case has been 
found, which follows Harding on the issue for which it is cited 
by the Court of Appeals, although one more recent Utah case does 
cite Harding for the position that the insurance company cannot 
deny liability after assuming payments to the insured's pre-
judice. See: Larsen v. Wvcoff, 624 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1981). 
That is the rule of law in the Harding case, not the 
language quoted by the Court of Appeals. After the language 
quoted by the Court of Appeals this Court continues as follows: 
MIt (the insurance carrier), however, cannot by 
its conduct in paying compensation over a long period 
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of time, and after either full investigation or 
opportunity and time for such inquiry, and after the 
claimant's position has changed and rights to which he 
was entitled are lost by lapse of time and the running 
of statutes of limitation, then interpose the defense 
that the policy of insurance did not cover the em-
ployee ." 
Questions as to what constitutes adequate opportunity to 
complete a full investigation, what constitutes a change in the 
employee's position and when his rights are prejudiced were not 
addressed by the Court of Appeals. 
In oar current high tech, computerized society the time 
required for full investigation is minimal and certainly not in 
any way comparable to the time which would have been required 
fifty five years ago when the rule cited by the Court of Appeals 
was gratuitously introduced into our law by the Harding Court. 
These questions clearly need to be decided now in light of 
current realities. 
Those realities now would dictate enforcement of an assump-
tion of liability after ample opportunity for investigation has 
expired. The investigation and evaluation in the present case 
were done with the aid of computers and with the advantages of an 
additional fifty five years of experience since Taggart. 
Prejudice and changed circumstances occurring in reliance on such 
acceptance and payment of claims should be reviewed and the 
result relaxed in a ratio to which the insurance carrier's burden 
has been reduced by modern technology. 
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The third case cited by the Court of Appeals, Crow v. 
Industrial Commission, 140 P.2d 321 (Utah 1943) is also not in 
point and easily distinguishable from the issues of the present 
case. In Crow the argument was that payment of temporary total 
disability estopped the insurance carrier from denying permanent 
total disability. There was no denial of coveragef accident or 
causation. The only issue was whether or not at the time of the 
denial of benefits and at the hearing, Mr. Crow was permanently 
totally disabled. All evidence and witnesses needed to prove or 
disprove that question were there and available at the time of 
hearing. There was no prejudice, nor could there be. The point 
was so clear to the Crow Court that it did not even cite an 
authority to support it's conclusion on that issue. 
There is thus no support in Utah law for the position of the 
Court of Appeals except for Harding v. Industrial Commission, 
supra page 22, and that case isf itself unsupportedf weak at 
best and outdated in the extreme. This Court should certainly 
undertake a clarification of the applicable rules of law and 
their application to cases where, as here, the insurance carrier 
has had ample time to complete investigation and continues to 
accept liability and make payments to the employee's ultimate 
prejudice. 
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POINT III 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN ABDICATING ITS RESPONSIBILITIES 
TO THE MEDICAL PANEL 
At the time of this accidentf section 35-1-85, Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended read as follows: 
"After each formal hearingf it shall be the duty 
of the commission to make findings of fact and con-
clusions of law in writing and file the same with its 
secretary." 
This section confers upon the "Industrial Commission both 
the responsibility and the prerogative" as fact finder- See 
Shipley v. C & W Contracting Company, 528 P.2d 153 (Utah 1974). 
This Court has often reaffirmed this rule of law. In I G A 
Food Fair v. John N. Martin, supra page 17, this Court said: 
"Concerning the medical panel report this is to be 
said: The panel of course performs an important 
function in giving the Commission the benefit of its 
diagnosis relating to those matters that are par-
ticularly within the scope of its expertise. But that 
is the extent of its prerogative. The final respon-
sibility of making the decision as to the issues in 
such a proceeding is given to the Commission." 
The Commission is clearly the final fact finder and cannot 
abdicate that responsibility to the medical panel. The Commis-
sion has the responsibility of applying the law to the facts, as 
found by it and not by the medical panel. see also, Price River 
Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra page 16. 
The natural result of this rule of law is that the Commis-
sion must submit the issue of medical causation to the medical 
panel on the basis of the facts as found by the Commission. 
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In the present case the Commission followed its regular 
practice of submitting the matter to the medical panel with a 
"summary of testimony", but no findings of fact were made and 
provided to the panel to control or guide the panel's actions. 
As is the Commission's practice, no findings were made until 
after the medical panel report was received. 
Under the Allen decision, supra page 15, a finding of legal 
causation must be made before the case goes to the medical panel. 
Other issues of fact must also be determined. It is, for 
example, the responsibility of the Administrative Law Judge to 
determine the veracity of the witnesses. Thus any issue on which 
there is a variance of evidence must be resolved before submis-
sion to the medical panel. To do otherwise leaves the medical 
panel open to judge the veracity of the witnesses and to make its 
own underlying findings of fact. This is clearly an abdication 
of the Industrial Commission's responsibilities to the medical 
panel. 
In the Price River Coal Co case, supra page 16, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
"It is not the role of the medical panel to 
resolve conflicts in the factual evidence regarding the 
injured party's activities. Section 35-1-85 of the 
Code places that responsibility solely on the Commis-
sion. U.C.A. 35-1-85 (1974 ed.). Under Allen, as 
before, the medical panel is only to take the facts as 
found by the administrative law judge and consider them 
in light of its medical expertise to assist the 
administrative law judge in deciding whether medical 
cause has been proven. The medical panel strays beyond 
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its province when it attempts to resolve factual 
disputes, and the administrative law judge improperly 
abdicates his function if he permits the panel to so 
act. IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 830 (Utah 
1978) ." 
See also Redman Warehousing Corporation v. Industrial Commission. 
supra , page 11. 
Without findings of fact to guide the medical panel, the 
panel willf by nature, stray into the role of fact finder. In 
the present case where the panel was given a presumption over the 
treating physicians the harm is greater yet. 
There should be no question but that Mr. Olsen is entitled 
to an order for permanent, total disability or, at least, to a 
reconsideration of his claim under appropriate guidelines. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission abdicated it's responsibilities to the 
medical panel and compounded that error by giving deference to 
the medical panel report. In doing so they failed to resolve 
obvious doubt in favor of Mr. Olsen so as to meet the humane 
objectives of the Workers Compensation Statutes. Both myocardial 
infarctions were compensable industrial accidents. The first was 
accepted as such and liability if fixed. Mr. Olsen is entitled 
to permanent total disability benefits under the law. The case 
should be remanded with instructions to enter an award for 
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permanent total disability benefits and medical payments on 
behalf of Mr. Olsen. 
j £ y ^ Meservy 
HJLtt6rn< orney for Petitioner 
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I cannot subscribe to the doctrine that just because one 
may be a party or interested in a matter he thereby loses 
his manhood and character in regard thereto. I think the 
word of a man of character, even though he be interested, 
is worth more than the word of a weakling, a "wishy wash" 
an unstable or unmoral person who happens to be, or ap-
pears to be, disinterested. I do not subscribe to the doctrine 
that all men suck eggs, but some hide the shells. I therefore 
dissent. 
MOFFAT, Justice (concurring). 
I concur in the fact solution contained in the dissenting 
opinion of Mr. Justice LARSON. 
CROW v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. 
No. 6452. Decided August 11, 1943. (140 P. 2d 321.) 
1. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Insurance carrier, which voluntarily 
paid medical and hospital expenses of injured employee and paid 
weekly sum to the employee for period of six years from date of 
accident, was not thereby "estopped" from claiming that the em-
ployee was not totally and permanently disabled, since employee 
did not change his position or relinquish any right in reliance on 
the payments. 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, for all other 
definitions of "Estop." 
2. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Evidence, including medical testi-
mony, sustained award denying further compensation to injured 
employee on ground that employee was not totally and perma-
nently disabled. 
3. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Where only member of Industrial 
Commission who heard testimony, which was sharply conflicting, 
and observed witnesses, did not participate in decision because he 
ceased to act as member of commission, failure of record to dis-
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close that such member made findings, either written or oral, 
making his opinion of evidence available to commission, required 
reversal of decision denying compensation, on ground that "full 
hearing" was not accorded to employee. 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, for all other 
definitions of "Full Hearing." 
MOFFAT and LARSON, JJ., dissenting in part. 
See 71 Workmen's Compensation Acts, sec. 1246; 28 R. C. L. 826 
(8 Perm. Supp. 6250). 
Original proceeding by Claude Crow, employee, against 
the Industrial Commission of Utah and others to obtain 
review of an order of the Commission in favor of defendant 
H. M. Robinson, employer, and the State Insurance Fund, 
insurance carrier. 
Order of the Commission reversed and cause remanded 
for rehearing. 
O. W. Moyle, of Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Grover A. Giles, Atty. Gen., Zar E. Hayes, Deputy Atty. 
Gen., and F. A. Trottier, of Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
WADE, Justice. 
On March 24, 1935, applicant Claude Crow, while work-
ing as a tool dresser on a drilling rig for H. M. Robinson 
at Tooele County, Utah, suffered an injury to his back while 
lifting heavy machinery with a crowbar. He was unable 
to continue work and shortly thereafter he was brought 
to Salt Lake City, where he was hospitalized a number of 
times and has been under medical care most of the time up-
to the date of the hearing. At the time of the hearing he 
had not returned to work nor had he performed any services 
for remuneration. The State Insurance Fund was the in-
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surance carrier and it, apparently without any decision of 
the Industrial Commission, voluntarily paid the medical 
and hospital expenses and $16 per week to applicant for a 
period of six years from the date of accident. At the end 
of that time the State Insurance Fund took the position 
that applicant was not totally and permanently disabled 
and discontinued the payments and at applicant's request 
the Industrial Commission granted a hearing thereon. 
The matter was heard on June 19, 1941. Frank A. Jugler 
was the only commissioner who attended the hearing. On 
June 30, 1941, Commissioner Jugler ceased to act as a 
member of the Commission and did not participate m the 
decision. The Commission rendered its decision on August 
14, 1941, denying further compensation on the ground tliat 
applicant was not totally and permanently disabled and 
applicant brings the matter to this court. 
Defendants were clearly not estopped from claiming that 
applicant was not totally and permanently disabled by rea-
son of having paid $16 per week for six years because he 
did not change his position or relinquish any right in reli-
ance thereon. Also the Commission having made no 
previous decision the question of whether it can 1 
change a former decision without a showing of a 
change of condition is not involved in this case. Admittedly 
applicant's disability, to the extent that he was disabled 
at the time of the hearing is permanent. The evidence tends 
to show that he will probably get worse but there was no 
evidence that he will get better. 
The only question on the proof is whether there was sub-
stantial evidence from which the commission could reason-
ably find that the applicant was not totally disabled There 
was testimony to the effect that applicant had suf-
fered only a bodily functional disability of from 25% 2 
to 30% and it is argued that he was therefore not to-
tally disabled. This does not necessarily follow. The fact that 
a man's back retains 75% of its normal functions does not 
prove that he has the strength or endurance to do 75% of 
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a days work. A person may retain all the normal bodily 
functions of his organs and still be so weak or be in such 
pain that he would be totally disabled from obtaining re-
munerative employment. He may also be physically able 
to do certain kinds of work and still be unable to obtain 
such employment on account of lack of training or skill 
in such fields. In either of these events he would be totally 
disabled. 
The testimony here went much further than merely to 
show applicant's lack of functional disability. Three doctors 
testified that in their opinion he is able to perform ordinary 
manual labor, specifically mentioning carpenter work, farm-
ing, plowing and harrowing and digging with pick and 
shovel in mines. They did concede, however, that he could 
not do the most heavy lifting or the most difficult labor. 
From the kind of work these doctors testified he could do, 
they clearly indicated that they did not agree with appli-
cant's description of his condition nor with the description 
of his condition given by the doctors who testitfied in his 
favor. If he is capable of doing this kind of work then he 
would have no trouble in obtaining remunerative employ-
ment, and he is not totally disabled. The evidence was 
therefore sufficient from which the commission could have 
reasonably so found. 
This case, however, must be reversed for another reason. 
Commissioner Jugler, the only commissioner who heard 
the evidence and saw the demeanor of the witnesses while 
testifying did not participate in the decision, and as far 
as the record discloses, he made no findings, either written 
or oral which made his opinion of the evidence available 
to the commisison in making its decision. Where, as in this 
case, the evidence is not entirely documentary, and there is 
a sharp conflict in the evidence, the credibility or lack 
thereof, of the witnesess is of paramount importance. Only 
a person who actually hears and sees a witness while testi-
fying is in a position to determine the weight or credibility 
which should be given to such testimony. The opinion of 
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such a person is a necessary factor in making any findings 
of fact. The situation is analogous to that of a judge who 
has tried a case, sitting without a jury, and whose office 
is either terminated or he resigns or dies before he has 
made findings of fact and conclusions of law. As stated 
in Case V. Fox et al, 138 Or. 453, 7 P. 2d 267, page 268, 
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 * * * we can readily perceive that a successor to a trial judge 
who was removed by death before he had announced any findings of 
fact, or had in any other manner pronounced judgment upon the 
cause, could not render findings of fact * • *" 
the reason being that the issue presented requires a weigh-
ing of testimony. See also, Labont V. Lacasse, 78 N. H. 
489,102 A. 540; McAllen v. Sauza, 24 CaL 2d 247, 74 P. 2d 
853; Bahnsen V. Gilbert, 55 Minn. 334, 56 N. W. 1117. 
There is a conflict in the authorities as to the power of 
a judge other than the one who tries the case to render 
a judgment or make a decision thereon. 30 Am. Jur. 750, 
Sec. 38. 
Where there is a conflict in the testimony, and the weight 
and credibility to be given testimony of the various wit-
nesses is the determining factor, in order to accord a "full 
hearing" to which all litigants are entitled, the person who 
conducts the hearing, hears the testimony, and sees 
the witnesses while testifying, whether a member of 3 
the board, or an examiner or referee, must either 
participate in the decision, or where, at the time the decision 
is rendered, he has severed his connections with the board, 
commission or fact finding body, the record must show 
affirmatively that the one who finds the facts had access 
to the benefit of his findings, conclusions and impressions 
of such testimony, by either written or oral reports thereof. 
This does not necessarily require that all of the commisison-
ers must be present at the hearing, or even that the one 
hearing the evidence must concur in the result, but his 
opinion on the testimony must be available to the commis-
sion in making its decision. This is in harmony with the 
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law on this subject regarding commission and quasi-judi-
cial triers of fact in the Federal Courts. See 1 Vom Bauer's 
Federal Administrative Law, 318 to 322, section 310 to 313; 
United States ex rel. Ohm v. Perkins, 2 Cir., 79 F. 2d 533; 
United States v. Nugent, 6 Cir., 100 F. 2d 215; Morgan V. 
United States, 1936, 298 U. S. 468, 80 L. Ed. 1288, 56 S. Ct. 
906; Id., 1938, 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 82 L. Ed. 1129. 
The showing here does not meet these requirements and 
the case is therefore reversed and remanded for a rehear-
ing, with costs to applicant. 
McDONOUGH, J., concurs. 
WOLFE, Chief Justice (concurring specially). 
It was contended by the plaintiff that the Commission 
was estopped from holding that he was not totally disabled 
from securing and retaining remunerative employment by 
reason of the State Fund having paid disability benefits 
to him for the six years period subsequent to his injury 
especially in view of the fact that there had been no im-
provement. 
The insurance Carrier is not "estopped" by its payment 
of compensation. It does not pay at the peril of admitting 
the extent or duration of the disability. I t is not 
estopped hecause the applicant has not acted to his 1 
detriment in reliance on its action. Its action in pay-
ing compensation as if the disability were total for an in-
definite period without requiring applicant to have it found 
by the Commisison as total is all for the applicant's benefit. 
To hold otherwise would discourage a practice highly bene-
ficial to all parties. 
It does not appear anywhere in the record that the In-
dustrial Commission made any finding as to the extent or 
duration of applicant's disability until August 14, 1941.. 
On that date the Commission found that Crow was not 
totally and permanently disabled. Therefore, there is in 
this case no question of the Commission's having made a 
/ 
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finding or an award prior to August 14, 1941, to the effect 
that the applicant was totally or permanently disabled, 
which it could not change except on change of condition. 
The fact seems to be that the State Insurance Fund, as is 
the practice of many insurance companies, simply paid the 
employee $16.00 per week because it concluded he was 
totally disabled, but by so doing for an indefinite time it 
did not admit that his condition was one of permanent 
total disability. Every now and then it had a physician 
examine the man and report to it on his condition. This 
of course is a wise practice because it leaves the matter 
of determining the extent and duration of the employee's 
disability open for future finding. Meanwhile the injured 
person is paid $16 per wek. If the insurance carrier could 
not pay for an indefinite time in order to see if there would 
be an improvement both as to extent and as to duration 
but must seek at once to have determined the extent if not 
duration of his disability, much hardship and injustice 
might ensue to the applicant or to the carrier. The Com-
mission would have to hazard a guess and once it committed 
it would be subject to the objection that it could not alter 
its award unless the conditions changed. In cases where 
there is a disability partial or total in extent for an indef-
inite time it is better if the matter be left for future deter-
mination as long as the party is receiving'compensation 
for the support of his family. 
I am in accord with the statement of the prevailing opin-
ion that the person who conducted the hearing, whether a 
member of the body which must eventually act or not, should 
convey his conclusions to the members of the body who did 
not participate in the hearing in the form of tenta-
tive findings or by consultation while he is connected 3 
with the commisison, board or official whose duty it 
is to act. My doubt arises on the question of whether the 
record should affirmatively show such was the case where 
the record showed that the member or examiner who con-
ducted the hearing had severed his connection with the 
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body for whom he had so acted between the time of hear-
ing and the ultimate handing down of the decision or 
whether it should not be presumed that he had deliberated 
with the members of the body before his departure. I do 
not deem it a matter of great importance because it would 
be only occasionally that an off-going member of a com-
mission or board or an examiner or referee with authority 
to hear witnesses for such body would depart before the 
decision was handed down or without making tentative 
findings. It may in this special case, in order to assure 
the reviewing tribunal that a "full hearing" was had, be 
salutary to require the record to show the fact of communis 
cation of the examiner's conclusions before his departure. 
But by so saying I do not mean to imply that administra^ 
tive conferences or deliberations of the administrators or 
their mental processes can be inquired into to ascertain, 
whether they accorded a fair hearing or due consideration 
to the questions presented. That can no more be inquired 
into than the deliberations or mental processes of jurymen* 
See 36 Columbia Law Review, 1156. In Cunnard S. S. Co. 
v. Elting, 2 Cir., 1938, 97 F. 2d 373, 376, it was contended 
that an order made by the assistant secretary of labor was 
illegal because no proof was adduced that he had considered 
the evidence upon which his order purportedly rested. But 
the court said that there was no proof that he had not done 
so; 
"on the contrary, there is a presumption that he did his duty. In the 
absence of evidence to the contrary that is sufficient." 
The point decided in the opinion of Mr. Justice WADE 
is confined to the narrow question of whether the record 
should reveal whether those responsible for deciding?* 
case who have not heard the evidence have been given t ic 
benefit of the observations and conclusions of the person 
who did conduct it where it appears that such person sW 
ered his connection with the agency before the decision will 
rendered. 
JL 
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I see no necessity of comparing it to the case where a 
judge hears the evidence and dies or resigns before making 
findings which reveal his conclusions. That touches the 
much larger point as to whether a hearer must be a decider. 
I call attention to the part 2 of Chap. VIII, dealing with 
the subject of "Fair Hearing" contained in Professor Gell-
horn's excellent case book on Administrative Law. The 
subdivision poses the question: "Must the One Who Hears 
Be the One Who Decides, or May One Person Receive and 
Another Consider the Evidence?" The comments of Pro-
fessor Gellhorn, in the light of his unique opportunity as 
Director of the Attorney General's Committee on Adminis-
trative Procedure, to view the entire field of Federal Ad-
ministrative Procedure and in the light of his intensive 
studies in the field of Administrative Law, are most valu-
able. He states: 
"Of course it is a commonplace that most administrative agencies 
of importance, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Com-
mission, the United States Maritime Commission, and the like (and 
their state counterparts) do not see the witnesses in matters coming 
before them. Their hearings are ordinarily conducted by trial ex-
aminers or other presiding officers, who have no power to find the 
facts finally and who sometimes are not even called upon to make 
recommendations to their superiors. Whatever may be the desirability 
of the procedure, there is no real doubt of its validity, for administra-
tion would come to a virtual standstill if the heads of governmental 
agencies were themselves required to preside at every hearing to re-
ceive testimony. 
"In the light of this observation [United State* v. Nugent} 6 Cir., 
1938,100 P. 2d 215, certiorari denied, 1939, Fidelity & Columbia Trust 
Co. v. United States, 306 U. S. 648, 59 S. Ct 591, 83 L. Ed. 1046, be-
comes an interesting case to note. That case involved a suit against 
the United States under the Tucker Act [28 U* S. C. A. § 764] as 
amended* The trial judge had resigned after the trial, without having 
announced a decision. The case was thereupon referred to another 
judge, who entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon the 
government's appeal, it was held that this was improper, since the 
successor judge did not hear the testimony, butf relied solely upon his 
consideration of the briefs of the parties and the transcript of the 
evidence taken on their behalf. The decision to this effect rested largely 
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upon the court's belief that the statute impliedly forbade the course 
pursued by the successor judge. When the plaintiff petitioned the 
Supreme Court for writ of certiorari, the Government opposed the 
petition. It supported the judgment below by an argument based on 
no narrow statutory ground, but on the broad proposition that This 
rule is of the utmost importance, because only the trier of facts, be 
it judge or the jury, can observe and consider the opportunity of the 
witness for knowledge, the intelligence of the witness and his conduct 
on the stand, the probability or improbability of his statements, preju-
dice or interest, corroboration, and facts and circumstances reflecting 
on his credibility, as well as his relationship to the parties.' (Brief 
for the United States in Opposition, No. 658, Oct. Term, 1938, p. 7.) 
On the face of it the Government seems to have wiped from its mem-
ory the practice of judges to refer cases to special masters and referees. 
[However, statutes usually require special masters and referees to 
file with the court, reports, findings or recommendations] for the 
purpose of taking testimony in cases which only the judges can decide; 
moreover, it seems to have put itself in the anomalous position of say-
ing that a Federal district judge cannot effectively find facts unless 
he saw the witnesses, whereas it has argued before and since that an 
administrative officer may do so with so great effectiveness that re-
viewing courts must accord much weight to his conclusions. Perhaps' 
the most charitable view is that the case was not considered to be very' 
important at the time, and someone was asleep at the switch in the 
Solicitor General's office when the brief passed through on its way 
to the Supreme Court. ; 
"Be that as it may, there are a number of instances of judicial dis^ 
approval of fact-finding by a judge who did not himself preside at: 
the trial. But such cases seem on the whole to express an aspiration' 
not likely to be achieved in an administrative process which also takes 
into account the aspirations of speed and flexibility." ''"?^  
• • • • ' * J 
Another quotation is from the case of Farran v. Curti* 
Pub. Co., 1923, 276 Pa. 553, 120 A. 544, 546. It deals &s^ 
pecially with a compensation award. The quotation f ollows[»i 
"The opinion of the workmen's compensation board was written by? 
a member who did not sit at the hearing. Said the court This practice,' 
while not ground for reversal, is not commended. When facts are rei 
quired to be found, and such is the case in all proceedings of this chirr 
acter, it is especially advisable that the commissioner who presides -a# 
the hearing and sees the witnesses and hears them testify should find? 
the facts. He is much better fitted to give proper effect to the tes t$ 
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mony than one who has before him merely the typewritten copy of the 
evidence/ " 
It must be admitted that the nature of the hearings of 
the Industrial Commission in determining compensation 
claims is judicial rather than legislative or executive. An 
award is a money judgment. It involves an adversary pro-
ceeding where the right of cross-examination is valuable. 
Procedure in administrative agencies must be fashioned to 
best perform the job required by the legislature. Procedures 
must therefore necessarily vary according to the type of 
function to be performed, the practical exigencies of the 
task and the nature of the purpose for which the agency 
is designed. See "Requirement of Opportunity to be Heard 
in the Administrative Process"—Kenneth C. Davis, 51 Yale 
Law Journal, May 1942, p. 1093. Is the function investiga-
tory or adversarial in nature? Is its primary purpose to 
find facts and make a report, or is it to regulate or super-
vise business or industrial activity, or to police or control 
such activities (which means ferreting out abuses and bad 
practices and requiring them to cease as well as making 
rules for their prevention or constructive guidance), or to 
license businesses, professions, or occupations, or to inquire 
into rates and charges and fix the same at reasonable levels 
or a mixture or combination of these purposes? Certainly 
the type of procedure in investigating and fixing a mini-
mum wage for women must necessarily differ from that 
of determining a claim for compensation. There is a ten-
dency to think that there is and should be one type of pro-
cedure and review for all administrative agencies. This is 
a great mistake founded on insufficient understanding of 
the field of administrative law. The approach to the prob-
lem is well stated by Mr. A. H. Feller in his article entitled 
"Administrative Procedure and the Public Interest—The 
Results of Due Process," 25 Washington University Law 
Quarterly, April 1940, p. 308, as contained in 1940 C. C. H„ 
Legal Periodical Digest 3548 where it is said: 
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"In considering administrative procedure, we should try to isolate 
and eliminate the element of current political controversy; we should 
leave behind our sympathy with or antipathy to this or that particular 
statute; we should put behind our sympathies or antipathies with re-
gard to government regulation of business as a general problem; and 
we should exclude from discussion the issue of the choice between 
court or commission for purposes of regulation. Having put aside 
these considerations, the question for discussion is this: How can 
administrative procedure best be adapted to the efficient dispatch of 
public business entrusted to an agency without the impairment of 
essential private rights?" 
See also "A Full Hearing Before Administrative Agen-
cies/' by Warren H. Wagner, in 5 I. C. C. Practitioner's 
Journal—June 1938, pp. 422-434. 
Both this latter article and that of Mr. Feller's were 
prompted by the first and second Morgan cases. Morgan 
V. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 912, 80 L. Ed. 
1288, and Morgan V. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 
773, 82 L. Ed. 1129. These two cases stimulated critical 
articles in many of the law journals of the nation. See 
A. H. Feller "Prospectives for the Further Study of Fed-
eral Administrative Law" (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 647; Kath-
ryn Pearlman "Effect of the Morgan Decisions on the Posi-
tion of the Trial Examiner." 10 George Washington Law 
Review, Nov. 1941, p. 43-62; also case notes in 12 Wis. 
L. R. 245 and 36 Columbia L. R. 1156. But all the conster-
nation raised by the Morgan decisions should not blind 
us to the fact that it was not there held that he who listens 
to the evidence must decide the case. It was said "the one 
who decides must hear," but it was further held that "to 
hear" as used in the statute means that the deciding officer 
must address himself to the evidence and the argument and 
that the argument may be written. Said Mr. Chief Justice 
Hughes in the first Morgan case: 
"This necessary rule [the one who decides must hear] does not pre~ 
dude practicable administrative procedure in obtaining the aid of 
assistants in the department. Assistants may prosecute inquiries. 
Evidence may be taken by an examiner. Evidence thus taken may be 
Jb 
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sifted and analyzed by competent subordinates. Argument may be 
oral or written. The requirements are not technical. But there must 
be a hearing in a substantial sense. And to give the substance of a 
hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evi-
dence, the officer who makes the determinations must consider and 
appraise the evidence which justifies them." 
The upshot of the matter is that even where the Admin-
istrative Agency is performing functions in their nature 
judicial, as is the case in hearing compensation claims, the 
requirements of due process do not require that he who 
conducts the hearing must make or participate in the deci-
sion. It is not analogous to the situation where a judge 
dies or resigns after hearing the evidence but before regis-
tering his conclusions. There is usually continuity of per-
sonnel on Administrative Agencies even though there may 
be rotation in office. What is required to satisfy the de-
mands of due process, that is, of a full or fair hearing, is 
that he who observes the witness and listens to the evidence 
must transmit his observations or conclusions to those oth-
ers who, whether they are superiors or associate members 
of the same agency, are to decide and this may be done in 
the form of tentative findings or by a report or recom-
mendations or orally in conference. And ordinarily where 
the examiner is still connected with the agency at the time 
it renders its decision it will be presumed that he has com-
municated his observations and conclusions to the body 
which employs him or of which he is a part but where he 
has, shortly after the hearing and before decision is handed 
down, severed his connection with the- agency, I see no 
objection to requiring that the record show that the re-
maining or new members who are to make the decision 
have had the actual benefit of his impressions and con-
clusions, and especially is this desirable where, as in the 
instant case, the outcome depends on non-documentary evi-
dence which is in sharp conflict. 
While the Commission in this case might well, without 
any strain of conscience and in view of the humane pur-
7?^ 
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poses of the Act, have found the applicant totally and 
permanently disabled for the rest of his life in view of 
his very unfortunate condition, it did not do so. Sec. 42-1-
63, U. C. A. 1943, makes certain losses, in law, total per-
manent disability. Then there is a zone in which the dis-
abilities may be total and permanent in fact although not 
made so by statute. In this zone the Commission must 
determine whether the loss is permanent and if so, its ex-
tent. And this means that it may have to decide that it 
is not permanent and total, that it does not run to totality 
but is only partial. Starting from the other side, under 
Sec. 42-1-62 there are certain disabilities named in law as 
partial permanent disabilities. Under the same section there 
is an added zone of disabilities partial in extent and per-
manent in duration which are not specifically made so in 
law. Within this zone the commission must determine the 
extent of the permanent disability and grant compensa-
tion. But here again its investigation may lead it to con-
clude that the disability is permanent and total. Some-
where these zones of total and partial disability approach 
each other to a point where they meet. That is, starting 
the determination under either Sec. 42-1-63 or 42-1-62 what 
was claimed to be a permanent total may be found to be 
a permanent partial and what was claimed to be a perma-
nent partial may be found to be so much "partial" as to be 
total, if we may use an apparent contradiction in terms 
in order to dramatize the difficulties at the border line 
between total and partial. It is in this twilight zone that 
easels very nearly the same may be in one instance judged 
by the commission as partial although in fact on the border-
line of total, while in the other instance practically the 
same kind of case may be judged as total although also on 
the borderline. Within this twilight zone where disabilities 
admittedly permanent in duration are so near the border-j 
line that they may on the evidence be determined either as, 
partial or total, it is very difficult to be consistent. It is 
unfortunate that the legislature did not provide for life-
y^ 
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long compensation for some permanent disabilities which 
could still be considered partial in extent although near 
the line of totality. But it did not do so. Consequently, 
wherever there is substantial evidence to support the find-
ings of the commission we should not overturn it. We only 
heighten the difficulty of its task because we pick out one 
case from the pattern which it may have formed from 
examining many cases. Perhaps the Commission may ac-
complish it by giving the applicant the benefit of the doubt. 
In this case there is evidence that the applicant was not 
totally disabled. I wish I could say there was no 
such evidence but I cannot. I must, therefore, in 2 
that regard concur with the main opinion because I 
think the law compels us to uphold the commission's deci-
sion as being supported by the evidence. 
LARSON, Justice (dissenting in part). 
I concur in the order of reversal. I dissent from the 
holding that the evidence sustains a finding that applicant 
is not totally disabled. 
MOFFAT, Justice (dissenting in part). 
Concurring in the result, otherwise dissenting. I can-
not agree that the cause should be reversed upon the ground 
of the failure of one of the commissioners who heard the 
testimony to participate or make findings. If the nonpar-
ticipating commissioner had made findings contrary to what 
the other two commissioners found from the record the 
cause could not have been either affirmed or reversed 
because of such disagreement. 
Upon the question of total disability I state the facts 
and draw the following conclusion: Claude Crow was work-
ing for H. M. Robinson in Tooele County, Utah. He was 
injured by accident arising out of or in the course of his 
employment. No question is raised as to that. At the time 
of the accidental injury his work was that of a tool-dresser 
in connection with a well drilling operation. He had assisted 
V 
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in lifting a large heavy metal bit. He felt a pain in his back. 
Later the same day he jerked or jarred his back while try-
ing with a crowbar to lift a pipe. Later he was lifting on 
a barrel partly filled with gasoline, his foot slipped and 
he fell. He spoke of the injury but finished his shift before 
going to bed. He was unable to work thereafter. He stayed 
at the camp for a time, then with attendant pain drove his 
car to his home in Salt Lake City. He saw a doctor and 
was placed in a hospital where he remained for some 
months. 
Application was made for woikmen's compensation. The 
State Insurance Fund, the insurance carrier, paid compen-
sation, for total temporary disability, for a period of about 
six years, or until March 15, 1941. Mr. Crow then applied 
to the Industrial Commisison for a hearing upon the ground 
he was totally and permanently disabled as a result of the 
injuries sustained and upon which he had been paid com-
pensation, and requested an award for total permanent 
disability. 
After a hearing, the Commission on August 14, 1941, 
found that he was not totally and permanently disabled 
and denied further compensation. There are two items 
involved. They are: (1) Is the conclusion of the Industrial 
Commission that plaintiff is not totally and permanently 
disabled contrary to the uncontradicted substantial evi-
dence? And (2) is he permanently disabled? 
The answer to the second question must be yes. It is not 
necessary to cite authorities or assemble reasons for that 
answer, except to say that all the testimony makes that 
fact certain, as permanent disability is presently used and 
understood. What is regarded as permanent now, may at 
a future time prove not to be so. Hope remains while life 
remains. "Permanent," as applied to the industrial func* 
tioning of a human being, is not thought of as the pennant 
ency of the everlasting hills. The record discloses that the 
applicant's condition will become progressively worse until 
death overtakes him. There is no difference in the expert 
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opinions on that matter. This leads to question (1), Is 
he totally disabled? 
At the time of the hearing, Crow was about forty-one 
years of age. He was born and raised on a farm, doing 
general farm work. Before going to work for Mr. Robin-
son, he had done cement work, dug basements, worked on 
a rock crusher, and at a service station for about a year. 
His work on the well drilling machine for Mr. Robinson was 
strenuous, physical work. He had a common school educa-
tion; his occupational effort was limited. He had no train-
ing in any field outside that of physical effort. This consti-
tuted his earning resource. He worked steadily until the 
time of the injury. He has not worked since. He has not 
applied for work, as he was told by his doctors to be quiet 
and not cause any strain to his back. He suffers constant 
pain in the lower sacro-iliac region. He wears a cast con-
stantly and has done so since the termination of hospital-
ization at the time of the injury. When he attempts to go 
without his cast his pain increases and his condition be-
comes worse; after walking three or four blocks he is "all 
in"; at times he is forced to go to bed for two or three days 
at a time; these attacks occur two or three times a month; 
he does not sleep normally; he cannot without increasing 
pain sit in one position for any considerable length of time; 
he must change position to ease discomfort; he has no more 
use of his back than immediately after his injury and less 
use of his hands and arms; he is constantly under doctor's 
care. He has arthritis and whether it arose from the in-
jury does not appear. This is his uncontradicted testimony. 
The Commission found the plaintiff was capable of doing 
light work, and "that he is not prevented from securing 
and retaining employment because of his injuries and is 
therefore not totally and permanently disabled." It will be 
noted the decision is negative and includes both permanent 
disability and total disability. 
Three doctors, the plaintiff and his wife testified to facts 
and conclusions indicating total unfitness of plaintiff for 
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participation in any industrial activity. Added to this is 
the former finding of the Commission of total disability 
and the undisputed evidence that plaintiff's condition is 
and will become progressively worse. Three other doctors 
testified as to percentages of disability without definitely 
referring to any specific functional disability, and gave 
approximations varying from 25 per cent to 35 per cent. 
Two of them gave instances of work being done by indi-
viduals having similar disability, but in fields for which 
plaintiff has no experience or training. The estimated per-
centage of functional disability, in the abstract sense, upon 
opinion evidence of functional incapacity of a body member 
such as an arm or leg, differs in the medical testimony and 
does not raise a conflict in the testimony upon the basic 
question of industrial disability. Caillet v. Industrial Com-
mission, 90 Utah 8, 58 P. 2d 760. 
Functional disability may be a problem for expert med-
ical opinion. Industrial disability is the problem of industry. 
It is a practical industrial problem. Doctors may testify 
as to the economic fitness or ability of a person to perform 
certain functions when qualified as to the functions re-
quired to be performed as related to the functional powers 
of the body members called upon to perform such func-
tions. A statement of a percentage of disability in general 
terms adds little upon which to base a determination of 
disability, permanent, partial or total. 
Presumptively the normal individual is the base from 
which a percentage of functional disability is calculated jfl 
general. That a person can do something functionally does 
not require a negative finding that he is "not totally, and 
permanently disabled." The limit of two hundred weeka 
applies to permanent partial disability and not to perma-
nent total disability. Silver King Coalition Mines Co. % 
Industrial Commission, 92 Utah 511, 69 P. 2d 608. 
Total disability may be permanent or temporary, WiiJ 
permanent disability may be partial or total. 
"It is a matter of common knowledge that a person may be pennflp 
nently and totally disabled, even though he retains his hands, anfl*i 
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feet, legs, and eyes. * * * No one who is permanently and totally 
disabled is expressly excluded from the benefits" 
of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 74 Utah 
103, 277 P. 206, 211. This must mean industrially disabled, 
and may not be taken out of the industrial field upon an 
opinion of certain functional percentages that still remain. 
A disability that may be overcome by a reasonable effort 
is not permanent, and it is the duty of the injured person 
to exert a reasonable effort to overcome the injury and 
prepare himself for some remunerative employment. Utah 
Fuel Co. V. Industrial Commission, 76 Utah 141, 287 P. 931; 
Caillet v. Industrial Commission, supra. Sec. 42-1-62, U. C 
A. 1943, recognizes a "partial disability" and a "total dis-
ability." Sec. 42-1-63 provides for "permanent total dis-
ability." Sec. 42-1-62, after specific provisions and fixing 
of times for permanent or partial disability, provides for 
compensation for "the loss of bodily function not otherwise 
provided for" and for 
"such period of compensation as the commission shall deem equitable 
and in proportion to fompensation in other cases, not exceeding two 
hundred weeks." 
"Liberal as the construction of the statute should be for the pur 
poses sought to be accomplished by it, and recognizing that any doubt 
respecting the right to compensation should be resolved in favor of 
the employee or his dependents by the Commission, we may not sub-
stitute our judgment or desires for the orders of the commission/' 
Batchelor v. Industrial Commission, 86 Utah 261, 42 P. 2d 996, 997, 
and cases cited. 
In the instant case, as heretofore indicated, the question 
of permanent disability is settled. Although the word "per-
manent" carries a conclusiveness with it; yet when applied 
to human disabilities it may not be known what nature or 
medical skill and science may do to make temporary that 
which appeared to be permanent. We say as to a disability, 
that it is permanent when at the time and under the cir-
cumstances no other reasonable conclusion may be drawn. 
s*^ 
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So it is as to the totality of a disability. For these reasons, 
it appears that the legislature provided for a continuing 
jurisdiction of the Industrial Commisison in compensation 
cases. Because compensation was paid for a period of six 
years does not work an "estoppel" as argued in the briefs. 
Upon changed conditions the powers and jurisdiction of 
the Commission over each case shall be continuing, and it 
may from time to time make such modification or change 
with respect thereto as in its opinion may be justified. 
Sec. 42-1-72, U. C. A. 1943; Silver King Coalition Mines Co. 
V. Industrial Commission, 92 Utah 511, 69 P. 2d 608. 
Summarizing: There is no evidence to support the find-
ing that the plaintiff is "not totally and permanently" dis-
abled. That his disability is permanent is not disputed. 
Some of the evidence tends to show a functional disability 
stated in percentages without reference to plaintiff's ability 
to do any of the things suggested. That others may possess 
capacity not possessed by plaintiff, does not help plaintiff. 
There is no evidence that his ability at the present time is 
such that he can perform any services for which he could 
obtain remuneration under his present ability, education 
and training. 
The decision of the Commission should be reversed. 
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Further, the doctrine of accretion or reliction of lands, 
when applicable, generally is applied to a gradual and 
imperceptible recession of waters of a lake or stream 16 
occasioned by natural causes. Whether it is applica-
ble to such an artificial cause as in the complaint alleged 
is another question, which, for the reasons heretofore stated, 
we find unnecessary now to decide. 
From what is said it follows that the court below erred 
in sustaining the defendant's demurrer to the complaint. 
The judgment of the court below, therefore, is reversed, the 
cause remanded, with directions to reinstate it, to overrule 
the demurrer, and give the defendant leave to further plead, 
if he be so advised. Costs to appellant. 
THURMAN, C. J., and CHERRY, HANSEN, and GID-
EON, JJ., concur. 
HALLING v. INDUSTRIAL COMM. OF UTAH et al. 
No. 4588. Decided December 27, 1927. (263 P. 78). 
1. MASTER AND SERVANT—DDCEASED EMPLOYEE'S DEPENDENTS, NOT 
SHOWING EMPLOYER'S WILLFUL MISCONDUCT, MUST RECOVER, IF 
AT ALL, COMPENSATION PROIVDED FOR IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION ACT (LAWS 1921, c. 67, AMENDING COMP. LAWS 1917, § 
3132). Dependents of employee could recover for his death, if at 
all, only the compensation provided for in Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act under Laws 1921, c. 67, amending Comp. Laws 1917, § 
3132, where it was not shown injury complained of was caused 
by any willful misconduct on par t of employer. 
2. MASTER AND SERVANT—LEGISLATURE CANNOT ENTIRELY ABROGATE 
COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES RESULTING IN DEATH (CONST. ART. 
16, § 5 AS AMENDED [SEE LAWS S P . SESS. 1919, p. 45]). Addition 
of words, "except in cases where compensation for injury result-
ing in death is provided by law," to Const, art. 16, § 5, by amend-
ment (see Laws Sp. Sess. 1919, p. 45), gave Legislature power to 
fix amount of compensation for injuries resulting in death, but 
not power to entirely abrogate compensation, and it is beyond 
power of Legislature to take from dependents of an employee 
U<u 
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their claim against employer, where such employee dies as result 
of wrongful injury by employer. 
3. CONSTITUTIONAL, LAW—STATUTES—EFFECT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO 
ALL LANGUAGE USED IN STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL, PROVI-
SION, LF POSSIBLE. When possible, effect should be given to all 
language used in statutory or constitutional provision. 
4. MASTER AND SERVANT—RIGHT OF DEPENDENTS TO COMPENSATION 
FOR EMPLOYEE'S DEATH IS NOT CONTRACTUAL, BUT IS CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHT (CONST. ART. 16 § 5, AS AMENDED [SEE LAWS 
SP. SESS. 1919, p. 45]; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT) . Right 
of an employee's dependents to recover for wrongful injury, re-
sulting in death of such employee, under Workmen's Compen-
sation Act (Comp. Laws 1917, §§ 3061, et seq. as amended), is 
not result of any contract but is right, under Const, art. 16, 
§ 5, as amended (see Laws Sp. Sess. 1919, p. 45), which can-
not be denied dependents without their consent except by court 
or other judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction, after notice 
given and hearing had. 
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—"VESTED RIGHT" OF ACTION IS "PROPERTY" 
IN SAME SENSE IN WHICH TANGIBLE THINGS ARE PROPERTY, AND 
IS EQUALLY PROTECTED AGAINST ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE. Vest-
ed right of action is "property" in same sense in which tangible 
things are property, and is equally protected against arbitrary 
interference. 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, 
First and Second Series, Property.] 
6. MASTER AND SERVANT—WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT MAKES 
No DISTINCTION BETWEEN CLAIM BASED ON EMPLOYER'S NEGLI-
GENCE AND CLAIM NOT FOUNDED THEREON. Workmen's Compen-
sation or Industrial Act (Comp. Laws 1917, § 3061 et seq., as 
Corpus Juris-Cyc. References: 
[1-3] Constitutional Law 12 C. J. p. 707 n. 35; Workmen's Com-
pensation Acts C. J. p. 13 n. 83 New; p. 99 n. 58 New; Statutes 36 
Cyc. p. 1128 n. 58. 
[4,5] Constitutional Law 12 C. J. p. 972 n. 85; Workmen's Com-
pensation Acts C. J. p. 7 n. 31 New. 
[6] Workmen's Compensation Acts C. J. p. 7 n. 25. 
[7] Constitutional Law 12 C. J. p. 1220 n. 87. 
[8] Workmen's Compensation Acts C. J. p. 99 n. 58 New; p. 117 
n. 56 New. 
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amended; makes no distinction between claim based on negli-
gence of employer a n d claim not founded on negligence of em-
ployer. 
7 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—NEITHER COURT NOR OTHER JUDICIAL TRI-
BUNAL MAY DENY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OR DEPRIVE PERSON 
OF VEHTKJ' PFTOPERTY INTEREST WITHOUT OPPORTUNITY TO BE 
HEARD* " D U E PROCESS OF LAW." While a court or commission 
exerciHMK judicial functions may on grounds of public policy 
limit v<'r*on *" o n e °PP° r t u n i t y t° De heard in proceeding affect-
ing such p<-r*on's property rights, neither court nor other ju-
dicial tribunal may deny constitutional right nor deprive such 
rson
 0f vented interest in property without any opportunity 
to be heard, aince to do so constitutes "taking of property without 
due proceim of law." 
fEd. Note.—For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, 
First and Second Series, Due Process of Law.] 
8 MASTER ANI> SERVANT—WIDOW AND CHILDREN OF DECEASED E M -
PLOYEE HAi> RIGHT TO HEARING ON APPLICATION FOR COMPENSA-
TION THOUGH DECEASED WAS DENIED COMPENSATION (COMP. 
LAWS 103 7, SS 3 1 2 7> 3 1 3 2» A 5 AMENDED BY LAWS 1921, c. 67; 
CONST. ART. J0t § 5, AS AMENDED [SEE LAWS SP. SESS. 1919, 
451). Under Const, art. 16, § 5, as amended (see Laws Sp. 
Sess. VJWf P< 4 5 >' a n d C o m P - L a w s 1917> §§ 3127> 3 1 3 2> a s amend-
ed by Law* lli21, c. 67, widow and minor children of deceased 
employe* had right to be heard on their application for compen-
sation after employee's death though employee during his life-
time wa* denied compensation for injury, because, as found by 
commission, injury did not occur, since such fact was in no way 
binding on claimants, and their claim was separate and indepen-
dent of claim of deceased during his lifetime.1 
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by 
Rose J. Hai l ing for herself and children, for the death of 
Mariner Hailing, her husband, claimant, opposed by Hen-
ning Henderson, employer, and the Hartford Accident & 
Indemnity Company, insurance carrier. The Industrial 
Commission denied claimant's application, and she brings 
an original proceeding in the Supreme Court to review its 
order. 
iTayl&r V. Barker, 262 P. 266, distinguished. 
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REVERSED AND REMANDED, WITH DIRECTIONS. 
Bagley, Judd & Ray and A. H. Nebeker, all of Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff. 
Harvey H. Cluff, Atty. Gen., J. Robert Robinson, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Young & Boyle, of Salt Lake City, for de-
fendants. 
HANSEN, J. 
This is a proceeding to review an order of the Industrial 
Commission dismissing the application of Rose J. Hailing 
for compensation for the death of her husband, Mariner 
Hailing. The application was made under our Industrial or 
Workmen's Compensation Act for the benefit of the appli-
cant and her five minor children, who are also the children 
of the deceased. 
Mariner Hailing died on December 7, 1926. Prior to his 
death, and on September 9, 1925, the deceased filed a writ-
ten application before the commission for adjustment of 
a claim for compensation, alleging that on August 8, 1925, 
he was injured by an accident arising out of and in the 
course of his employment by Henning Henderson. The 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, a corporation, 
was the insurance carrier. 
Hearing was had on the application of the deceased Oc-
tober 7, 1925. The commission found: 
'The applicant, on the 8th day of August, 1925, was not injured 
by reason of an accident arising out of or in the course of his em-
ployment while regularly employed by Henning Henderson." 
The commission rendered its decision denying compensa-
tion to the applicant, Mariner Hailing, February 17, 1926. 
Application for rehearing was filed March 9, 1926, and de-
nied by the commission on the same day. No appeal was 
taken from the decision denying Mariner Hailing compensa-
tion. 
On February 11, 1927, within a year after the death of 
Mariner Hailing, Rose J. Hailing, on behalf of herself and 
minor children, filed her application with the Industrial 
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Commission for compensation on account of the death of her 
husband. In her application it is alleged that, between the 
1st and 10th of June, 1925, and again on August 8, 1925, 
Mariner Hailing was injured by an accident arising out of 
and in the course of his employment by Henning Henderson, 
an employer subject to the provisions of the Industrial Act; 
that the employer and his insurance carrier denied liability 
for compensation; and that Mariner Hailing never recovered 
from the injury sustained, but died as a direct result thereof 
December 7, 1926. The application also contains the other 
necessary allegations to entitle the widow and minor children 
of deceased to compensation in the event the death of Mar-
iner Hailing was caused by an accident arising out of or 
in the course of his employment by Henning Henderson. 
The defendant Henning Henderson, and his insurance car-
rier, the Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, an-
swered the application, denying that Mariner Hailing died 
as a result of any accident arising out of or in the course 
of his employment by Henning Henderson. 
Application for compensation of Rose J. Hailing came 
on for hearing before the Industrial Commission March 9, 
1927. Before any evidence was offered, the commissioner 
before whom the hearing was to be had observed that, under 
date of February 17, 1926, the Industrial Commission of 
Utah had rendered a decision upon the application of Mar-
iner Hailing denying him compensation for an injury, which 
he, Mariner Hailing, claimed had occurred August 8, 1925, 
while in the employ of Henning Henderson; that, at the 
time the hearing was had on said application of Mariner 
Hailing, evidence was also offered as to an injury which 
Mariner Hailing claimed he received between June 1, and 
June 10, 1925, while in the employ of Henning Henderson; 
that, while the commission did not mention the injury 
claimed to have been sustained by Mariner Hailing in June, 
it, none the less, had such claim in mind, and the commission, 
in fact, intended to deny compensation for both claimed 
injuries. Thereupon the commissioner who was conducting 
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the proceedings inquired of counsel for Rose J. Hailing and 
her minor children, and also of counsel for the defendant 
Henning Henderson and the Hartford Accident & Indemnity 
Company, if they would agree that the record in the hearing 
upon the application of Mariner Hailing might be made 
part of the record in the hearing upon the application of 
Rose J. Hailing and her minor children. Counsel for both 
the applicants and the defendants agreed that this might be 
done. It was further stipulated and agreed between counsel 
for the applicants and defendants and the commissioner who 
was conducting the hearing that before any further pro-
ceedings were had upon the application of Rose J. Hailing 
and her minor children, the commission should determine 
whethor or not the decision rendered upon the application 
of Mariner Hailing precluded Rose J. Hailing and her minor 
children from recovering compensation for the death of 
Mariner Hailing. 
On April 9, 1927, the commission rendered its decision 
denying compensation to the applicants because, as stated 
by the commission, it had denied compensation to Mariner 
Hailing, and therefore "his wife and minor children, who 
claim through him, could be in no better position before 
the commission than the deceased himself, and that there-
fore we are without jurisdiction to entertain this applica-
tion, and that for this reason the case should be dismissed." 
The sole question before us for review in this proceeding 
is whether or not the commission properly dismissed the 
application of Rose J. Hailing and her minor children for 
the reasons stated by the commission in its decision. To 
determine this question it is necessary to briefly review 
the history of the laws of this state with respect to the rights 
of a surviving widow and minor children in a claim grow-
ing out of an injury resulting in the death of the husband 
and father. It is a well-recognized and generally accepted 
rule that, at common law, an action for personal injury 
abates upon the death of the person injured. Tiffany, Death 
by Wrongful Act (2d Ed.) c. 1, § 1; Mason v. Union Pacific 
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R. R. Co., 7 Utah, 77, 24 P. 796. Since the enactment in 
England of the statute commonly known as Lord Campbell's 
Act in 1846, most of the states in this country have enacted 
laws embodying the same general provisions as are con-
tained in the English act. Prior to statehood Utah had such 
a law. Comp. Laws Utah, 1888, § 3179, provided: 
"When the death of a person not being a minor is caused by the 
wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs or personal representa-
tives may maintain an action for damages against the person causing 
the death, or if such person be employed by another person who is 
responsible for his conduct, then also against such other person. In 
every action under this * * * section, such damages may be given 
as under all the circumstances of the case may be just." 
This provision of Comp. Laws Utah 1888, supra, remained 
the law of this state, with some slight changes not material 
here, until the enactment of Laws Utah 1921, c. 67, §§ 3133 
and 3140. The provisions of Comp. Laws Utah 1888, § 3179, 
were construed by the Supreme Court of the Territory of 
Utah in the case of Mason V. Union Pacific R. R., supra, 
decided in June, 1890. It is there held on page 82 of the 
Utah report and page 797 of the Pacific report: 
"The wife or children do not succeed to the husband's or father's 
cause of action; that dies with him. But, immediately upon his death, 
a new cause of action arises in their favor. The statute then gives 
them a new cause of action. It does not revive or continue the hus-
band's or father's cause of action. Whitford v. Railroad Co., 23 N. Y. 
465; Hegerich v. Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258, 1 Ne. E. 787 [52 Am. Rep. 
25]." 
Similar results were reached by this court in the case of 
Candland v. Mellen, 46 Utah 519, 151 P. 341. To the same 
effect are the following cases cited in plaintiffs brief: 
Earley v. Pacific Electric R. R. Co., 176 Cal. 79, 167 P. 513, 
L. R. A. 1918A, 997; Munro V. Dredging Co., 84 Cal. 515, 
24 P. 303, 18 Am. St. Rep. 248; Btvrk V. Areata & Mad 
River Railway Co., 125 Cal. 364, 57 P. 1065, 73 Am. St. Rep. 
52; Blackwell V. American Film Co., 189 Cal. 689, 209 P. 
999; Tann V. Western Pacific Railway Co., 39 Cal. App. 377, 
178 P. 971. 
%tfU 
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When Utah became a state in 1896, its Constitution, art. 
16, § 5, provided; 
"The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in 
death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not 
be subject to any statutory limitation." 
Under our Workmen's Compensation or Industrial Act, 
which was enacted by the Legislature in 1917, it is provided 
that : 
"For injuries, however, resulting in death, the dependents of the 
deceased employee are given the right, within such time as the com-
mission by rule shall prescribe, to elect (a) between bringing suit at 
law against such employer to recover damages for such death and 
in the event of suit said dependents must prove negligence on the 
employer's part before they can recover, or (b) to accept the benefits 
allowed to dependents of deceased employees by this title in the event 
of death. If they elect (b) they shall not be entitled to sue such em-
ployer at law to recover damages. If they elect (a) they thereby 
forfeit any rights to compensation under this title, and in a suit 
at law shall not be entitled to recover damages from such employer 
if the deceased employee was himself guilty of contributory negli-
gence, or if he assumed the risk, or if his death was due in whole or 
part to the negligence of a fellow servant." Comp. Laws Utah 1917, 
§ 3127. 
It will be observed under the original Workmen's Compen-
sation or Industrial Act, as above quoted, the dependents 
of an employee who died as a result of wrongful injury by 
the employer retained, if they so elected, the rights provided 
for by Comp. Laws Utah 1888, supra, and made secure from 
legislative interference by the Constitution of Utah, art. 16, 
§ 5. At the special session of the thirteenth Legislature of 
the state of Utah, held September and October, 1919, a 
resolution was passed proposing to amend section 5, art. 16, 
of our state Constitution, so that the same should read : 
"The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in 
death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall 
not be subject to any statutory limitation, except in cases where com-
pensation for injuries resulting in death is provided for by law." 
See Laws Sp. Sess. 1919, p. 45. 
» ^ 
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It was further provided by the resolution that the pro-
posed amendment should be submited to the electors of the 
state at the next general election, and, if adopted by the 
electors of the state, the amendment should take effect 
January 1, 1921. The proposed amendment was adopted by 
the electors of Utah at the general election held November, 
1920, and therefore went into effect on January 1, 1921. 
In 1921, the Legislature of Utah amended the Workmen's 
Compensation or Industrial Act in various particulars, 
among such amendments being Comp. Laws Utah 1917, 
§ 3127, which was amended to read: 
"Employers who comply with the provisions of section 3114 shall 
not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute, 
except as hereinafter provided, for injury or death of any employees, 
wherever occurring/' Laws Utah 1921, c. 67, § 3127. 
It will not be necessary to here consider the other provi-
sions of the Workmen's Compensation or Industrial Act, 
except to observe that in the instant case the appli-
cant must recover, if at all, the compensation pro- 1-3 
vided for in such act. Under the provisions of Laws 
Utah 1921, c. 67, § 3132, it is only in the case of an injury 
caused by the employer's willful misconduct that an injured 
employee, or, in case the injury results in death, his de-
pendents, may recover damages in an action at law for a 
wrongful injury. When the injury is caused merely by the 
negligent act of the employer, the injured employee, or, 
when the injury causes death, his dependents, must be 
content to accept the compensation provided for by the 
act. No claim is here made that the injury complained of 
was caused by any willful misconduct on the part of the 
employer. If the deceased, Mariner Hailing, died as the 
result of an injury arising out of or in the course of his 
employment by Henning Henderson, the rights of the appli-
cants are the same, whether such injury was or was not 
caused by the negligence of Henning Henderson. Under the 
provisions of article 16, § 5, of the Constitution of Utah, 
u> 
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both before and after the amendment, the right to recover 
damages for injury resulting in death can never be ab-
rogated. The addition of the words, "except in cases where 
compensation for injuries resulting in death is provided for 
by law," gave to the Legislature the power to fix the amount 
of compensation, but not the power to entirely abrogate 
compensation. Any other construction would be contrary 
to the well-recognized rule of construction that when pos-
sible, effect should be given to all of the language used in 
a statutory or constitutional provision. It therefore is be-
yond the power of the Legislature to take from the depend-
ents of an employee their claim against the employer, where 
such employee dies as the result of a wrongful injury by the 
employer. Under the provisions of article 16, § 5, of our 
Constitution, prior to the amendment, the Legislature could 
neither abrogate nor limit the amount of recovery in such 
case, and, after the amendment, the Legislature may pro-
vide for compensation, but may not take from the depend-
ents their rights to some compensation. 
It is earnestly contended on behalf of defendants that an 
award under the Workmen's Compensation or Industrial Act 
is not made on the theory that a tort has been com-
mitted, but, on the contrary, it is on the theory that 4, 5 
the statute giving the commission power to make an 
award is read into, and becomes, a part of the contract. It 
is true that frequently, and probably in a majority of cases, 
compensation is allowed without any wrongdoing on the 
part of the employer. But, under the Workmen's Compen-
sation or Industrial Act, the same procedure is had, and 
the same amount of compensation allowed in a case where 
the employer is guilty of negligence resulting in an injury, 
as where the employer is free from any negligence. In either 
case the employee or his dependents are without any remedy, 
except to accept the compensation provided by law. As we 
have indicated, the right of an employee's dependents to re-
cover for wrongful injury resulting in the death of such em-
ployee is not the result of any contract. It is a constitutional 
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right which cannot be denied dependents without their con-
sent, except by a court or other judicial tribunal of compe-
tent jurisdiction after notice given and a hearing had. To 
hold otherwise would be depriving the applicant of property 
without due process of law. 
"A vested right of action is property in the same sense m which 
tangible things are property, and is equally protected against arbi-
trary interference " 2 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) 
p. 756, and cases, cited in the footnote. 
If the dependents of Mariner Hailing have a right to be 
heard on their claim for compensation in case his injury and 
resulting death was caused by the negligence of his 
employer, then it follows that such dependents like- 6 
wise have such right to be heard on their claim for 
injury resulting in his death, in the absence of any negli-
gence of his employer so long as such injury and resulting 
death arose out of or was received in the course of the em-
ployment of the deceased. The Workmen's Compensation 
or Industrial Act makes no distinction between a claim based 
upon negligence of the employer and a claim not founded on 
any negligence of the employer. Prior to the enactment of 
Laws Utah 1921, c. 67, by both judicial construction and 
constitutional provision, the rights of the employee's depend-
ents in case death resulted from wrongful injury were 
separate and distinct from the rights of the employee for 
such injury. The law has not been changed where the em-
ployer willfully injures the employee, nor in case the rela-
tion of employer and employee does not exist. We find noth-
ing in the language of the Workmen's Compensation or In-
dustrial Law in its present form indicating any legislative 
intent to change the nature of the rights of the dependents 
who claim compensation under the provisions of such law 
rather than under the law as it existed before we had a 
Workmen's Compensation or Industrial Act. In the main, 
the reasons advanced in support of the conclusions reached 
in the case of Mason V. Union Pacific Railroad Co., supra, 
JbJL. 
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are applicable here. We are therefore of the opinion that the 
wife and minor children of Mariner Hailing did not, and 
could not, derive any claim for compensation through the 
deceased, but their claim is separate and independent of any 
claim deceased may have had during his lifetime. It is 
earnestly contended on behalf of defendants that, if the 
law is not such that Rose J. Hailing and her minor children 
are bound by the adverse decision against Mariner Hailing 
during his lifetime, serious consequences will result to the 
dependents of other employees who die as a result of injuries 
actually received in the course of or growing out of their 
employment. Our attention is called to the rule as to mutual-
ity of judgments under which a party is not bound by a 
judgment in a subsequent proceeding, unless the adverse 
party seeking the benefit of the former adjudication would 
have been prejudiced if it had been determined the other 
way. It is thus urged that, if the widow and minor children 
of Mariner Hailing are not to be bound by the adverse 
decision against the claim for compensation of Mariner 
Hailing, they could not have taken advantage of a decision 
of the commission holding that Mariner Hailing received 
an injury in the course of, or growing out of, his employ-
ment ; that if the dependents may not rely upon the findings 
in favor of an employee during his lifetime, his dependents, 
after his death and consequent loss of his evidence, may 
find it impossible to establish a just and proper claim 
against the employer, if such dependents are compelled to 
again establish the fact that the injury arose out of or in 
the course of the employment of the deceased. Our atten-
tion is called to the case of Biederzycki v. Farrel Foundry 
& Machine Co., 103 Conn. 701, 131 A. 739. It is there held 
that where the commission found that an employee was 
found entitled to compensation during his lifetime because 
of his injury, such findings "must be accepted as final and 
conclusive in so far as they bear upon the dependent's claim, 
and the only additional facts which must be established by 
the dependent are, first, the death of the employee, second, 
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dependence upon him, and third, the causal connection be-
tween the injury for which he was awarded compensation, 
and his death." The quotation is from the syllabus. 
It is insisted that, by reason of the rule as to mutuality 
of judgments, if, as was held in the case of Biederzychi v. 
Farrel Foundry & Machine Co., supra, the employer was 
bound by the former adjudication on a subsequent applica-
tion of the dependents, likewise the dependents should be 
bound where the decision is adverse to the employee during 
his lifetime. 
This court, in the recent case of Tcuylor v. Barker, District 
Judge, 262 P. 266, had occasion to apply the rule as to 
mutuality of judgments with results such as are contended 
for by the defendants in this proceeding, but, as indicated 
in the case of Taylor v. Bwker, supra, there are exceptions 
to the rule. 1 Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.) § 439, p. 
935, in discussing the rule as to mutuality of judgments, 
has the following to say : 
"The rule of mutuality is itself based upon policy and practical 
necessity and justice, as is the whole doctrme of res judicata, and 
on the same grounds of policy and justice there would seem to be 
no objection to departing from it where the party affected has been 
given one adequate opportunity to be heard either personally or by 
representation." 
In the case of Biederzycki V. Farrel Foundry & Machine 
Co., supra, the defendant had been given one opportunity 
to be heard, but the applicants in this case were in no sense 
given any opportunity to be heard in the proceedings had 
upon the application of Mariner Hailing. The applicants 
in the instant case were entire strangers, in a legal sense, 
to the proceedings had upon the application of Mariner Hail-
ing. They may or may not have known of the former pro-
ceeding. It is clear that they had no right to control the 
former proceedings, nor to produce or cross-examine wit-
nesses, nor to appeal from the judgment rendered, nor to 
prevent Mariner Hailing from filing or refusing to file his 
application for compensation. 
tt 
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While a court, or commission exercising judicial functions, 
may, upon grounds of public policy, limit a person to one 
opportunity to be heard in a proceeding affecting such 
person's property rights, neither a court nor other 
judicial tribunal may deny a person a constitutional 7 
right or deprive such person of a vested interest in 
property without any opportunity to be heard. To do so 
constitutes taking of property without due process of law. 
The conclusions reached in the case of Biederzycki V. Farrel 
Foundry & Machine Co., supra, are not necessarily incon-
sistent with the views herein expressed. 
From what has been said, we do not wish to be understood 
as holding that, where an employee, during his lifetime, re-
covers a judgment for compensation for an injury arising 
out of or in the course of his employment, his dependents, 
after his death, may rely upon such judgment as being bind-
ing upon the employer. This question is not before us in 
this proceeding, and we reserve expressing any opinion in 
such case until the question is properly presented for our 
determination. 
What we do hold is that, under the Workmen's Compen-
sation or Industrial Laws of this state, Rose J. Hailing and 
her minor children have a right to be heard on their appli-
cation for compensation after the death of Mariner Hailing. 
The fact that Mariner Hailing, during his lifetime, was 
denied compensation because, as found by the com-
mission, the injury did not occur, is in no way bind- 8 
ing upon the applicants in this proceeding. The order 
dismissing" the application of Rose J. Hailing and her minor 
children for compensation is reversed, and this cause is 
remanded back to the Industrial Commission, with direc-
tions to hear and determine the application herein without 
regard to the decision rendered upon the application of 
Mariner Hailing. 
THURMAN, C. J., and CHERRY, STRAUP, and GID-
EON, JJ., concur. 
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The case is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial 
court, with directions to reinstate the cause and proceed to 
the hearing of the case. Appellant to recover costs. 
STRAUP, C. J., and ELIAS HANSEN, FOLLAND, and 
EPHRAIM HANSON, JJ., concur. 
HARDING v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH et al. 
No. 5442. Decided January 4, 1934. (28 P. [2d] 182.) 
1. INSURANCE. Generally, in absence of prejudice to employee, in-
surance carrier may, notwithstanding voluntary payment of com-
pensation, furnishing of hospital or medical care, entry of ap-
pearance, or admission of liability, urge that insurance did not 
cover employment in which employee sustained injury (Comp. 
Laws 1917, § 3061 et seq., as amended).1 
2. INSURANCE. Insurance carrier, after payment of compensation 
over long period of time, and after full investigation or oppor-
tunity for inquiry, and after prejudice to claimant, cannot inter-
pose defense that insurance did not cover employee (Comp. Laws 
1917, § 3061 et seq., as amended). 
3. INSURANCE. Where insurance carrier had opportunity for full 
investigation and voluntarily paid compensation and medical care 
for over five years, insurance carrier held estopped to assert em-
ployee was not within protection of insurance policy, in view of 
prejudice to employee from running of statute of limitations 
against claim for injuries (Comp. Laws 1917, § 3061 et seq., as 
amended). 
4. INSURANCE. Employee injured while performing act fairly in-
cident to prosecution of business, trade, or occupation of em-
ployer and appropriate in carrying it forward, held not barred 
from recovering compensation on ground work, a t time of injury, 
was not wholly embraced in process or operation for which in-
surance was carried (Comp. Laws 1917, § 3061 et seq., as 
amended).2 
^Taggart v. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah 598, 12 P. (2d) 356. 
2Anderson v. Last Chance Ranch Co., 63 Utah 551, 228 P. 184. 
^is As 
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5. INSURANCE. Employee of brick and tile manufacturing business, 
injured through fall off load of hay while hauling hay for feed 
for horses used in connection with business, held not engaged in 
"agricultural employment" outside protection of compensation 
insurance policy (Comp. Laws 1917, § 3061 et seq., as amended).1 
Proceedings by Heber Harding against the Provo Brick 
& Tile Company and the State Insurance Fund to review an 
order of the Industrial Commission dismissing an applica-
tion for adjustment of claim for compensation. 
Order of the Industrial Commission set aside and annulled, 
and cause remanded. 
Christenson & Straw, of Provo, for plaintiff. 
Robinson & Robinson, of Provo, for defendant Provo Brick 
& Tile Co. 
Joseph Chez, Atty. Gen., for defendants Industrial Com-
mission and State Insurance Fund. 
FOLLAND, Justice. 
This is a proceeding to review an order of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah dismissing the application for adjust-
ment of claim filed by plaintiff with the commisson October 
27,1932. In such application it was alleged that plaintiff on 
June 23, 1927, was injured by accident arising out of and in 
course of employment with the Provo Brick & Tile Company, 
a corporation, while hauling hay, he being on top of a load 
of hay when the team started suddenly and precipitated him 
to the ground causing permanent injuries, that compensa-
tion was paid him for a period of five years by the State In-
surance Fund, as well as medical and hospital expenses, and 
that the State Fund then refused to make further payment 
on the ground it believed there was no total permanent dis-
3Distinguishing Ocean Accident & Guarantee Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 69 Utah 473, 256 P. 405; Murray v. Strike, 76 Utah 118, 287 
P. 922; and citing Anderson v. Last Chance Ranch Co., 63 Utah 551, 
228 P. 184. 
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ability. On the filing of this claim the case came before the 
Industrial Commission of Utah for formal adjudication for 
the first time. At the hearing the State Fund offered in 
defense that at the time of injury plaintiff was engaged in 
agricultural work, was not covered by the policy of insur-
ance issued by it to the employer, and that he had not suf-
fered total permanent disability. 
The findings and conclusions of the commission follow: 
"I . That Heber Harding brought this proceeding before the In-
dustrial Commission of Utah by virtue of an application filed on 
the 27th day of October, 1932; tha t the applicant a t the time of the 
hearing was 62 years of age and was married; that the applicant 
was injured on the 23rd day of June, 1927, while employed by the 
defendant, Provo Brick & Tile Company, herein referred to as the 
Company. 
"II . That the Company is the owner of a t ract of land consisting 
of about 100 acres situated a short distance North of Provo City, 
Utah. It is engaged in manufacturing brick and tile. The plant 
consists of several brick kilns together with the buildings necessary 
in the making of brick and tile. About 10 acres of the land is used 
for the purpose of manufacturing brick, and about 40 to 60 acres of 
the 100 acre tract is under cultivation and the balance is in river bed. 
At the time of the injury the Company had about 12 head of horses 
in use in its operations and the cultivated land was devoted to the 
raising of hay and grain. All hay and grain raised by the Company 
was fed to the horses used by the Company in its operations. The 
active season of the Company's operations is from March to Novem* 
ber. The men regularly employed in the plant were used to harvest 
the hay raised on the farm land of the Company. 
"III. The Company carried insurance on its employees with the 
defendant, State Insurance Fund- The employees of the Company 
were classified into groups and the applicant was classed as being en-
gaged in Brick and Clay Products manufacture, including construe: 
tion and reconstruction of sheds and kilns, and clay shale and sand 
digging. At the time of the injury the insurance policy did not cover 
farm labor. The insurance policy, marked Defendant's Exhibit #A, 
has attached several endorsements and the first endorsement carrying 
coverage for farm labor is for the year 1931. 
"IV. The principal business in which the applicant was engaged was 
loading and unloading the kilns. On the day of the injury the ap-* 
plicant had been working in the brick kilns prior to eleven o'clock to' 
the forenoon; he had helped haul one load of hay and was helping! 
JLM 
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with the second when he fell from the load of hay and sustained the 
injury complained of. That the total time the applicant worked in 
the hay each season would not exceed, on the average, more than three 
days. That as a result of the injury the applicant was disabled and 
was under the care of a physician and confined to the hospital for a 
considerable time. In view of the conclusions reached by the Com-
mission we make no findings as to the extent of the disability or its 
permanence. 
"Conclusions. 
"In view of the foregoing facts, the Commission concludes that the 
applicant at the time of the injury, was engaged in an agricultural 
occupation; that at the time of the injury the Provo Brick & Tile 
Company had not elected to come under the provisions of the Work-
men's Compensation Act (Comp. Laws 1917, § 3061 et seq., as 
amended) as to its agricultural employees; and that the Commission 
is without jurisdiction to grant an award of compensation to the 
applicant. 
"If an employer can refuse to provide insurance for its employees 
performing such agricultural work as was done by the applicant and 
can, by having the regular industrial employees do the farm work, 
claim the benefits of the act, then the insured Company would secure 
coverage for its employees for employment not embraced in the con-
tract of insurance. Under the contract of insurance in this case, the 
State Insurance Fund undertook the coverage of the employees of 
the Company engaged in work specified in the contract. 
irNor can the insurance Carrier be held liable merely because the 
applicant was generally engaged in work covered by the policy. If 
the Company had elected to provide coverage for its agricultural 
employees the State Insurance Fund could have no ground to com-
plain. It would then have contracted to meet just this situation. But 
the Company cannot decline to provide coverage for such employees 
while doing farm work and then protect itself by showing that it 
used its regular employees for farm work only when such work was 
necessary. On such occasions and during such employment they were 
no longer in the course of the employment for which they were in-
sured." 
The record discloses that the facts found are amply sup-
ported by evidence. Indeed, there is little conflict in the evi-
dence. Other facts shown by the record but not included in 
the findings are these: That plaintiff filed a claim for bene-
fits under the Workmen's Compensation Act with the State 
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Insurance Fund (Industrial Commission of Utah), wherein 
he stated he had sustained injury on June 23, 1927, while in 
the employ of the Provo Brick & Tile Company, and in an-
swer to the question, "Describe in full how injury was sus-
tained," said: "Fell off wagon hauling hay. Horses pulled 
wagon suddenly." The part of body injured was said to be, 
"shoulders and back." This claim was received and filed by 
the State Insurance Fund July 11, 1927. Premiums were 
paid by the employer to the State Fund based on the wages 
paid plaintiff for his full time, including the parts of two 
days engaged in hauling hay, payments being computed un-
der the classification in the policy No. 4029, "Brick Manu-
facturing, not otherwise classified, including construction 
and reconstruction of kilns." The policy includes a classifi* 
cation No. 7205, drivers of animals and drivers' helpers (not 
otherwise classified)"; but there was no coverage for agri-
cultural laborers. Plaintiff testified that on the day of the 
accident he was driver of the team and was on top the load 
of hay which was being loaded in the field when one of the 
workmen started toward the horses with a pitchfork in his 
hand and frightened the horses, causing him to fall off the 
load of hay. That after the accident, at the hospital, he had 
a conversation with the manager of the brick company re-
specting liability on account of the injury and was told by 
him that he would be cared for by way of compensation from 
the State Insurance Fund. That he understood at the time 
that by acceptance of compensation benefits he would be 
precluded from holding the company liable for negligence. 
The State Fund interposed two defenses to plaintiff's ap-
plication for continued compensation on account of alleged 
total permanent disability: (1) That plaintiff was not totally 
and permanently disabled, and (2) that at time of his injury 
he was not insured by the policy issued to the employer be-
cause he was then engaged in agricultural employment. The 
commission withheld decision on the question of disability, 
but held the plaintiff not covered by the policy of insurance 
because he was injured while in agricultural employment. 
•^yv^-.'J^li 
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Two points are urged by plaintiff on this review: First, 
that the conclusions of the commission are erroneous as mat-
ter of law; and, second, that the State Insurance Fund was 
and is estopped from making the defense of nonliability 
under its policy because of having assumed liability and paid 
compensation for a period of five years. 
First, as to estoppel: Ordinarily, in the absence of preju-
dice to the employee or of facts giving rise to estoppel, an 
insurance carrier, may, notwithstanding voluntary payment 
of compensation, the furnishing of hospital or medical care, 
the entry of appearance, or statement made that the 
policy covered the employee, urge the defense that 1-3 
the employee did not meet with an accident, or that 
the policy did not cover the employment, or that there 
was no causal connection between the injury and disability. 
Taggart V. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah 598, 12 P. (2d) 
356; Fidelity & Casualty Co. V. Baker, 162 Okl. 10,18 P. (2d) 
894; Neilson V. Crowder (La. App.) 141 So. 832; Ginn V. 
Forest Nursery Co., 165 Tenn. 9, 52 S. W. (2d) 141. It would 
be unjust to both the employee and the insurance carrier if 
the law were that when the insurance carrier once under-
takes to provide medical or other care for an injured work-
man it has lost all right to afterwards defend against what it 
believes to be an unjust or illegal claim. The insurance car-
rier cannot and ought not wait until full investigation has 
been made before providing necessary care and treatment 
for injured men. It, however, cannot by its conduct in paying 
compensation over a long period of time, and after either 
full investigation or opportunity and time for such inquiry, 
and after the claimant's position has changed and rights to 
which he was entitled are lost by lapse of time and the run-
ning of statutes of limitation, then interpose the defense 
that the policy of insurance did not cover the employee. In 
this case plaintiff timely filed his claim with the State In-
surance Fund which is administered by the State Industrial 
Commssion. There was no hearing had or award made by 
the commission for the reason that the State Fund officials 
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acknowledged liability and regularly paid compensation. The 
filed claim truthfully states the cause of injury, including 
the time, place, and circumstances thereof. There was no 
deception practiced by claimant, nor, so far as the record 
discloses, any attempt to prevent full investigation. It may 
be fairly assumed that the manager and claims adjusters of 
the fund were better informed as to the terms and classifica-
tions of the policy, and whether claimant was covered there-
by, than would be the claimant. He was informed by his em-
ployer that he was protected by compensation insurance. 
He was assured of this fact when compensation and hospital-
ization expenses were in fact paid. If this had not been so, he 
would have had a right of action against his employer which 
he might have prosecuted with success. Whether he would 
have succeeded or not, or whether his right of action might 
have been worth more or less than he has received from the 
State Fund, is immaterial. It is enough that he had such a 
right which he might have pursued in the courts if he chose 
to do so. By lapse of time the statute of limitations may now 
be successfully urged against any such action and it is lost 
to him. His condition has changed to his prejudice. He was 
lulled into a sense of security and led to believe that he could 
rely entirely on the State Insurance Fund for the full cover-
age allowed by law for such injuries as he suffered. Now 
he is told the insurance carrier was mistaken in assuming 
liability, that he was not covered by the policy, and the pay-
ments made to him were a mere gratuity. The circumstances 
are such that the State Insurance Fund is now estopped tQ 
urge that the employee was not within the protection of the 
policy of insurance issued by it to the Provo Brick & Tile 
Company. 
Somewhat analogous, and affording support to the posi-
tion we take, are the cases which hold that where an em-
ployer's liability insurance carrier assumes the defense 
against a claim for damages, even though it does not directlx 
admit liability, as was done in this case, the carrier is 
estopped to deny liability that the employee was not covered 
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by the policy. Rieger V. London Guarantee & Ace. Co., 202 
Mo. App. 184, 215 S. W. 920; Empire State Surety Co. V. 
Pacific Nat. Lbr. Co. (C. C. A.) 200 F. 224; Constitution 
Indemnity Co. V. Beckham, 144 Okl. 81, 289 P. 776; Royle 
Min. Co. V. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y., 161 Mo. App. 
185, 142 S. W. 438; Humes Const. Co. V. Philadelphia Casur-
alty Co., 32 R. I. 246, 79 A. 1, 3, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 906. 
Counsel for the State Insurance Fund have argued that 
when plaintiff stepped out of his employement as classified 
in the policy of insurance into an agricultural employment, 
not covered thereby, that there was then no contractual 
relationship upon which to base an estoppel. This sort of 
contention was well answered in Humes Const. Co. V. Phila-
delphia Casualty Co., supra, as follows: 
"The defendant has also urged that the principle of estoppel can-
not be applied to extend the liability of the defendant beyond the 
terms of the policy and to furnish indemnity to the insured for loss 
arising from an accident to a person not an employee. The doctrine 
of quasi estoppel is broad enough to include such a result, and its 
application is not restricted, as the defendant urges, to cases where 
the conduct of the insurer precludes him from insisting upon a for-
feiture for the violation of a condition contained in the policy. It is 
the nature of this principle to extend liability. It is not invoked 
for the purpose of enforcing a true obligation or one that is clearly 
defined by the terms of a contract. In this consideration it is not 
material what the defendant's real liability under the policy was, for 
by its own election of positions it is now precluded from asserting 
that its liability was not in accordance with its apparent admissions." 
In assuming liability and paying compensation after being 
informed by the filed claim that claimant's injury was sus-
tained by falling off a wagon hauling hay, the insurance 
carrier placed its own construction on the scope of the 
policy and the meaning of it. FuUerton V. United 4, 5 
States Casualty Company, 184 Iowa, 219, 167 N. W. 
700, 6 A. L. R. 367. We are inclined to the view that such 
construction was the right one. An employee injured while 
performing an act which is fairly incident to the prosecution 
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of the business, trade, or occupation of the employer and 
appropriate in carrying it forward and providing for its 
needs, is not to be barred from the benefits of compensation 
because the act is not wholly embraced in the precise and 
characterization process or operation made the basis of the 
group in which employment is claimed. Anderson v. Last 
Chance Ranch Co., 63 Utah 551, 228 P. 184, 186; Matter of 
Larsen V. Paine Drug Co., 218 N. Y. 252, 112 N. E. 725. 
Hauling hay to be fed the horses necessarily used in connec-
tion with the brick and tile manufacturing business is fairly 
incidental to the business or occupation of the employer. 
True it may also be incidental to farming operations, depend-
ing on the circumstances. This plaintiff was loading and 
hauling hay. He was the teamster. The hay was already 
grown, cut, and harvested. Had he been hauling baled hay 
from a hay and grain store to the brick plant for use there 
and was injured by falling off the load, he certainly could 
not be said to have been engaged in agricultural employment 
at the time. So, likewise, if he were hauling hay from the 
field of another at the request of his employer who had pur-
chased the hay in the field or stack. 
We are told the commission correctly concluded plaintiff 
was engaged in agricultural work because of the decision 
in Ocean Ace. & Guarantee Co. v. Industrial Commission, 69 
Utah 473, 256 P. 405, 407. In that case the court held that a 
person or corporation may be engaged in more than one busi-
ness, trade, or occupation, and that when engaged in farm-
ing operations as a business its employees engaged exclu-
sively in such occupation if injured are not compensable un-
less the employer elects to provide coverage and complies 
with the requirements of the law with respect thereto. To< 
similar effect is Murray v. Strike, 76 Utah 118, 287 P. 922. 
The present case is clearly distinguishable from Oceew 
Ace. & Guarantee Co. v. Indicstrial Commission, supra, not* 
withstanding the general situation was somewhat similar ill 
that the employer there conducted a sand and gravel busi-
ness and also operated a farm on adjacent property. The 
tt 
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employee who was injured had never been employed in 
the sand and gravel business, but was employed exclusively 
as an agricultural laborer and was injured while so engaged. 
The court drew the proper distinction when it said: 
"This is not a case where the employee temporarily digresses from 
his usual work, but a case where the employer is engaged in two 
occupations, one coming under the Workmen's Compensation Act and 
one that does not come under the act unless the employer so elects," 
and again, "The evidence is positive and without conflict that the 
Ogden Realty & Investment Company and its receiver were engaged 
in the business, trade, or occupation of farming, and that the de-
ceased, at the time of his death and prior thereto, was exclusively 
engaged as an agricultural laborer." 
The plaintiff here was regularly engaged as an employee of 
the brick plant and only incidentally and on rare occasions 
hauled hay. On the day of the accident he had worked in the 
brick kiln until about 11 o'clock in the morning and had 
hauled but one load of hay prior to the one from which he 
fell. In the Ocean Ace. & G. Co. Case the employee was ex-
clusively employed in farming operations and had no relation 
whatever with the sand and gravel business, although the hay 
was to be fed horses used in the sand and gravel business. 
In Anderson v. Last Chance Ranch Co., supra, the court 
held that under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law the controlling factor in determining the nature of 
the employment and the right to compensation was the gen-
eral business of the employer, and since the general 
business—that is, "the usual course of trade, business, 
or occupation of his employer," to use the language of the 
statute—was agriculture, the injured employee was not with-
in the protection of the Compensation Law even though he 
was engaged in the construction of a building; the construc-
tion of the foreman's home being incidental to the farming 
operations of the employer. So here the hauling of hay being 
incidental to the operation of the brick plant and the em-
ployee injured being regularly engaged at the plant the work 
13 
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of the moment was within the characterization of the general 
business of the employer—that of brick manufacture. 
On account of the conclusions reached by the commission, 
no findings were made on the issue of whether or not plain-
tiff sustained total permanent disability, and that question 
is not now before us. 
The order of the Industrial Commission dismissing plain-
tiff's application for adjustment of claim is set asde and 
annulled, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. 
STRAUP, C. J., and ELIAS HANSEN, EPHRAIM HAN-
SON, and MOFFAT, JJ., concur. 
BOX ELDER COUNTY et al. v. HARDING et al. 
No. 5244. Decided January 4, 1934. (28 P. [2d] 601.) 
1. APPEAL AND ERROR. Supreme Court had jurisdiction of appeal 
from judgment dismissing suit brought by county and its treas-
urer, notwithstanding treasurer did not appeal and was not served 
with notice of appeal, since treasurer was not beneficially in-
terested in recovery and hence not an "adverse party." 
(Ed. Note.—For other definitions of "Adverse Party," see 
Words & Phrases.] 
2. LIMITATION OP ACTIONS. County's action against former treas-
urer and surety to recover money which treasurer had deposited 
m bank which closed, brought more than one year after treasurer 
left office, held barred by limitation (Comp. Laws 1917, §§ 1467, 
1485, 1492; § 6466, subd 2; § 6468, subd. 1; § 6469, subd. 1). 
Appeal from District Court, First District, Box Elder 
County; Melvin C. Hcurris, Judge. 
Action by Box Elder County, a municipal corporation, and 
another, against Benjamin Dwight Harding and another. 
From a judgment, first-named plaintiff appeals, and the de-
fendants move to dismiss the appeal. ,, 
Motion for dismissal of appeal denied, and judgment af-
firmed. 
C O D E • CO 
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rest, we distinguish the line of cases holding 
that stock in an irrigation company may be 
appurtenant to, and impliedly conveyed with, 
an interest in real property. The rule of those 
cases does not apply to the creation and per-
fection of security interests in irrigation 
company stock. This conclusion is grounded in 
the rule that a later statute supersedes an 
earlier statute if the two are in conflict,10 
inasmuch as the Uniform Commercial Code, 
enacted in 1965 in Utah, followed in time 
section 73-1-10 of Utah Code Ann., which 
was last amended in 1959. Moreover, in view 
of the importance of uniformity and predict-
ability in commercial law,11 we favor a result 
which will not have the effect of creating an 
exception to the Article 9 priority structure for 
something which has the appearance of fitting 
rather clearly within that structure. We also 
note, as the trial court did, that it is equitable, 
as between Sevys and Associates, that the loss 
resulting from the double collateralization fall 
upon the Sevys, who, albeit unwittingly, left 
the Stewarts in the position to again borrow 
on the stock. 
We therefore hold that the security interest 
of Associates in the irrigation company stock 
is prior to the unperfected security interest of 
the Sevys, and that Associates may foreclose 
the Sevys' security interest in accordance with 
Article 9 of the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code. The order of the district court is ther-
efore affirmed.12 
Dean E. Conder, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. Dean E. Conder, Senior District Judge, sitting by 
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-3-24(1)0) (1987). 
2. Irrigation companies are a common legal means 
of owning and distributing irrigation water in Utah. 
Many of them began as cooperative enterprises by 
early settlers and eventually took corporate form, 
usually on a not-for-profit basis. The ownership 
of stock in such a company typically gives the sto-
ckholder the right to receive a part of the 
company's water proportionate to the 'amount 
owned. The ownership of stock in the irrigation 
company thus becomes in some respects tantamount 
to ownership of the water rights themselves. 
3. Associates argues that the notice of appeal is 
untimely, based on the fact that the date stamped 
on the judgment as the date of entry was altered. 
There is no claim, however, of unauthorized tamp-
ering with the court records, or even of error in 
showing the date of entry as November 4, 1987. We 
therefore conclude that the notice of appeal was 
timely filed. 
4. Compare Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 with Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (1988). 
5. R. Utah Sup. Ct. 4C; R. Utah Ct. App. 4C. 
6. Wood v. Turner. 18 Utah 2d 229, 419 P.2d 634, 
635 (1966); Nunlcy v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 
15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798 (1964). 
7. The trust deed of which the Sevys were named 
beneficiaries suffices as a security agreement and 
both parties appear to have satisfied the prerequis-
ites of Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-203 (1980) for 
creation and attachment of their security interests in 
the stock. 
8. Roundy v. Coombs, 668 P.2d 550 (Utah 1983); Ab-
bott v. Christensen, 660 P.2d 254 (Utah 1983); Hatch 
v. Adams, 7 Utah 2d 73, 318 P.2d 633, afCd 
on reh., 8 Utah 2d 82, 329 P.2d 285 (1958) (decided 
on rehearing on the basis of the parol evidence rule) 
Brimm v. Cache Valley Banking Co., 2 Utah 2d 93, 
269 P.2d 859 (1954). 
9. Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-304(l), (4) (1980); see also 
R. Henson, Handbook on Secured Transa-
ctions 108-110(1973). 
10. Pride Club v. Miller, 572 P.2d 385, 387 (Utah 
1977); see also Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 
757 P.2d 882, 884-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
11. See, Utah Code Ann. §70A-1-102(1) (1980) 
and §70A-l-102(2)(c); Butts v. Glendale 
Plywood Co. 710 F.2d 504, 506 (9th Cir. 1983). 
12. Because we hold that Associates' security inte-
rest is prior to that of the Sevys, we do not reach 
the question of estoppel on which the district court 
based its decision, or the question whether the 
material facts concerning estoppel were in dispute so 
as to preclude summary judgment. 
Cue as 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Petitioner Douglas Olsen appeals from the 
Jt£ 
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Industrial Commission's decision denying him 
workers' compensation benefits for injuries he 
suffered as a result of two separate heart 
attacks. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Petitioner was hired by Tyger Construction 
as a laborer in April 1984. It is undisputed 
that prior to his employment with Tyger, 
petitioner had a family history of heart 
attacks, diabetes, and high blood pressure, 
and a personal history of smoking approxim-
ately one pack of cigarettes per day since age 
16, and high blood cholesterol and triglyceride 
levels, all of which predisposed petitioner to 
heart disease. On October 29, 1984, petitioner 
suffered a heart attack while at work. He was 
subsequently diagnosed as having suffered an 
acute anterior wall myocardial infarction. 
Petitioner was hospitalized for several days, 
and received uncontested temporary total 
disability benefits for the period October 30, 
1984, through December 2, 1984. On Dece-
mber 3, 1984, petitioner was released by his 
attending physician and informed that he 
could return to work without limitation. 
In June 1985, petitioner was assigned by 
Tyger to supervise several concrete plants. 
Between June and October of 1985, petitioner 
claimed he worked sixty hours per week. By 
November 1985, petitioner was working seven 
days a week until the plants supervised by 
petitioner were shut down on November 22, 
1985. Following the shut down, petitioner and 
his wife traveled to Colorado for a vacation. 
On December 2, 1985, petitioner suffered a 
second heart attack. The second heart attack 
was diagnosed as a myocardial infarction 
involving the inferior left ventricle wall and 
rendered him permanently and totally disa-
bled. 
Following the second heart attack, petitioner 
filed two claims for disability benefits. One 
claim requested additional benefits for the 
1984 heart attack, the second for injuries 
suffered as a result of the 1985 heart attack. 
The administrative law judge conducted an 
evidentiary hearing and referred its summation 
of the evidence to a medical panel doctor. 
Although there was conflicting medical evid-
ence in the record, the administrative law 
judge ultimately adopted the findings expre-
ssed by the medical panel doctor, Dr. Preece. 
Based on these findings, the administrative law 
judge denied both claims. The Commission 
affirmed the administrative law judge's dete-
rmination concluding: 1) petitioner's 1985 
heart attack was not related to or precipitated 
by his 1984 heart attack, and 2) neither the 
1984 heart attack nor the 1985 heart attack 
was medically related to petitioner's employ-
ment activities. 
Petitioner appeals from the Commission's 
decision claiming: 1) both heart attacks were 
compensable industrial accidents and the 
Commission's determination that no medical 
causation existed was arbitrary and capricious, 
and 2) since Tyger paid petitioner disability 
benefits for the 1984 heart attack, it is esto-
pped from challenging its liability in these 
proceedings, and the Commission erred in 
failing to so determine. 
MEDICAL CAUSATION 
Petitioner claims the medical testimony 
demonstrates that both his 1984 and 1985 
heart attacks were medically related to his 
employment activities. Legal causation is not 
disputed. Thus, our review is limited to 
whether the Commission's determination that 
petitioner's heart attacks were not medically 
related to his employment activities was arbi-
trary and capricious or "without any reason-
able basis in the evidence" to support it. See, 
e.g., Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109, 
111 (Utah 1986).! 
To demonstrate "medical causation," petit-
ioner must introduce evidence establishing 
"that the stress, strain, or exertion required by 
his or her occupation led to the resulting 
injury or disability." Allen v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986). For 
this purpose, petitioner proffered the written 
medical opinions of his two attending physic-
ians, Dr. Heuser, a cardiologist, and Dr. 
Davidson, a family practitioner. Dr. Davidson 
concluded petitioner's 1984 heart attack was 
related to his employment activities and the 
1985 heart attack was a recurrence of the 1984 
heart attack. Dr. Heuser similarly concluded 
that the heart attacks were related but did not 
express an opinion concerning their relation-
ship to petitioner's work activities. 
However, after examining the petitioner and 
reviewing the administrative law judge's 
summation of the evidence and petitioner's 
medical records, Dr. Preece, the medical panel 
doctor, concluded petitioner's heart attacks 
resulted from preexisting medical conditions, 
and were not related to his employment acti-
vities. Specifically, Dr. Preece concluded the 
petitioner's 1984 heart attack resulted from a 
blocked coronary artery. Dr. Preece believed 
the blockage was due to preexisting heart 
disease, and not due to any physical work the 
petitioner performed on the day of his attack. 
Dr. Preece similarly concluded the 1985 heart 
attack was a result of premature atheroscler-
osis and not petitioner's work activities prec-
eding the attack. In his letter to the adminis-
trative law judge, Dr. Preece wrote: 
In summary, ... we have an early 
middle-aged male who is unfort-
unate enough to have had two 
separate myocardial infarctions. He 
•obviously has premature atheroscl-
erosis and we would attribute this 
to his major risk factors including 
the cigarette smoking, the elevated 
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blood cholesterol, and particularly 
the positive family history for cor-
onary artery disease. 
Petitioner's claim, therefore, is that the 
Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
by discounting the opinions of his experts and 
adopting the opinion of the medical panel.2 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated 
that where the medical evidence is conflicting, 
"it is the responsibility of the administrative 
law judge to resolve factual conflicts." Lanc-
aster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 237, 241 (Utah 
1987). Moreover, we do not deem the Com-
mission's findings arbitrary and capricious 
"simply because the Commission adopted the 
findings of the panel rather than those of the 
independent physicians ...." Rekward v. Ind-
ustrial Comm'n, 755 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). Accordingly, we find there was 
competent, comprehensive medical evidence in 
the record upon which the Commission could 
rely in concluding that petitioner's heart 
attacks were not medically related to his 
employment activities, and thus we reject this 
aspect of petitioner's challenge. 
REOPENING LIABILITY FOR 1984 HEART 
ATTACK 
Petitioner also filed a claim for additional 
benefits relating to the 1984 heart attack, 
claiming that since he had received the temp-
orary disability benefits, his condition had 
deteriorated. See Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
78 (1988). The Commission, again relying on 
the opinions of the medical panel, rejected 
petitioner's claim. Instead, the Commission 
concluded the 1984 heart attack was not a 
compensable industrial accident because it was 
not medically related to petitioner's employ-
ment activities. Petitioner claims the Board 
was precluded from "reopening" the initial 
question of compensibility of the prior 1984 
heart attack because Tyger had voluntarily 
paid benefits. Therefore, petitioner argues 
Tyger is estopped from now denying that his 
injury was compensable under the Workers' 
Compensation Act. Petitioner further argues 
the Commission's review should have been 
limited to a consideration of whether his 
condition had deteriorated, which if answered 
in the affirmative, entitled him to additional 
disability benefits. 
Petitioner's position fails for two reasons. 
First, the mere fact that an employer pays 
benefits initially without contesting liability 
does not mean it is thereafter, as a matter of 
law, barred from contesting liability. See, e.g., 
Crow v. Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 333, 
140 P.2d 321, 321-22 (1943); Harding v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 83 Utah 376, 28 P.2d 
182, 184 (1934); Taggart v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 79 Utah 598, 12 P.2d 356, 357 
(1932). In Harding, the Utah Supreme Court 
wrote: 
ial Commission „ 
fv. R?P, ft 21 
Ordinarily, in the absence of prej-
udice to the employee or of facts 
giving rise to estoppel, an insurance 
carrier may, notwithstanding volu-
ntary payment of compensation, the 
furnishing of hospital or medical 
care, the entry of appearance, or 
statement made that the policy 
covered the employee, urge the 
defense that the employee did not 
meet with an accident, ... or that 
there was no causal connection 
between the injury and disability. 
28 P.2d at 184. Petitioner has failed to allege 
sufficient facts to establish that Tyger should 
be estopped from contesting its liability for the 
1984 heart attack. For instance, petitioner has 
not demonstrated that he changed his position 
or relinquished any rights as a result of recei-
ving temporary disability payments. Cf. Crow, 
140P.2dat321. 
Moreover, adopting the position urged by 
petitioner would encourage employers to 
contest all employment related injuries to 
avoid later being estopped from raising their 
claims. 
It would be unjust to both the 
employee and the insurance carrier 
if the law were that when the insu-
rance carrier once undertakes to 
provide medical or other care for an 
injured [employee] it has lost all 
right to afterwards defend against 
what it believes to be an unjust or 
illegal claim. The insurance carrier 
cannot and ought not wait until full 
investigation has been made before 
providing necessary care and treat-
ment for injured [employees!. 
Harding, 28 P.2d at 184. See generally, 4 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 
§82.61 at 15-1215 to 15-1224 (1989) 
(voluntary payment does not constitute an 
"award" for which proceedings may be reop-
ened nor does it waive the employer's right to 
later dispute the claim). 
A second reason for rejecting petitioner's 
claim is that petitioner's 1984 heart attack was 
never formally considered by the Industrial 
Commission. Thus, the Commission did not 
"reopen" the issue of compensability, but 
rather reviewed petitioner's heart attack for 
the first time. Accordingly, we review the 
Commission's determination with respect to 
the 1984 heart attack under the same standard 
of review previously set forth in this opinion, 
and our conclusion remains the same—there 
is substantial, competent medical testimony 
supporting the Commission's conclusion that 
petitioner's 1984 heart attack was not medic-
ally related to his employment activities. 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission's 
determination denying petitioner disability 
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benefits is affirmed. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. These proceedings were commenced before the 
effective date of the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-l to-22 (1988 
Supp.). For a recent case discussing the Act's effect 
on the standard for reviewing agency findings of 
fact, see Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 110 
Utah Adv. Rep. 34,35-36 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
2. Petitioner also claims the Commission improperly 
afforded greater weight to the medical panel's 
opinion. Specifically, the Commission wrote: 
In cases where medical opinion contro-
verting that of the medical panel is 
submitted, the Commission has in the' 
past maintained a fairly consistent pra-
ctice of deferring to the medical panel 
absent good reason shown why the 
medical panel report is insufficient or 
biased. In the instant case, the medical 
panel doctor is a well respected specialist 
in cardiology and his report is clear and 
unequivocal regarding his conclusions 
that the infarction was caused by pre-
existing conditions and not exertional 
activity. Although Dr. Heuser and Dr. 
Davidson make contrary conclusions, 
the reasons for those conclusions are not 
stated. In contrast, the medical panel 
doctor's conclusions are explained with 
a listing given [sic] of the numerous pre-
existing conditions suffered by the app-
licant predisposing him to cardiac arrest. 
Petitioner claims the Commission granted the 
medical panel's expert opinion a presumption of 
correctness, contrary to Utah law. See, e.g., 
Rushton v. Geko Express, 732 P.2d 109, 111-12 
(Utah 1986). We agree the Commission's statements 
are inappropriate. The Commission must always 
weigh conflicting evidence in light of materiality, 
credibility, and competency, among other recognized 
considerations, without any preconceived deference 
to either side. However, we are not persuaded the 
Commission's unfortunate dicta affected its deci-
sion. Taken in the context of the Commission's 
further elaborations, it is dear that the Commission 
also considered acceptable factors, and found the 
medical panel opinion more credible and based on 
specific preexisting conditions suffered by petitioner. 
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BOXINGS, Judge: 
Defendant Roger Clayton Smith appeals 
from his jury conviction of two counts of 
attempted second degree murder and one 
count of possession of a weapon by a restri-
cted person. Defendant claims the trial court 
erred in denying his motion for a new trial 
and motion to arrest judgment. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Defendant, a restricted person, found two 
teenage boys soaping the windows of and 
throwing eggs at his friend's daughter's car. 
Defendant blocked the boys' car and as they 
attempted to leave, fired several shots into the 
car at dose range seriously injuring one of the 
boys. 
Based on these events, defendant was con-
victed by a jury of two counts of attempted 
second degree murder in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-4-101 (1978) and §76-5-
203 (1988), and possession of a weapon by a 
restricted person in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-10-503 (1988). Following his 
conviction, defendant moved to arrest judg-
ment and for a new trial claiming he was 
deprived of a fair trial because one of the 
jurors was threatened by an unknown indivi-
dual during the trial. The court denied both 
motions on October 13, 1987, by an unsigned 
minute entry, and committed defendant to the 
Division of Corrections for a ninety-day 
diagnostic evaluation. 
Following the initial diagnostic evaluation, 
the trial court granted defendant's motion to 
appoint alienists pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ § 7 7 - 1 6 - 1 , - 2 (1982) . The order was 
granted for the purpose of considering 
PRICE RIVER COAL CO 
Cite a* 7^1 if2d I 
Plaintiff merely asserts that defendant 
Look his land from Tracy Wright, a witne^ 
in the Sullivan case We must therefore 
consider whether a "predecessor in inter-
est" of defendant's had an opportunity and 
similar motive to develop the testimony 
presented in the abstract 
The phrase "predecessor in interest" is a 
term of art Rule 804 of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence as originally drafted by the 
Supreme Court allowed former testimony 
to be used if the party against whom the 
testimony was offered or a person "with 
motive and interest" similar to his had cin 
opportunity to examine the witness Wem 
stein, Evidence II 804[01] (1985) The 
House of Representative Judiciary Commit-
tee, however, rejected that standard as un-
fair and redrafted the rule to require a 
party's "predecessor in interest" to have 
been present and to have had a simiUr 
motive to develop the testimony Id The 
Senate adopted the version of the rule 
promulgated by the House, as did Utah 
when it adopted the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. While we agree that the "predeces-
sor in interest" requirement is broader 
than the common law privity requirement, 
which required a common property interest 
between the parties, Lloyd v American 
Export Lines, Inc, 580 F 2d 1179, 1185-87 
(3d Cir), cert, denied, 439 US 969, 99 
S Ct 461, 58 L Ed 2d 428 (1978), we do not 
find the similarity of parties here close 
enough to permit use of the testimony 
against defendant under the rule In the 
Sullivan case, the central issue was wheth-
er John Condas trespassed upon Sullivan's 
land While Condas presented evidence 
concerning all of the road, the case and 
Sullivan's main concern in cross-examina-
tion focused upon the nature of the road 
where it abutted Sullivan's land We find 
the relationship between Sullivan, who in 
1927 tried to prove a trespass by demon-
strating that White Pine Canyon was not 
public where it abutted his land, and de-
fendant in the present action to be too 
attenuated to consider Sullivan a predeces-
sor in interest of defendant. 
Based on the foregoing, we find that it 
was error for the trial judge to have collat-
v. INDUSTRIAL COMN Utah 1()79 
079 (Utah 19K6) 
erallv estopped defendant bv the outcome 
of the Sullivan and Condas cases and to 
have admitted the abstract of the record 
from the Sullivan case 
Reversed and remanded for trial 
H\LL C J , and HOWE and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ , concur 
STEWART, J , dissents 
( O f KEYNUM8tRSYSUM> 
PRICE RIVER COAL CO. and Insur-
ance Co. of North America, 
Employer-Carrier, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and Marie T. Mabbutt, widow of 
Fred C. Mabbutt, deceased, Defendants. 
No. 20473. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Dec 31, 1986 
Industrial Commission allowed death 
benefits for surviving spouse of employee, 
who died of heart attack while working as 
miner Employer filed action for review 
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J , held 
that (1) employee's heart attack was "un-
expected or unintended event" that caused 
his death and, therefore, was "accident" 
within meaning of statute, which allows 
compensation for dependents of employee 
killed bv accident arising out of or in the 
course of employment, (2) establishing that 
employee's heart attack arose out of or in 
the course of employment, rather than as 
result of preexisting heart disease, re-
quired finding that employment activities 
involved exertion or stress in excess of 
normally expected level of nonemployment 
activity for persons in latter half of twenti-
eth century, and (3) remand was required 
* * 
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for administrative law judge to make addi-
tional findings of fact as to what employee 
was doing on day of heart attack. 
Remanded. 
Stewart, J., dissented and filed opinion 
joined by Hall, C.J. 
1. Workers' Compensation <s=»571 
Employee's heart attack while working 
as belt attendant in underground coal mine 
was "unexpected or unintended event" that 
caused his death and, therefore, was "acci-
dent" within meaning of statute, which al-
lows compensation for dependents of em-
ployee killed by accident arising out of or 
in the course of employment. U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Workers' Compensation =^»571 
Establishing that employee's heart at-
tack arose out of or in the course of em-
ployment, rather than as result of preexist-
ing heart disease, required finding that em-
ployment activities involved exertion or 
stress in excess of normally expected level 
of nonemployment activity for persons in 
latter half of twentieth century. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45. 
3. Workers' Compensation <*=>1949 
Inadequacy of administrative law 
judge's findings as to what employee's ac-
tivities were on day of death while working 
alone justified remand for more detailed, 
resolution of conflicting testimony, find-
ings and determination whether activities 
amounted to unusual or extraordinary ex-
ertion causing heart attack that arose out 
of or in course of employment. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45. 
4. Workers' Compensation «=»1536 
Evidence that belt attendant job was 
sometimes performed by women did not 
establish that job required less than ex-
traordinary effort or strain and that male 
employee's heart attack was caused by 
preexisting heart disease, rather than 
course of employment 
5. Workers' Compensation <£=>1949 
Uncertainty as to whether administra-
tive law judge intended to apply correct 
legal standard when it used words, "un-
usual exertion," in concluding that employ-
ee's heart attack arose out of or in course 
of employment justified remand for appli-
cation of proper standard to determine le-
gal cause. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 35-
1-45. 
6. Workers' Compensation <s=»1730 
Medical panel, which served purpose of 
taking facts as found by administrative law 
judge and assisting administrative law 
judge to decide whether medical cause has 
been proven, does not serve role of resolv-
ing conflicts in factual evidence with re-
gard to injured party's activities. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45, 35-1-85. 
7. Workers' Compensation <£=>1730 
Administrative law judge permitting 
medical panel to resolve factual disputes 
improperly abdicates function. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45, 35-1-85. 
James M. Elegante, Erie V. Boorman, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Virginius 
Dabney, Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
On December 20, 1984, the Industrial 
Commission through its administrative law 
judge issued findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, and an order allowing death bene-
fits for applicant Marie J. Mabbutt, the 
widow of Fred C. Mabbutt, who died of a 
heart attack while working as a miner for 
plaintiff Price River Coal Co. ("PRC"). 
Mrs. Mabbutt's claim for compensation was 
based upon the Workers' Compensation 
Act, U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (1974 ed., 
Supp.1986), which allows compensation to 
"the dependents of every such employee 
who is killed, by accident arising out of or 
in the course of his employment" PRC's 
motion for reconsideration or review was 
denied by the Industrial Commission. PRC 
tr 
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thereupon filed this action for review. We 
remand for additional findings of fact. 
Fred C. Mabbutt was found dead on Oc-
tober 23, 1981, at the end of his eight-hour 
shift as a belt attendant in PRC's under-
ground coal mine in Helper, Utah. Mab-
butt's job consisted of keeping certain un-
derground conveyor belts working and of 
keeping the belt rollers and the area sur-
rounding these belts free of coal dust and 
other materials which fall from the belts or 
collect around them in the normal course of 
their operation. 
According to both parties, the crux of 
this case is the question of whether there is 
substantial evidence to support the decision 
of the administrative law judge that Fred 
Mabbutt's heart attack and subsequent 
death satisfies the requirement of section 
35-1-45 that the death be "by accident 
arising out of or in the course of his em-
ployment." However, both sides disagree 
about the appropriate legal standard to be 
applied in evaluating the evidence. There-
fore, we have two questions on appeal. 
The first is, What constitutes a compensa-
ble "accident"? The second question is 
whether the evidence of Mr. Mabbutt's ac-
tivities on the day of his death satisfies the 
element of causation such that the acci-
dent, if one did occur, was in fact related to 
his employment. 
There is no need to dwell at length on the 
question of the appropriate legal standard. 
This issue has just been dealt with exten-
sively in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). There we at-
tempted to settle the meaning of the term 
"by accident," which had become confused 
by varying and inconsistent statements 
from this Court over a long period of time. 
The Allen definition is as follows: "Where 
either the cause of the injury or the result 
of an exertion was different from what 
would normally be expected to occur, the 
occurrence was unplanned, unforeseen, 
unintended and therefore 'by accident.'" 
Id. at 22 (emphasis in original). This 
definition follows the standard articulated 
in Carting v. Industrial Commission, 16 
Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), and in 
earlier decisions of this Court that can be 
traced back to 1922, including most notably 
Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). This 
standard has been fottowed most recent/y 
in Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 
P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980), and Kaiser Steel 
Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890-91 
(Utah 1981). 
[1] Under the Allen standard, it is fair-
ly easy to determine that Mr. Mabbutt did 
die "by accident" on October 23, 1981. His 
heart attack was certainly an "unexpected 
or unintended" event that resulted in his 
death. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 
at 22. However, the finding that the 
death was "by accident" does not complete 
the analysis of whether the resulting injury 
is compensable. Under Allen, the more 
difficult question involves the determina-
tion of whether the injury had the requisite 
connection with the employment duties— 
whether it arose "out of or in the course of 
. . . employment." U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 
(1974 ed., Supp.1986); see Allen v. Indus-
trial Commission, at 22. 
Prior to Allen, the obvious need for a 
test to assure that there was a causal con-
nection between the injury and the employ-
ment duties of the injured party was some-
times dealt with in our cases by requiring 
that th$ occurrence resulting in the injury 
be shown to have involved "unusual exer-
tion." Allen v. Industrial Commission, 
at 23, This is the standard apparently ap-
plied by the Commission in this case and 
found to have been met. 
However, Allen discarded the 
usual/unusual exertion distinction as a 
means for determining whether the injury 
was the result of an "accident." Instead, 
the Court dealt with the causation require-
ment in more candid terms that focus 
frankly on the questions of legal and medi-
cal causation. It delineated the analysis as 
follows: 
Under the legal test, the law must define 
what kind of exertion satisfies the test of 
"arising out of the employment" . . . 
[then] the doctors must say whether the 
exertion (having been held legally suffi-
% 
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cient to support compensation) in fact 
caused this [injury]. 
Id. at 25, citing Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation § 38.83(a), at 7-276 to -277 
(1986). 
In applying the Allen analysis to the 
present case, then, the first question is 
whether legal cause has been shown. Un-
der Allen, a usual or ordinary exertion, so 
long as it is an activity connected with the 
employee's duties, will suffice to show le-
gal cause. However, if the claimant suf-
fers from a pre-existing condition, then he 
or she must show that the employment 
activity involved some unusual or extraor-
dinary exertion over and above the "usual 
wear and tear and exertions of nonem-
ployment life." Allen v. Industrial Com-
mission, at 26. In appraising whether 
the employee's exertion would be usual or 
ordinary in nonemployment life, an objec-
tive standard is to be applied that is based 
on the nonemployment life of the average 
person, not the nonemployment life of a 
particular worker. Id. The requirement 
of "unusual or extraordinary exertion" is 
designed to screen out those injuries that 
result from a personal condition which the 
worker brings to the job, rather than from 
exertions required of the employee in the 
workplace. Id. at 25.! 
In the present case, Mabbutt was suffer-
ing from a preexisting condition which con-
tributed greatly to his heart attack. The 
evidence is uncontroverted that he had hy-
pertensive cardiovascular disease, atheros-
clerotic cardiovascular disease, and possi-
bly diabetic cardiomyopathy. His hyper-
tension was exacerbated by his obesity and 
possibly a high salt diet. He was a diabetic 
and had gout The doctor on the medical 
1. As a practical matter, when the Allen standard 
is being applied to cases which may involve 
preexisting conditions, before evidence is taken 
on the issue of legal cause, the Commission 
would be well-advised to first make a determi-
nation of whether or not the preexisting condi-
tion does in fact exist. If a preexisting condi-
tion exists, then the parties and the hearing 
officer will know that the "extraordinary exer-
tion" test will be applied to the facts as they are 
developed, and the evidence can be appropriate-' 
ly prepared and marshalled for presentation to 
panel to which this case was referred by 
the administrative law judge concluded 
that there was no evidence that Mabbutt's 
work "had any relationship to [his] develop-
ment of coronary artery disease." 
[2] Since Mabbutt brought heart dis-
ease to the workplace, before legal causa-
tion can be established, the Commission 
must find that his employment activities 
involved exertion or stress in excess of the 
normally expected level of nonemployment 
activity for men and women in the latter 
half of the twentieth century. If such a 
finding is made, then the requirement of 
legal cause is satisfied because it is pre-
sumed that the employment increased the 
risk of injury to which that worker was 
otherwise subject in his nonemployment 
life. At that point, the inquiry shifts to 
medical cause, i.e.t whether the injured par-
ty's work-related activities were, in fact, 
causally linked to the injury. Allen v. In-
dustrial Commission, at 26. 
The question of whether the employment 
activities of a given employee are sufficient 
to satisfy the legal standard of unusual or 
extraordinary effort involves two steps. 
First, the agency must determine as a mat-
ter of fact exactly what were the employ-
ment-related activities of the injured em-
ployee. Second, the agency must decide 
whether those activities amounted to un-
usual or extraordinary exertion. This sec-
ond determination is a mixed question of 
law and fact. 
[3] Because the whole legal cause de-
termination hinges upon the agency's find-
ings as to what the injured worker's job-re-
lated activities were, our review of the 
Commission's decision must begin with 
those findings. In the present case, we are 
the fact finder. If a preexisting condition does 
not exist, the hearing may be expedited because 
there will be no need to show how hard the 
employee was or was not working, only that the 
employment activity led to the injury. Of 
course, even if a preexisting condition is in-
volved, if the Commission finds that legal cause 
does exist, then it is still appropriate to refer the 
matter to a medical panel to determine whether 
the facts, as determined at the legal cause hear-
ing, are sufficient to establish medical causa-
tion. 
gUdU^-* 
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unable to affirm the Commission's ruling 
because of the inadequacy of these find-
ings. In his job, Mabbutt worked alone in 
the mine, and he encountered only one per-
son while working on the day of his death. 
For that reason, it was necessary to infer 
what Mabbutt's activities were from the 
conflicting evidence adduced at the hearing 
before the administrative law judge. The 
company brought in an expert to describe 
his understanding of the exertion required 
to perform that particular job. His testi-
mony would support a conclusion that no 
unusual or extraordinary effort was re-
quired. On the other hand, Mabbutt's wid-
ow introduced testimony from a fellow 
worker who described how she had seen 
Mabbutt perform the work, testimony that 
might support a conclusion that the effort 
required was unusual. This testimony was 
disputed by the company. 
Unfortunately, the administrative law 
judge's findings do not resolve the conflicts 
in the testimony and do not indicate that he 
made a finding as to exactly what Mab-
butt's activities were on the day of his 
death. Absent such findings, it is impossi-
ble for us to take the next step and deter-
mine whether Mabbutt's work-related ac-
tivities, as found by the Commission, rose 
to the level necessary to satisfy the "un-
usual or extraordinary" exertion threshold 
established by Allen for injured employees 
with preexisting problems. 
The administrative law judge found that 
"Mabbutt died as the result of an accident 
in the course of his employment . . . result-
ing from unusual exertion and stress con-
nected with his employment." It may be 
argued that this is a sufficient finding of 
legal cause to warrant our affirming the 
Commission on this point. However, the 
"finding" of unusual exertion and stress is 
2. Wc reject, categorically, the suggestion ad-
vanced by the company that because the belt-at-
tendant job is sometimes performed by women, 
it must necessarily involve less than extraordi-
nary effort or strain. We take judicial notice of 
the fact that women, as a group, tend to be 
smaller in size and have less physical strength 
than do men, as a group. However, with re-
spect to size and strength, individual men and 
women are arrayed over a continuum from one 
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nothing more than a conclusion. It is not 
supported by anything that could be con-
strued as a finding as to precisely what 
Mabbutt was doing on the day of his death. 
We cannot affirm such a mixed conclusion 
of fact and law when its necessary premis-
es are not evident. 
[4,5] There is an added problem here. 
The Commission decided this case under 
pre-A lien law. We cannot determine 
whether the administrative law judge used 
the words "unusual exertion" in the same 
sense as they have been defined by Allen. 
A talismanic incantation of "unusual or 
extraordinary exertion" is not a substitute 
for careful analysis by the Commission of 
whether the actual job-related activities in 
question exceed the normally expected lev-
el of activity for men and women in the 
latter half of the twentieth century.2 In 
the present case, we are uncertain of the 
standard applied by the Commission and 
cannot tell how the stated conclusion was 
reached. For that reason, we must reverse 
and remand the matter to the Commission 
so that proper findings of fact can be en-
tered and the Allen standard can be ap-
plied to them to determine legal cause. 
A word about the issue of medical cause. 
As noted, the administrative law judge did 
not resolve conflicts in the testimony about 
Mabbutt's work activities. However, he 
did adopt the findings of the medical panel, 
which contained a doctor's assumptions 
about what Mabbutt was actually doing on 
the day in question, and which then relied 
on those factual assumptions in finding a 
causal link between the work and his death. 
The factual recitation in the panel report 
was derived from the conflicting evidence 
presented at the hearing and inferences 
drawn from that evidence. In a number of 
extreme to the other. No generalization can be 
made that because a woman performs a certain 
job it necessarily involves strength and exertion 
requirements at the lower end of the spectrum, 
and the contrary is, of course, true of a job 
performed by a man. Each job's demands must 
be evaluated on their own; they cannot be cate-
gorized'as requiring "usual" or "unusual" exer-
tion simply because they are normally done by 
women or men, respectively. 
. » > 
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respects, as the company demonstrated at 
the hearing on its objections to the medical 
panel report and \tv its brief on appeal, the 
panel was confused as to some of the basic 
duties of Mabbutt's job and made assump-
tions about his actual activities which are 
unsupported by the evidence. 
[6,7] It is not the role of the medical 
panel to resolve conflicts in the factual 
evidence regarding the injured party's ac-
tivities. Section 35-1-85 of the Code places 
that responsibility solely on the Commis-
sion. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-85 (1974 ed.). 
Under Allen, as before, the medical panel 
is only to take the facts as found by the 
administrative law judge and consider them 
in light of its medical expertise to assist the 
administrative law judge in deciding wheth-
er medical cause has been proven. The 
medical panel strays beyond its province 
when it attempts to resolve factual dis-
putes, and the administrative law judge 
improperly abdicates his function if he per-
mits the panel to so act. IGA Food Fair v. 
Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978). 
We acknowledge that during the adjudi-
cation of this matter, the Commission was 
laboring under the confusing and conflict-
ing state of the law as it had developed 
prior to Allen, The issues presented by 
this and similar cases should be easier to 
resolve in the future. However, questions 
of some subtlety will remain in cases in-
volving claims for internal failure where 
the worker has a preexisting condition that 
contributes to the injury and where a deter-
mination must be made as to whether a 
specific work activity amounts to "unusual 
or extraordinary" exertion. The concept of 
"unusual or extraordinary" exertion re-
mains to be fleshed out over time. Of 
necessity, the process of pouring specific 
content into that concept will rely heavily 
upon the Commission's expertise in and 
familiarity with the work environment. 
This case is remanded to the Industrial 
Commission for findings of fact as to what 
Mabbutt's activities actually were on the 
day of his death. Based upon those find-
ings and upon a review of Allen, the Com-
mission may then adhere to or abandon its 
conclusion that those activities amounted to 
extraordinary exertion. Because the deter-
mination of medical cause must be h&sed 
upon the Commission's findings as to the 
actual activities of the worker, and because 
the panel's report in the present case rest-
ed upon the medical panel's improper as-
sumptions as to the facts, the Commission 
should resubmit the question of medical 
causation to the panel after it has made the 
appropriate factual findings. 
HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice (dis-
senting)'. 
I dissent. In one of the first important 
tests of the rules laid down in Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 
1986), the majority reverses and remands 
to "resubmit the question of medical causa-
tions to the panel." But the medical panel 
has already addressed that exact question, 
and the administrative law judge found 
that the decedent's death was caused by 
his job-related activities on the day that the 
fatal accident occurred. What more the 
court expects than has been done by the 
Commission is not explained by the majori-
ty. The administrative law judge was cor-
rect in his ruling, the Commission so found, 
and I agree. 
It is precisely this kind of case that dem-
onstrates that our newly formulated meth-
ods of analysis will inevitably draw the 
Commission off into pathways that are 
bound, I believe, to lead to error. The 
Court's unfortunate requirement that, 
since Mabbutt had a preexisting condition, 
the Commission must find "that his em-
ployment activities involved exertion or 
stress in excess of the normally expected 
level of activity ior men and women in the 
latter of the twentieth century," is precise-
ly the discriminatory application of work-
ers' compensation laws to workers with a 
preexisting condition, which I referred to in 
my dissent in Allen. 
I would affirm on the authority of Pitts-
burgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 
P.2d 1367 (Utah 1983), and Kaiser Steel 
Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 
c&t> 
STATE v 
Cite as 731 P^d 
1981). Like Pittsburgh Testing and 
Monfredi, the decedent's preexisting coro-
nary condition was clearly aggravated in 
this case. The administrative law judge 
made that clear in his findings: 
(T]here is no way of knowing exactly 
how long before the hour of 4:20 p.m. the 
applicant first felt the effects of that 
stress or at what time he actually died 
but it could have been some hours before 
4:20 p.m. We are not called upon to 
speculate as to those times or as to the 
excessive stress or exertion later in the 
afternoon in view of the fact that two 
fine cardiologists have agreed that the 
evidence is sufficient to convince them 
that the death was industrially related. 
The Administrative Law Judge finds 
that Mr. Mabbutt died as the result of an 
accident in the course of his employment 
on October 23, 1981 resulting from un-
usual exertion and stress connected with 
his employment on that fateful after-
noon. 
I would affirm. The Commission has 
found the necessary facts, and it is not for 
us to ignore them. 
HALL, CJ., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of STEWART, Associate C J . 
(O |MYmmwIsYSTlM> 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Joseph P. DORSEY, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 20124. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 31, 1986. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Timothy 
DORSEY Utah 1085 
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Hanson, J., of possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute for value. Defendant 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, 
Associate C.J., held that there was probable 
cause for officer's stop and search of defen-
dant's truck. 
Affirmed. 
Zimmerman, J., filed an opinion concur-
ring in the result in which Durham, J., 
joined. 
1. Arrest <3=>63.5(6) 
Probable cause requirement for search 
is subject to narrow exception for stops of 
moving vehicles where police officers have 
articulable suspicion that automobile's oc-
cupants are involved in criminal activity. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
2. Searches and Seizures <3=>40 
Validity of determination of probable 
cause to conduct search is made from ob-
jective standpoint of prudent, reasonable, 
cautious police officer guided by his experi-
ence and training. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
4. 
3. Searches and Seizures <s=»40 
Determination of whether probable 
cause existed to conduct search depends 
upon examination of all information avail-
able to searching officer in light of circum-
stances as they existed at time search was 
made. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
4. Searches and Seizures <*=»41 
In making determination of probable 
cause justifying search, police officer is 
entitled to rely on information gained from 
other police officers. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 4. 
5. Arrest <s=»63.5(6) 
Drugs and Narcotics <*=>183 
Although actual observations of police 
officer conducting search were not enough 
to rise to the level of probable cause, infor-
mation that he received from other officers 
involved in undercover narcotics buy was 
sufficient for him to conclude there was 
probable cause for stop and search of de-
fendant's truck. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
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TAGGART v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH et al. 
No. 5281. Decided June 18, 1932. [12 P. (2d) 356.] 
1. MASTER AND SERVANT. Compensation claimant must establish 
hemorrhage contributing to employee's death was due to com-
pensable accident. 
2. MASTER AND SERVANT. Death of flour company's employee who 
had been engaged in sifting phosphate which irritated his nose, 
and which death was contributed to by hemorrhage of nose, held 
not result of accident "arising out of and in course of employ-
ment"1 
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of "Arising Out of Em-
ployment" and "Course of Employment," see Words and 
Phrases.] 
3. MASTER AND SERVANT Finding of Industrial Commission sup-
ported by substantial evidence will not be disturbed. 
4. INSURANCE. That employer's insurer paid compensation to em-
ployee held not to preclude insurer from denying that employee 
met with accident causing death.2 
Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by 
Mrs. Adelgunda Taggart for the death of James H. Tag-
gart, her husband, opposed by the Sperry Flour Company, 
employer, and the Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corporation, 
insurer. The Industrial Commission of Utah denied claim-
ant's application, and she brings an original proceeding 
in the Supreme Court to review its order. 
AFFIRMED. 
C. R. Hollingsworth, of Ogden, for plaintiff. 
Geo. P. Parker, Atty. Gen., and Bagley, Jvdd & Ray, of 
Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
distinguishing Amalgamated Sugar Co. V. Industrial Commission, 
56 Utah 80, 189 P. 69; Tintic Milling Co. V. Industrial CommUtum, 
60 Utah 14, 206 P. 278, 23 A. L. R. 325. 
2Halling v. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 112, 263 P. 78. 
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WOLFE, District Judge. 
James H. Taggart died on April 27, 1931. His widow, 
the petitioner, Adelgunda Taggart, filed her application with 
the Industrial Commission claiming compensation for the 
death of her husband. This was on the ground that on 
August 11, 1928, he suffered an accident while in the course 
of his employment resulting in a hemorrhage of the nose 
involving a great loss of blood, which in turn weakened the 
heart muscles, from which weakened condition of the heart 
death resulted. It transpired from the evidence that Tag-
gart worked for the Sperry Flour Company since 1920; 
that from that date until August, 1928, he had apparently 
been in good health and had no serious illnesses; that he 
weighed over 200 pounds at the time of his hemorrhage. 
At that time he was engaged in sifting phosphate which was 
to be mixed with self-rising flour; that for about a year 
previous to the hemorhage he had been sifting phosphate 
several times a day for comparatively brief intervals; that 
there is always a certain amount of flour dust and other 
dust in a flour mill; that phosphate in this case meant cal-
cium acid phosphate consisting of about 98 per cent phos-
phate calcium which caused, or was likely to cause, some 
irritation of the nose and respiratory tract as also did flour 
dust to some extent. Upon the day in question the deceased 
suffered a severe hemorrhage bleeding profusely from the 
nose. It is a fair conclusion from all the evidence that the 
hemorrhage indirectly caused or contributed to the death. 
The question is: Was the hemorrhage due to an accident 
arising out of or in the course of the employment? 
The doctor testified that the hemorrhage was caused by 
an ulcer about two-thirds of the distance from the end of 
the nose to the top of the septum in the right nostril; that 
blood came from at least two blood vessels. Dr. Harding 
gave it as his opinion that the constant use of phosphate 
had dried the mucous membrane and that in a man of his 
age perhaps one of the small blood vessels was near the sur-
face of the mucous membrane; that repetition of drying 
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out the membrane and dilation of the small blood vessel due 
to blowing the nose burst the vessel. There was no direct 
evidence as to whether the bleeding had been caused by 
picking or blowing the nose or by sneezing, or by some other 
circumstance, although Dr. Harding testified that the de-
ceased had stated that he felt all the time that he wanted to 
blow something out of his nose but there was nothing there. 
Dr. Donoher testified that in his opinion a single inhalation 
of calcium phosphate could not have caused the perforating 
ulcer, but that the development covered a considerable pe-
riod of time; that the mucous membranse farthest from the 
blood supply would be attacked first by the dust and phos-
phate in the air at those places where there were iregular-
ities of the membrane; that the depressed spaces of the 
membrane would accumulate dust and that a scaling would 
result; that such scale might, in the course of time, be picked 
of or blown off or fall off by the contraction of the crust 
itself; that in the course of time, nobody could tell how 
long, the scale would become thicker and the depression 
deeper and would go through the septum and perforate it, 
and upon striking a blood vessel of considerable size there 
would be marked bleeding. 
The commission found: "That the hemorrhage so suffered 
by James H. Taggart was not the result of an accident aris-
ing out of or in the course of his said employment with the 
Sperry Flour Company, but was the result of the gradual 
growth and development of said ulcer to a point where 
such growth and gradual progress caused a rupture of a 
blood vessel in the said James H. Taggart's nose; that said 
hemorrhage was not caused directly or indirectly by any 
accident arising out of or in the course of his said employ-
ment." 
The applicant contends that there was no competent evi-
dence to support said finding, but that the evidence shows 
that the death resulted from an accident arising out of or 
in the course of the employment. A reading of the record 
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reveals that no only was there competent evidence to 
support the finding of the commission, but that it is 1-3 
doubtful whether the commission could have made 
any other finding under the evidence. The applicant failed 
to sustain the burden of proving that the hemorrhage was 
due to an accident. If it were conceded that the picking 
of the nose or sudden blowing or sneezing was itself such 
an accident for which compensation could be given and the 
mere fact that it happened during the time of employment 
would satisfy the requirement of being in the course of the 
employment, there nevertheless is no evidence in this case 
to show that the hemorrhage occurred from any of such 
causes. It may have occurred naturally by the scale falling 
off, the mucous membrane carrying with it a portion of 
the wall of the blood vessel, and might have occurred any 
other place as well as during the time the deceased was at 
his employment. It is quite difficult to see how the com-
mission could have decided it any other way under the evi-
dence of this case. At the most, the hemorrhage was caused 
by an occupational disease which is not compensable under 
our law. Under the oft-repeated principle laid down by 
this court, if there is any substantial evidence to support 
the finding of the commission the award will not be dis-
turbed. There is not only substantial evidence supporting 
the finding that the hemorrhage was not due to an acci-
dent, but it is questionable whether there is any substan-
tial evidence in the record that it was due to an accident. 
The cases cited by the applicant, Amalgamated Sugar Co. 
V. Industrial Commission, 56 Utah 80,189 P. 69; Tintic Mill-
ing Co. V. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 14, 206 P. 278, 
23 A. L. R. 325; and Industrial Commission of Ohio V. Tol-
son, 37 Ohio App. 282, 174 N. E. 622, are readily distin-
guishable in principle from the instant case. 
It appears that the Ocean Accident & Guarantee Cor-
poration, insurance carrier for the Sperry Flour Company, 
paid compensation of $59.43 covering compensation for twen-
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify 
award — Authority to destroy records — Interest 
on award — No authority to change statutes of 
limitation. 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be 
continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time 
modify or change its former findings and orders. Records pertaining to cases 
that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than cases of total 
permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section 
35-1-99, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the 
rate of 8% per annum from the date when each benefit payment would have 
otherwise become due and payable. 
(3) (a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the 
statutes of limitations contained in other sections of this chapter or Chap-
ter 2, Title 35, the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law. 
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation 
referred to in Subsection (a) in any respect. 
243 
Jury tnai. _ . _ 
Employer, who denied accident arose Co. v. Industr ial Comm., 53 U. 133, i/fl 
out of and in course of employment, was P . 57. 
35-1-85. Duty of commission to make findings of fact and conclusions 
of law—Filing—Conclusiveness on questions of fact—Review—Court judg-
ment.—After each formal hearing, it shall be the duty of the commis-
sion to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in writing and file the 
same with its secretary. The findings and conclusions of the commission 
on questions of fact shall be conclusive and final and shall not be subject 
to review; such questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and the find-
ings and conclusions of the commission. The commission and every party 
to the action or proceeding before the commission shall have the right 
to appear in the review proceeding. Upon the hearing the court shall 
enter judgment either affirming or setting aside the award. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 87; C. L. Where employee suffered pain as result 
1917, §3148; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1 ; R. S. of l if t ing heavy object and seven months 
1933 & 0. 1943,-42-1-79; I*. 1949, ch. 52, § 1 . la ter lifted another heavy object which 
caused hernia, finding of industrial Cora-
Compiler's Notes. mission tha t hernia followed second lift-
The Supreme Court of Utah has indi- nig resulted from pain nnd exertion of 
cated this section is still in effect al- first l if t ing was not supported by substan-
though it was purported to have been tial evidence and, hence, was set aside, 
amended by subst i tut ing the provisions Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Industr ial 
set forth as section 35-1-85.1 therefor. Comm., 64 U. 415, 213 P . 442. 
Vause v. Industr ial Comm., 17 U. (2d) If findings of commission are insuffi-
217, 407 P. 2d 1006; Baker v. Industr ia l cient to support a finding tha t employee 
Comm., 17 U. (2d) 141, 405 P . 2d 613, is suffering from a disabili ty caused by 
dissenting opinion. an accidental fall, i t s award will be an-
The 1949 amendment inserted the first nulled. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Indus-
sentence, tr ial Comm.,* 74 U. 170, 278 P. 60. 
Where industr ial commission denied corn-
Accident not arising in course of employ- pensation on ground tha t employee's in-
nient. jury was result of revival of old injury 
In appeal from award grant ing com- for which employee had been compen-
pensation for death of employee from sated, order was annulled since compensa-
blood poisoning from a scratch where tion cannot be denied because new injury 
physical surroundings were not such tha t revived existing infirmity of employee, 
commission could reasonably infer, to the Spencer v. Industr ia l Comm., 87 U. 336, 
exclusion of other causes, "that the acci- 40 P. 2d 188, affd. 87 U. 358, 48 P . 2d 
dent from which the injury resulted hap 1120. 
pened in course of employment, award was In compensation proceeding for injury 
annulled. Cudahy Packing Co. of Ne suffered by employee while working for 
braska v. Brown, 61 TJ. 29, 210 P. 608. state road commission, in a t tempt ing to 
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TITLE VI. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO COURT OF APPEALS. 
Rule 42. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of 
Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a 
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.) 
Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective January 1, 
1988]. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and 
(v) the state engineer; 
(0 a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except for the following matters: 
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(0 taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, 
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. Certiorari, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 4; 
1986, ch. 47, ft 41; 1987, ch. 161, ft 303. U.R.C.P. 65B. 
Amended effective January 1, 1988. — Chief justice to preside over impeachment of 
Laws 1987, ch. 161, ft 303 amends this section governor, § 77-6-3. 
effective January 1, 1988. See catchline Election contest appeals, ftft 20-3-35, 
"Amendment Notes," below. 20-15-14. 
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Rule 42. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of 
Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a 
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.) 
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. \ INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
c / NORMAN H BANGERTER, GOVERNOR 
November 1&, 1987 
STEPHEN M. HADLEY, CHAIRMAN 
L L. NIELSEN. COMMISSIONER 
X)HN FLOREZ, COMMISSIONER 
Michael J. Preece, M.D. 
333 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8A102 
Dear Dr. Preece: 
Re: Douglas Olsen 
Inj: 10/29/84 
Emp: Tyger Construction 
You are hereby appointed chairman of a medical panel to evaluate the 
medical aspects of this case. 
Enclosed please find available x-rays and medical records for your 
review. 
I would appreciate your assistance in answering the following 
questions, in terms of reasonable medical probability: 
1. Was the heart attack of October 29, 1984, a result of 
or related to the work activities of October 29, 
1984? Please explain as necessary. 
2. Was the heart attack of December 2, 1985, causally 
related to the heart attack of October 29, 1984? 
Please explain as necessary. 
3. What is the permanent impairment, if any, due to the 
events of October 29, 1984? 
4. What is the pre-existing heart impairment? 
5. Did the injury of October 29, 1984, aggravate the 
pre-existing heart condition? If so, was the 
aggravation permanent or temporary? 
Neither a representative of the Commission nor the parties to this 
proceeding, other than the applicant, will be in attendance at your 
deliberations. 
/ / / 
DOUGLAS OLSEN 
PAGE TWO 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
BY DIRECTION: 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
en 
Law Judge 
TCA:sj 
cc: Douglas R. Olsen, P.O. Box 687, Mancos, Colo 81328 
Robert Shaughnessy, Atty., P.O. Box 963, SLC, Ut. 84110 
Wausau Insurance Companies, 404 East 4500 S Suite A-34, SLC, Ut. 
Michael Dyer, Atty., P.O. Box 2465, SLC, Ut. 84110 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
84107 
- 0 4 East 45CO South - Suite A 3 4 • Box 7400 • Salt Lake City. Utah 84107 • (Q,P1} 26?-S7c 
Douglas R . Glsen 
P.O. Box 198 
Altamont, Utah 34001 
February 2 7, 1985 
Guy F. Atkinson Company (Tyger Construction 
Douglas R. Olsen 
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We contacted you and determined that on Oeceaber 2, 1985 you 
awoke in the morning with chest pains and subsequently 
underwent treatment and h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n . 
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We will therefore be unable to provide any workers 
compensation benefits for the problea you developed on 
Oeceaber 2t 1985. We are notifying the medical providers of 
our decision by providing them with a copy of this letter. 
If you disagree with our decision, the law requires us to 
advise you that you should contact the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84145-0580. 
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feel free to c o n t a c t i e . 
( / / * o^a--
DICK SAGARA 
C l a i s S u p e r v i s o r 
O S / j a 
cc: Tyger C o n s t r u c t i o n 
A l b u q u e r q u e C a r d i o v a s c u l a r A s s o c i a t e s 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 86000411 
* 
DOUGLAS R. OLSEN, * 
Applicant, * FINDINGS OF FACT 
* 
vs. * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
* 
TYGER CONSTRUCTION and /or * AND ORDER 
WAUSAU INSURANCE COMPANY and * 
SECOND INJURY FUND * 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 16, 
1986 at 10:00 a.m. o'clock. Said hearing was pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was present and represented by Robert J. 
Shaughnessy, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by Michael Dyer, 
Attorney at Law. 
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Erie V. 
Boorman, Administrator. 
Following the evidentiary hearing, the matter was taken under 
advisement by the Administrative Law Judge. Thereafter, the case was referred 
to a medical panel whose report was received by the Commission. The medical 
panel report was mailed to the parties. The applicant, by and through 
counsel, filed objections to the medical panel report supported by a report 
from the applicant's treating physician. The applicant waived any hearing on 
his objections. The applicant's treating physician, a family practitioner, 
concluded that the applicant's work activities of October 29, 1984, resulted 
in his heart attack of that date. By contrast, the medical panel cardiologist 
found that the applicant's heart attack of October 29, 1984, was due to a 
blockage of his coronary artery due to pre-existing heart disease, and not due 
to any physical work he was performing on that date. Dr. Heuser, Mr. Olsen's 
treating cardiologist in New Mexico, also indicates that the applicant's heart 
attacks of October 29, 1984, and December 2, 1985, were due to 
arteriosclerotic coronary disease. 
OtoP 
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The applicant's objection to the medical panel report also indicates 
that the heart attack of December 2, 1985, was directly related to the heart 
attack of October 29, 1984, as found by the applicant's treating family 
practitioner, Dr. Davidson. The doctor concluded, when asked if the December 
2, 1985 heart attack was causally related to the heart attack of October 29, 
1984: "I cannot describe a direct causal relationship, but the second event 
was directly related, in fact a recurrence, of the myocardial infarction that 
took place October 29, 1984. '• The Administrative Law Judge mist respectively 
disagree with Dr. Davidson in this regard, since her foregoing finding is 
contrary to the overwhelming medical evidence contained on the file. For 
example, Dr. Perry, a cardiologist, found that: 
Clearly the inferior wall myocardial infarction was caused 
by acute occlusion of a vessel not involved with his first 
myocardial infarction directly. 
From this I would definitely stated there was no direct 
relationship between his first myocardial infarction and 
the second myocardial infarction fourteen months later in 
December of 1985. 
The panel also found no causal relationship between the heart attack 
of December 2, 1985, and the heart attack of October 29, 1984. 
The Administrative Law Judge finds that the overwhelming 
preponderance of the medical evidence on this file supports the findings of 
the medical panel, and accordingly the objections of the applicant to the 
medical panel report are hereby dismissed. The medical panel report is 
admitted into evidence. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Douglas R. Olsen was hired by Tyger Construction as a laborer in 
April of 1984, to work on the Stillwater Dam project. In July of 1984, the 
applicant was asked to become the operator of the crushing plant. This job 
involved working in a trailer and working the control board. The applicant 
was then promoted to the night foreman of the maintenance crew of the crushing 
plant. On this job, he would work anywhere from eight to twelve hours per 
night. 
On October 29, 1984, the applicant started working at 6:00 p.m. It 
was cold and he had on heavy clothing which was normal for this time of year. 
The maintenance crew used portable welding machines as part of their 
equipment. These machines would sit outside and would thaw out during the 
day, but by the time he reported for work at 6:00 p.m. the machines would be 
frozen to the ground. On this date, they had hooked one of the 500 amp 
welding machines to a truck and were attempting to move it when they 
discovered it was frozen to the ground. The applicant and two other workers 
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then took hold of the tongue of the trailer upon which the welding machine was 
mounted, and tugged on it with all of their strength. The trailer tongue came 
loose, and they then attached it to the truck. 
The applicant then went and sat in a pickup, and after approximately 
five minutes he felt a pain and some pressure in his left chest. The pain 
intensified, and the applicant started to notice that he was sweaty and clammy 
and his left arm started to hurt. He then went Lo the trailer, and was then 
taken to the medical trailer. He was seen by the EMT, and when his condition 
did not improve he was taken by ambulance to the Duschene County Hospital. 
There he came under the treatment of Dr. Ace Madsen, who advised him that he 
was having a heart attack. He was given an injection of Streptokinase. After 
his condition stabilized, he was then transferred to the LDS Hospital where he 
came under the treatment of Dr. Laser. Dr. Laser arranged for an angiogram, 
and Mr. Olsen was given an angioplasty. He was then discharged from the 
hospital four or five days later. He returned to the Roosevelt area, and 
received follow up care from Dr. Madsen. On December 3, 1984, the applicant 
was released by Dr. Madsen to return to work with no limitations. He was paid 
temporary total disability for the period October 30, 1984 through December 2, 
1984. 
When the applicant returned to work, the maintenance was now being 
handled by the daytime crew, so Mr. Olsen returned to his job as the crusher 
operator. He continued to work in that capacity until December 22, 1984, when 
the employees of the crusher were laid off because everything would freeze up 
in the crusher. 
In January of 1985, the applicant was called back to work as a crane 
operator. This job consisted solely of sitting and operating hand controls 
inside a crane. The applicant continued this job until June of 1985, when he 
was placed in charge of the ready-mix concrete plants. The applicant was in 
charge of three plants, and between June and October of 1985, he was working 
60 hours per week. He testified that one of the conveyor belts from the 
concrete plant ran to the dam sight and that belt was on a 7 degree angle 
running downhill. The belt was approximately a mile long. While walking up 
this belt in September of 1985, the applicant started noticing what he thought 
was heart burn high in his stomach and low chest area. He would have to stop 
and catch his breath for three or four minutes, and he would also take a Turns 
or Rolaids and the heart burn would go away. He denied having this heart burn 
at any other time other than while walking up a conveyor belt. He also 
indicated that his heart burn became more and more frequent. By November of 
1985, the applicant stated that they were working seven days per week working 
very long hours, and that they were only getting approximately five or six 
hours per night of sleep. Since they exceeded the quota of concrete which had 
been set by the company, the entire operation was shut down on November 22, 
1985. The applicant was then able to leave Altamont and take his 40 foot 
trailer to Ignatio, Colorado to a friend*s farm. Upon his arrival, he and his 
wife relaxed, since there was nothing else to do in the area. 
Ai S>J su 
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On December 2, 1985, at approximately 6:00 a.m., the applicant woke 
up with a severe case of heartburn. The heart burn went all the way to the 
roof of his mouth and after taking some medication, he noticed no 
improvement. He then roused his wife and she took him to the Mercy Medical 
Center in Durango, Colorado where he was treated by Dr. Wilson. The applicant 
was placed in the ICCU for approximately a week and was also given a double 
dose of Streptokinase, but with no improvement. While his doctor was treating 
him the applicant had a heart attack in his presence. He was then given the 
option of being transferred to Salt Lake City, Denver or Albuquerque. The 
applicant chose the Presbyterian Hospital in Albuquerque since it was closest 
to his home. He was initially treated with an angiogram, and was scheduled 
for angioplasty, but was informed that the status of his heart would not 
tolerate that procedure without the installation of a pump. A pump was 
installed and the angioplasty was performed. Mr. Olsen was advised that he 
would not be a good candidate for by pass surgery, since his heart could not 
withstand that procedure because the applicant has ischemic cardiomyopathy. 
He has been told that he may have to receive a heart transplant in four or 
five years. He was released with Ma bunch of restrictions", so he traveled to 
Arizona for some warm weather. 
The applicant applied for social security benefits, and after an 
initial denial, has been granted benefits. 
In his early 20fs Mr. Olsen broke his right leg in a snowmobile 
accident. In 1970, he lost part of his right index finger in an industrial 
accident he sustained in upper Michigan. He has previously been compensated 
for that injury. The applicant denied any prior heart problems or chest 
pain. In July of 1986, Mr. Olsen had a gallbladder problem which eventually 
resulted in surgery. 
The file indicates several positive risk factors for heart attack. 
The applicant's family history indicates that his father died at the age of 56 
of a heart attack, and that he had also had three heart attacks in his 40's. 
Mr. Olsen*s father also had diabetes and he has two brothers that also have 
that condition. The applicant's mother has high blood pressure as does the 
applicant. Mr. Olsen started smoking at age 16 and smoked one pack per day. 
He discontinued smoking in 1982, and had put on some weight as a result. Just 
before his heart attack of October 29, 1984, he had resumed smoking again. 
The applicant's medical records indicate that he has high cholesterol levels 
and elevated LDL and trigylceride levels. 
With the file in this posture, the case was referred to a medical 
panel for its evaluation. The medical panel found that there was no medical 
causal relation between the applicant's heart attack of October 29, 1984, and 
his work activities of that date. The panel found that the cause of the 
applicant's heart attack was due to "progressive atherosclerotic blockage of 
the coronary artery**. The panel concluded that the applicant's heart attack 
*Vas simply due to the combination of pre-disposing factors which he had at 
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the time. We would not attribute any causative role to any physical work 
which he was doing at the time." With respect to the heart attack of December 
2, 1985, the panel found no causal connection between it and the attack of 
October 29, 1984. Rather the panel found that the attack was caused by the 
applicant's premature pre-existing atherosclerosis. It should also be noted 
that the first heart attack involved an acute anterior wall myocardial 
infarction. By comparison, the second attack involved the inferior left 
ventricle wall. Dr. Perry, a cardiologist, concluded that "clearly the 
inferior wall myocardial infarction was caused by acute occlusion of a vessel 
not involved with his first myocarcial infarction directly. The applicant's 
treating physician, Dr. Davidson, also fails to attribute a direct causal 
connection between the activities of October 29, 1984 and the attack of 
December 2, 1985. The Administrative Law Judge, after considering all of the 
evidence, adopts the findings of the medical panel as his own. 
Because of the pre-existing heart disease, it is necessary to apply 
the test of Allen v. Industrial Commission concerning legal causation. The 
activities of October 29, 1984 must have amounted to exertion beyond what the 
applicant would have expended in the activities of every day life. Giving the 
applicant the benefit of the doubt, I find his exertion in lifting the trailer 
tongue may be extraordinary and therefore would satisfy the legal causation 
requirement of Allen. However, the applicant must also satisfy the medical 
causation test of Allen. Based on the findings of the medical panel and the 
preponderance of medical evidence, and considering the applicant's positive 
risk factors for heart disease, I conclude that he has not satisfied the 
medical causation requirement of the Allen accident test. Accordingly, the 
applicant's claim must be denied. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant has not sustained his burden of proving that his heart 
condition was medically caused by his work activities of October 29, 1984. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of Douglas Olsen for 
compensation benefits for an industrial accident on October 29, 1984, should 
be, and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
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specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Timothy C. AJ 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
^/^^ day of February, 1988. 
ATTEST: 
Linda J. Strasjmrg 
Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING l)V'' 
I certify that on February 
2k. 
1988 a copy of the attached 
ORDER in the case of Douglas Olsen issued February£-\Q was mailed to the 
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Douglas R. Olsen 
P.O. Box 687 
Mancos, Co 81328 
Robert Shaughnessy 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 963 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Michael Dyer 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Wausau Insurance 
P.O. Box 7400 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By 
Sherry 
DURANGO MEDICAL & SURGICAL ASSOCIATES, P.C. ' 
1800 E. 3RD AVENUE • DURANGO, CO 81301 
PHONE 303-247-2611 < « < < 
^ 
• • • « « • 
• • « 
IENERAL SURGERY 
Villius W. Halley. M.D. 
FAMILY PRACTICE 
lartin P. Pirnat. M.D. 
tonald L. Rappe. M.D. 
loe M. Murphy, M.D. 
Mane Davidson. M.D. 
• t 
December 3 1 , 1987 
ADMINISTRATION 
Bonnie M. DuPuis 
EMERITUS 
jeo W Lloyd, M.D. 
Worker's Compensation Division 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
Dear Sirs: 
I have been involved in the medical care of Mr.Doug Olsen 
as his primary care physician ,here in Durango, Colorado since 
December, 1985 and am quite familiar with his history of 
cardiac illness and myocardial infarction. I understand that 
claims related to his myocardial infarctions of October 29, 1984 
nad December 2, 1985 are still under consideration by your 
commission and I would like to take the liberty to address 
some pertinent concerns which have been a part of that evaluation. 
2. Was the heart attack of December 2, 1985, causally related to 
the heart attack of October 29, 1984?: 
I cannot ascribe a direct causal relationship, but the second 
event was directly related, in fact a recurrence, of the 
myocardial infarction that took place October 29, 1984* 
What is the permanent Impairment, if any, due to the events 
of October 29, 1984?: 
The patient had permanent damage to the heart muscle due 
to that myocardial infarction, severely restricted activity 
tolerance, and is in fact disabled by his cardiac condition at 
this time. 
u o 
Doug (iisen -puge', 2« 
• # « « What is the pre-existing heart impairment?: J 
Although Mr Olsen had some recognized risln ractor^ 'fo'i? •*• 
c • • • • • 
coronaryartery disease, he had no prior cardiac episo*des* 
nor evidence of myocardial infarction. 
t i t < 
•ax»is t ing Did the injury of October 29, 1984, aglgfavaJ 
heart condition?: « I 
The answer to this is definitely yes, and the injury sustained 
was permanent. 
» « , * « « 
ie Che ore< 
I hope this information is helpful in your evaluation of 
Doug Olsen's claim, and I will be happy to provide any other 
information necessary. 
S i n c e r e l y , 
MU tHiiij&m /D 
A. Marie Davidson M;D. 
E b *GOSS. M D 
W RAMO. M D 
JT L RAFF.M 0 
L MADDOUX. M 0 
*DR HEUSER.MO 
•HAOOFF.M 0 
JQUERQUE CARDIOVASCULAR ASSOCIATES, LTD. 
March 12, 1986 ' ° - U 
%
 w 
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Wausau Insurance 
404 East 4500 South, Suite A-34 
Box 7400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
RE: OLSEN, Doug 
Gentlemen: 
Mr. Doug Olsen was seen by me for the first time on 11-6-85 with post 
infarction angina pectoris. The patient had an anterior infarction 11/84 
treated with streptokinase and coronary angioplasty. I saw him after an 
inferior infarction and he had restenosed the left anterior descending 
coronary artery that was dilated in Salt Lake City. He had severe 
diminished left ventricular function with restenosis of that vessel and 
underwent coronary angioplasty of the left anterior descending coronary 
artery, the vessel that was occluded previously in Salt Lake. All of these 
medical problems have certainly related to the first problem from 1984. 
This patient has had extensive intervention and life-saving therapy done by 
us and it disturbs me that you are denying him his benefits. Once again it 
appears that the insurance companies are more concerned about saving money 
than they are in taking care of patients who pay large premiums for many 
years. I am sending a copy of this letter to the Insurance Commissioner in 
the State of Utah. I feel strongly that this is misuse of your clients 
funds. 
Please let us know as soon as possible when the patient will receive his 
compensation for the problems he has had and should be covered under your 
jurisdiction. 
Richard R. Heus\r, M.D, 
RRH:lra 
TIC AND INTERVENTIONAL CAROIOLOGY, ANGIOPLASTY, AND ELECTROPHYSlOLOGY; ADULT ANO PEDIATRIC. 
\a inic 
o 
MAIN OFFICE 
333 SOUTH NINTH EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102 
(801) 535-8163 
FOOTHILL OFFICE 
1355 FOOTHILL BLVD , SUITE 100 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84108 
(801) 582-7767 
NORTH REDWOOD OFFICE 
679 NORTH REDWOOD ROAD 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84116 
(801) 322-3481 
SANDY OFFICE 
9500 SOUTH 1300 EAST 
SANDY, 4>TAH &407€ 
(So£) 565-23 0d 
November 19f 1987 
Timothy Allen 
Administrative Law Judge 
The Industrial (Zomnission of Utah 
1160 Est 300 South, P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84145-0580 
Dear Mr. Allen: 
Re: Douglas R. Olsen 
This letter will summarize for you the results of my evaluation of 
Mr. Douglas R. Olsen. 
This 47-year-old male has risk factors for vascular diseasef including a 25 
pack year history of cigarettes which he stopped in November of 1985f a history 
of elevated blood cholesterolf and a significant family history for coronary 
disease. His father had an infarct at age 52 and later died of cancer. His 
sister had percutaneous angioplasty of coronary artery obstruction at age 55. 
The patient's cardiac history began on October 29f 1984f when he was 
hospitalized in Rooseveltf Utah with an acute anterior wall myocardial 
infarction in progress. He was treated with streptokinase intravenously and 
two days later was transferred to Salt Lake City. He was found here to have a 
severe occlusion of the proximal left anterior descending artery and an 
angioplasty was done of that vessel. Presumably the infarct that had occurred 
was transmural prior to the angioplastyf however. 
The patient subsequently returned to wrk in January of 1985. He did well 
until December 2f 1985. Prior to December 2f 1985f he had been vorking on a 
dam construction project near Rooseveltf Utah. His job required him to do 
rather strenuous physical work repeatedly each day. He did veil during that 
work, howsver. At the last of Novemberf the job site was closed down and he 
returned to his home near Durangof Colorado. On December 2f 1987f two days 
after returning home he was again hospitalized with chest pain and this time 
found to have an acute inferior wall myocardial infarction. His early post 
myocardial infarction course was complicated by overt left heart failure. 
Timothy Allen 
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About one week following his admission to the hospital
 f he developed more chest 
pain. He was then transferred to Albuquerquef New Mexico where coronary 
angiography was performed. That study showed him to have significant three 
vessel coronary artery disease. He had total occlusion of the right coronary 
artery over much of its middle third and a recurrence of 90 percent severe 
occlusion of the proximal left anterior descending artery. An intra-aortic 
balloon was placed for hemodynamic support and an angioplasty was done of his 
proximal left anterior descending artery lesion. His ejection fraction was 
very markedly decreased and described as being 24 percent on that occasion. 
Subsequentlyf the patient has been stable. He is on multiple medicationsf but 
has not developed any overt cardiac failure and is experiencing no recurrent 
chest pain. 
He does have a chronic severe exertional breathlessness and such minor activity 
as climbing a single flight of stairs renders him significantly breathless. He 
does denief howeverf any palpitationsf edemaf orthopnea. He also has no 
breathlessness at rest. 
I failed to mention that his second myocardial infarction was preceded by a 
several week history of exertional burning pain in the substernal arear which 
probably in retrospect represented angina pectoris, although the patient 
attributed it to "heartburn." 
His current medications include Dipyridamole 75 mg b.i.d.
 f Cardiazem 30 mg 
b.i.d. , aspirin 325 mg b.i.d.f Lasix 40 mg daily, Tagamet 300 mg as needed for 
abdominal pain. He takes zero to one per day. Questran one scoop before 
meals, and Niacin 500 mg twice daily. 
On physical examination he is a mildly overweight, middle-aged male. His 
weight is 210 lbs., his height is 71 inches, his blood pressure is 120/70, his 
pulse is 64 and regular. His neck veins are not distended. His cardiac exam 
reveals a prominent apical impulse, evidencing left ventricular enlargement. I 
do not hear any nurmurs or gallops, however. His extremities are free of 
edema. His abdominal exam is negative and his pulses are normal without 
carotid bruits. 
In sunmary, then we have an early middle-aged male who is unfortunate enough to 
have had twD separate myocardial infarctions. He obviously has premature 
atherosclerosis and we would attribute this to his major risk factors including 
the cigarette smoking, the elevated blood cholesterol, and particularly the 
positive family history for coronary artery diseaes. 
Timothy Allen 
November 19, 1987 
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I will answar the questions opposed in your letter of November* l£f "19&7V 
The first question has to do with whether or not the heart attack of 
October 29r 1984f was a result of or related to the work activities which he 
was engaged in at the time. The myocardial infarction is known to be due to 
progressive atherosclerotic blockage of a coronary artery. The final event in 
a myocardial infarction is a clot which develops at the site of the severe 
atherosclerotic obstruction. This clot usually occurs while the patient is at 
rest and not usually during exertion. It would be very difficulty to explain 
how his various work activities might have had a causative role in producing 
the myocardial infarction. Our best understanding is that it vgas simply due to 
the combination of predisposing factors which he had at the time. Vfe would not 
attribute any causative role to any physical work which he was doing at the 
time. 
The second question relates to whether or not the heart attack of 
December 2, 1985f was causally related to the heart attack of October 29f 1984. 
If I understand the question correctly, the answer is nof the myocardial 
infarction of December 2f 1985f was not produced by the myocardial of 
October 29r 1984. However, both myocardial infarctions have a common 
causative elementf that is the prenature atherosclerosis which this patient is 
unfortunate enough to have. 
The third question relates to the degree of inpairment from the myocardial 
infarction of October 29
 f 1984. Obviously f the myocardial infarction which he 
sustained on that datef did produce significant damage to his heart. He wasf 
of coursef able to return to work with a somewhat compromised heart and seemed 
to function fairly well. His very extensive incompacity at presentf is due to 
the combination of the two separate myocardial infarctions
 f which in 
combination have produced very extensive dysfunction of his heart. 
The next question is "what is the pre-existing heart inpairment?" I am not 
sure what is intended by this question. If you are asking what was the heart 
inpairment prior to his first myocardial infarction in October of 1984
 f then 
the answer is that he had no significant inpairment of the heart muscle. He 
did obviously have earlyf extensivef and progressive coronary atherosclerosis. 
The function of the muscle pumpr however f was presumeably normal prior to his 
first heart attack. 
The final question asks whether or not the injury of October 29
 f 1984 f 
aggravated the pre-existing heart condition, if sof was the aggravation 
permanent or temporary. 
Timothy Allen 
November 19f 1987 
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I think this question has already been answered
 f if you will study all of the 
above material and try to understand the concepts contained therein. The 
ansv*sr to this question vould be that he had no significant impairment of the 
heart muscle prior to October of 1984f and the first injury he had occurred on 
October 19f 1984. Obviouslyf this infarct produced a permanent scar or amount 
of damaged muscle to his heart. That amount of muscle by itself was not enough 
to incapacitate him. It was only when the second myocardial infarction 
occurred in December of 1985f that he had sufficient muscle damage so that he 
is now permanently and significantly incapacitated. 
This letter will constitute my final report to you. If there are any further 
questionsf please feel free to write or call. 
Sincerelyf ) 
Michael J. Preecer M.D. 
MJP:cm 
CPi 
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On February 26, 1988, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying 
workers compensation benefits for the above-referenced applicant's December 2, 
1985 myocardial infarction and denying additional workers compensation 
benefits for a October 29, 1984 myocardial infarction incurred by the 
applicant. The Administrative Law Judge based his denial on the conclusions 
of the medical panel doctor. Dr. M. Preece. Dr. Preece concluded that the 
October 29, 1984 myocardial infarction was not caused by exertion at work and 
that the December 2, 1985 myocardial infarction was also not caused by work, 
nor related to the October 29, 1984 myocardial infarction. 
Prior to the examination and report of Dr. Preece, two other doctor 
opinions had been rendered regarding the medical cause of the applicant's 
myocardial infarction. Dr. J. Perry reviewed the applicant's medical records, 
and without addressing the cause of the 1984 myocardial infarction, stated 
with definity in a letter dated March 10, 1986 that the 1985 myocardial 
infarction was in no way related to the 1984 myocardial infarction. Dr. R. 
Heuser similarly reviewed records regarding the 1984 myocardial infarction and 
stated in a letter dated March 12, 1986 that he felt the 1985 myocardial 
infarction was related to the 1984 infarction. Also, just prior to the 
issuance of the Administrative Law Judge's Order, in connection with the' 
applicant's Objections to the medical panel report, a letter from Dr. A. M. 
Davidson, the applicant's "primary care physician," was submitted stating that 
the applicant's 1984 infarction was work related and that the 1985 infarction 
was "directly related" to the 1984 infarction. 
With the above-listed medical evidence submitted, the Administrative 
Law Judge determined that the medical panel report should be adopted as the 
preponderance of the medical evidence was supportive of the conclusions of the 
medical panel doctor. On March 30, 1988, counsel for the applicant filed a 
Motion for Review contesting the Administrative Law Judge's adoption of the 
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medical panel report. Counsel for the applicant raises two major issues in 
his Motion for Review. First, counsel for the applicant notes that this is 
the first medical report he has ever seen where the doctor has stated that 
contemporaneuous exertional activities in no way contributed to the heart 
failure. Second, counsel for the applicant notes that it is inconsistent for 
the Administrative Law Judge to find that the 1984 infarction is not 
compensable as the defendants accepted liability for that incident and paid 
benefits for it. 
On April 19, 1988, counsel for the defendants filed a Response to the 
applicant's Motion for Review. Addressing the two points raised by counsel 
for the applicant, counsel for the defendants first points out that it is not 
for the applicant's counsel to determine what is "mainstream" medical 
opinion. In addressing the second issue, counsel for the defendants states 
that the payment of benefits by the defendant/carrier is not equivalent to an 
acceptance of liability. In the alternative, counsel for the defendants 
argues that even if the defendants did accept liability for the 1984 
infarction by paying benefits, this does not mean that liability for the 1985 
infarction necessarily follows, as it is clear in the majority of the medical 
evidence that the 1984 and 1985 infarction are not causally related. 
The Commission finds that the only issue on review is whether the 
Administrative Law Judge correctly determined that there is insufficient 
evidence to support a finding of medical causation. This case is unusual in 
the diversity of medical opinion presented. Several of the doctors who have 
rendered opinions regarding the causation issue have stated conclusions that 
are exactly the opposite of another doctor. In cases where medical opinion 
controverting that of the medical panel is submitted, the Commission has in 
the past maintained a fairly consistent practice of deferring to the medical 
panel absent good reason shown why the medical panel report is insufficient or 
biased. In the instant case, the medical panel doctor is a well respected 
specialist in cardiology and his report is clear and unequivocal regarding his 
conclusions that the infarction was caused by pre-existing conditions and not 
exertional activity. Although Dr. Heuser and Dr. Davidson make contrary 
conclusions, the reasons for those conclusions are not stated. In contrast, 
the medical panel doctor's conclusions are explained with a listing given of 
the numerous pre-existing conditions suffered by the applicant predisposing 
him to cardiac arrest. There appears no good reason to reject the medical 
panel report, there being no insufficiency in the explanation and no bias. 
Therefore, the Commission must deny the applicant's Motion for Review and 
affirm the Administrative Law Judge. 
0 u 
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ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicants, March 30, 1988 Motion 
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judgefs February 26, 1988 
Order is hereby affirmed and final with further review to the Court of Appeals 
only within the thirty (30) day time limit as specified in U.C.A. 35-1-83. 
fHomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
/ ^ day of 4fay-, 1988. 
ATTEST: C^tZ^CC^ 
tf>-
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ORDER UPON 
REMAND 
FURTHER EVIDENTIARY HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
SECOND HEARING ON OBJECTIONS 
TO MEDICAL PANEL REPORT: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Coxnmission of 
Utah, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on July 7, 1987, at 10:00 a.m.; same 
being pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
C ononis s I on. 
Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge 
The applicant was present and represented by 
Virginius Dabney, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by James 
Elegante and Hal Pos
 9 Attorneys at Law. 
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Erie 
V. Boorman, Administrator. 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on February 17, 1988, at 8:30 a.m.; same 
being pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and represented by 
Virginius Dabney, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by James 
Elegante, Attorney at Law. 
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Erie 
V. Boorman, Administrator. 
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This case involves the death Fred C. Mabbutt on October 23, 1981. 
The Commission, previously entered an Order awarding Mr. Mabbutt*s widow death 
benefits in this case. The employer, by and through counsel, filed an appeal 
with the Utah Supreme Court. In an opinion filed December 31, 1986, a 
majority of the Court found that the case should be "remanded to the 
Industrial Commission for findings of fact as to what Mabbutt's activities 
actually were on the date of his death." The Court also instructed that "the 
Commission should resubmit the question of medical causation to the panel 
after it has made the appropriate factual findings." 
The Administrative Law Judge made his findings on or about July 8, 
1987, and referred the same to the medical panel for its further evaluation. 
The medical panel filed its supplemental report on September 1, 1987. 
Unfortunately, that report contained a typographical error in the following 
passage: "I still feel that the patient's work activities were an inmaterial 
(sic) contributing factor to his death from coronary artery disease." 
Thereafter, the applicant by and through counsel, filed a request for 
clarification of the supplemental panel report with the Commission. Shortly 
thereafter, the employer, by and through counsel, indicated that the error was 
clearly a typographical error, and that the defendants could not understand 
why the file was being referred on for further clarification. Apparently, the 
employer did not fully review the report of Dr. Perry, since the very next 
sentence stated: "If he did not have coronary artery disease, the stress and 
work of that occasion would not have percipitated (sic) his demise." Since 
this sentence is inconsistent with the sentence containing the error, 
vigilance would have required the employer to ask for a clarification also. 
The employer did not see fit to do so, but rather after the clarification was 
received from Dr. Perry indicating that the sentence should have read: I 
still feel that the patient's work activities were a material contributing 
factor to his death from coronary artery disease." Upon receipt of that 
report, then the employer filed an objection to the medical panel report 
contending that the clarification had completely altered the meaning of the 
original report. However, a close review of the file, including .the medical 
panel's original report will indicate that for the panel to have made the 
finding contended by the employer, would have required a 360 degree turnabout 
on the part of the medical panel. If such were the case, again vigilance 
would have required that the employer seek a clarification of this astounding 
turnabout by the doctor, if such was the case. Therefore, in a technical 
sense, the applicant's motion to have the defendant's objections to the 
medical panel report stricken in a technical sense should be granted. 
However, recognizing that the Commission is not bound by any stricken rules of 
evidence or procedure, I have denied the motion so that a full record might be 
made in this case. 
The tenor of the employer's objection to the medical panel report is 
first that the applicant's work activities of October 23, 1981, were not the 
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necessary precipitating factor resulting in his death. However, it would 
appear to the Administrative Law Judge that the defendants have missed the 
point of the Workers Compensation Act. The Act does not require that the 
death of an individual be the result of a necessary precipitating factorf 
rather the Workers Compensation Act would appear to only require that the work 
activity were a sufficient precipitating factor resulting in the death of the 
employee. When the issue is framed as such, it seems clear to the 
Administrative Law Judge that there really is no disputed medical issue in 
this case. A close and careful review of the medical report of the employer's 
medical expert, Dr. Fowles, dated November 25, 1987, indicates as much. Or. 
Fowles indicates "I agree with Dr. Perry that individuals without coronary 
disease usually do not die from physical exertion or emotional stress.9* 
Further down in the report the doctor indicates "I repeat my statement 
rendered in the hearing of October 24, 1984, that on the whole, extreme 
physical exertion and emotional stress can accompany sudden cardiac death and 
are sufficient but are not necessary.** In Dr. Fowles testimony, he was asked 
if the activities of Mr. Mabbutt of October 23, 1981, were sufficient 
precipitating events, to which he answered they were. He also went on to 
indicate that he agreed with Dr. Perry and Dr. Yanowitz that the applicant's 
activities of October 23, 1981, contributed something substantial to increase 
the applicant's risk he already faced of having a heart attack. Again, the 
only difference of opinion, if there is one, is Dr. Fowles* belief that "the 
events on the date of his death were not necessary for sudden cardiac death.** 
However, as I have indicated, I find that our law does not require that the 
work activities be necessary to cause a heart attack, only that they be a 
sufficient cause of the applicant's problem. For the above stated reasons, I 
find that the objections to the supplemental medical panel report of the 
employer should be, and the same are hereby denied. Accordingly, the medical 
panel report is admitted into evidence. 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Fred C. Mabbutt was exsployed by Price River Coal as a belt 
attendant. This job consisted of keeping the conveyor belts working and 
clean, and also required the rock dusting of the area at the end of each 
shift. On October 23, 1981, Mr. Mabbutt arose from bed as usual, and after 
shaving bade his wife goodbye. At approximately 7:00 a.m., he picked up c 
co-worker, who testified that Mr. Mabbutt seemed fine and was not complaining 
about his health or about chest pains. Mr. Mabbutt then reported for work at 
8:00 a.m., and thereupon discovered that the flyte pump or sump pump was 
clogged. As a result, the normal holding area known as the block dam, was 
accumulating coal fines (fine coal particles) in a pile. The deceased was 
attempting to unplug this clog in the pump by using a one inch high pressure 
hose in an effort to flush out the blockage. 
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At 11:15 a.m.t the belt inspector, Gene Miller, approached Mr. 
Mabbutt and observed that he was attempting to unplug the pump blockage with 
the high pressure hose, and that the pump was off. Since it was close to 
lunch time, Mr. Miller suggested to the deceased that he relax and take it 
easy, since the line was already plugged. Mr. Mabbutt was clearly agitated, 
and was cursing and attempting to fix the pump. At one point, he became so 
frustrated with his in ability to disassemble a clamp, that he threw his 
gloves down onto the ground, Mr. Miller also observed that Mabbutt had a pale 
face and hands. Mr. Mabbutt was also trying to lift the 110 pound pump out of 
the sump by tugging and pulling on the hose, but with no success. Although 
Miller suggested to Mabbutt that he eat his lunch, on three separate 
occasions, Mabbutt did not do so but rather continued working in the agitated 
and charged state. The deceased had advised Mr. Miller that the pump line had 
been plugged since the beginning of his shift that morning. Mr. Miller, when 
he approached Mr. Mabbutt, observed that the coal fines and muck had spilled 
over the block dam, and had cause a puddle in the area 10 feet by 20 feet, two 
inches deep in the most shallow point, and approximately two feet deep at the 
deepest point. While Miller was attempting to coax the deceased into eating 
his lunch, he observed that Mr. Mabbutt had made four trips from the sump area 
to the 04 belt. Each bucket of muck weighed at least 65 pounds, and it was 
Mr. Mabbutt• s practice to carry two buckets at a time, so as to even out the 
weight and ease his ambulation. The distance from the sump to the 04 exchange 
belt was approximately 60-70 feet, up a 7% grade or incline. Miller estimated 
that to clean the area where Mr. Mabbutt vras working would have required the 
removal of 100 buckets of muck. Mr. Miller stayed with the deceased until 
approximately noon, and at that time moved on to another belt for inspection. 
However, Mr. Mabbutt did not eat his lunch with Mr. Miller or while Mr. Miller 
was present. 
The deceased continued to work in this matter, and the last known 
contact with him was a 1:15 p.m. At that time, there was a stoppage of the 
belts in the mine, since the problem with one causes the interlock mechanism 
to terminate all belt operations. At 1:15 p.m., Miller called Mabbutt and 
inquired if there was a problem with his belt. Mabbutt advised Miller that 
the problem was not with his belt. Before the belt was shut down at 1:15, it 
had been running all morning while Mr. Mabbutt was attempting to solve the 
problem with the sump pump. As a result, the accumulations from the belt were 
also mounting, since Mr. Mabbutt was not shoveling coal fines from beneath the 
rollers or in the vicinity of the drive unit. 
The deceased continued shoveling and carrying buckets of muck to the 
04 belt, and continually was engaged in these activities until his unfortunate 
demise. At approximately 4:20 p.m., the belt attendant assigned to the next 
shift following Mabbutt9s reported to the belt. Upon arriving, she noticed 
that the area had not been rock dusted and that the surface of the belt was 
partially clean. Further investigation lead her to the discovery of Mr. 
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Mabbutt's body, which had a hose in the left hand, which was still running, 
and a shovel near by which was used to shovel muck onto the belt. Also near 
by was a muck bucket, which was still wet, although it had been emptied. 
The Administrative Law Judge finds that the deceased's activities of 
October 23, 1983, amounted to unusual exertion. What we have is a coal miner 
who was confronted with a plugged sump pump, which was causing coal fines and 
muck to spill over the block dam resulting in a large puddle. The belt line 
is a secondary escape way true enough from the mine, but testimony clearly 
indicated that in the event of a fire or other tragedy in the mine which would 
prevent a miner from seeing his way clear to make an escape, the belt line 
offers the only other sure method of escape, because a miner can feel his or 
her way out of the mine by following the belt line. Thus it is reasonable to 
conclude that Mr. Mabbutt felt he was under some pressure to keep that area of 
the mine clean in the event an accident should occur. In addition, Mr. 
Mabbutt was under the pressure of being behind in his work, and being 
frustrated by an inoperative piece of machinery. Tliere was a possibility of 
an MSHA citation being issued if the pile were too big, which only helped add 
urgency to Mabbutt*s efforts. 
Based on the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Miller, I conclude that 
Fred Mabbutt moved the estimated 100 buckets of muck to clean out his area of 
the belt, or some amount close to that. It is true that some doubt exists as 
to the exact activities of Mr. Mabbutt on October 23, 1981, but viewing the 
uncontradicted portions of the evidence, and the evidence itself as a whole, 
and giving the benefit of the doubt to the applicant, I conclude that Mr. 
Mabbutt did move all of the muck that had accumulated in the sump portion, or 
at least a major portion of it. I find that his work activities on October 
23, 1981, involved usual exertion, especially in light of the problem he was 
having with the pump which had caused such a hugh accumulation of muck in he 
area. When Mr. Mabbutt was seen by Mr. Miller he was clearly stressed and 
pale from his extraordinary efforts that morning. It can hardly be said that 
carrying 130 pounds of muck up a steep 7X slope for 70 feet approximately 50 
times is something he would have done as an activity of every day life. It is 
clear to the Administrative Law Judge that the carrying of all these muck 
buckets was extraordinary exertion under any definition of that term. 
Further, his efforts at freeing the 110 pound sump pump were also 
extraordinary exertions under any definition of the term. Accordingly, 
pursuant to the Allen decision, I find that the work activities of Fred C. 
Mabbutt on October 23, 1981, ". . .contributed something substantial to 
increase the risk he already faced in every day life because of his 
condition.- Allen v. Industrial Commission 729 P2d 15 (Utah 1986) at 25. 
Therefore, although the applicant may have had pre-existing coronary disease, 
his work activities of October 23, 1981, were clearly extraordinary exertion, 
and therefore the legal causation requirement of Allen has been met. The 
applicant must also prove medical causation, in that he must show that the 
"stress, strain or exertion required by his or her occupation lead to the 
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resulting injury or disability." Allen at 27. In this case, the medical 
panel found that the applicants work activities of October 23, 1981, resulted 
in the resulting death he sustained as the result of a heart attack on October 
23, 1981. This finding was also bolstered by an additional medical expert 
that testified on behalf of the applicant, and is also supported by the 
findings of Dr. Fowles, the defendants medical expert. Put differently, all 
three cardiologists who have submitted reports in this matter conclude that 
the applicant's work activities of October 23, 1981, were a sufficient 
precipitating factor resulting in his death by heart attack. 
Tha employer has also urged that there be an apportionment of 
liability for the death benefits in this case as between it and the Second 
Injury Fund. A review of the file indicates that this issue was first raised 
by the employer in its letter motion for review on October 19, 1987. The 
Administrator of the Second Injury Fund filed a response indicating that the 
belated efforts of the employer to raise the apportionment issue at this late 
date should be dismissed. The Second Injury Fund points out that the employer 
has waived the apportionment of Second Injury Fund liability through their 
inaction. The Administrator points out that this case went through the entire 
death benefit application procedure including an evidentiary hearing, medical 
panel referral and report, hearing on objections to the medical panel report, 
issuance of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, motion for review, 
denial of motion for review, petition for Supreme Court review, Supreme Court 
briefs and oral argument, and a decision from the Utah Supreme Court, which 
provided that the case be remanded to the Commission for the purpose of 
determining what Mr. Mabbutt's actual activities were on October 23, 1981. 
Nowhere in any of those proceedings did the employer see fit to raise the 
apportionment of liability for death benefits as between itself and the Second 
Injury Fund. In fact, the issue was not raised at the second evidentiary 
hearing or the second medical panel referral or after the receipt of the first 
report. How, at this late date, the employer seeks to involve apportionment 
of the death benefits as between itself and the Second Injury Fund. The 
Second Injury Fund cites the case of Pease v. Industrial Commission 694, P2d 
613 (Utah 1984) for the proposition that where a party files a motion for 
review, they have an obligation to raise all issues that can be presented at 
that time and that those issues which are not raised ara waived. In the 
instant case, the employer did not raise the apportionment issue when it first 
filed its motion for review, and it also failed to mention that issue in its 
brief to the Utah Supreme Court in its oral argument or even at the second 
evidentiary hearing before the Administrative Law Judge. It is therefore my 
finding that under the rational of the Pease decision, that the defendant, 
Price River Coal, has waived the apportionment of death benefits in this case. 
In passing, I might note that even if the right to apportionment of 
the death benefits in this case were not waived by the employer, I see no 
basis upon the record to grant the relief they seek. There is no apportioning 
of liability by the defendant's own expert, Dr. Fowles, does not set forth any 
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basis upon which apportionment might be made. On cross-examination, the 
medical panel chairman could not quanify what portion of the substantial 
material contributing factor would have been due to the applicant's 
pre-existing coronary disease, and what might have been due to the unusual 
exertion he performed on October 23, 1981. Dr. Yanowitz also was unable to 
quanify the relationship in this case. In addition, the Second Injury Fund 
has argued that there is no statutory provision allowing for the apportionment 
of death benefits in workers compensation cases. By comparison, the employer 
argues that there is nothing in the Workers Compensation Act to suggest that 
death benefits cannot be apportioned. The arguments of counsel are both 
correct, however, the Administrative Law Judge finds that in the absence of a 
specific statutory provision allowing for the apportionment of death benefits, 
the Administrative Law Judge will not create a right, which has heretofore not 
been allowed by either the Legislature or the Utah Supreme Court. 
Accordingly, the request of the defendants for apportionment of death benefits 
in this case is hereby denied. 
As indicated previously, I have found that Fred C. Mabbutt sustained 
a compensable industrial accident on October 23, 1981, while employed by Price 
River Coal as a belt attendant. On that date, Mr. Mabbutt was earning wages 
sufficient to entitle him to the maximum award for death benefits in the 
amount of $255.00 per week for 312 weeks for a total of $79,560.00. In 
reviewing the file, it appears that these benefits awarded herein will 
terminate effective October 16, 1987. Thereafter, the applicant may be 
entitled to continuing benefits from Price River Coal/CIGNA Insurance upon the 
completion and submission of a Declaration of Dependency form which will be 
sent to her by the Industrial Commission. Mrs. Mabbutt should return that 
form for further processing by the Administrative Law Judge. In the event the 
Declaration of Dependency form indicates that the applicant is still dependent 
upon the benefits of the employer for her continued support, then CIGNA will 
be entitled to an offset of 50% of the applicant's social security death 
benefits she is currently receiving. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Fred C. Mabbutt sustained a compensable industrial accident on 
October 23, 1981, while employed by Price River Coal Company. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Price River Coal and/or Cigna Insurance 
pay Marie T. Mabbutt compensation at the rate of $255.00 per week for 312 
weeks for a total of $79,560.00, as compensation for the death of her husband, 
Fred C. Mabbutt. These benefits shall commence effective October 24, 1981, 
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and are due and owing in a lump sum. These benefits shall also include 
interest of 8^ per annum commencing effective November 14, 1981, with interest 
continuing until payment is made. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Cigna pay Virginius Dabney, attorney for 
the applicant, the sum of $14,184.00 for services rendered in this matter, the 
same to be deducted from the aforesaid award of the applicant and remitted 
directly to his office. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the issue of Mrs. Mabbutfs continued 
dependancy is hereby reserved pending receipt of a Declaration of Dependency 
form from her, which will entitle her to benefits after October 16, 1987, if 
so found by the Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Second Injury Fund is hereby dismissed 
as a party defendant in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
/ 
Timothy C^j tTlen 
Admini^STfr^rtive Law Judge 
Passed by 
of Utah, 38s£ 
the Industrial Commission 
alt Lake City, Utah, this 
day of February, 1988. 
ATTEST; 
Linda 
Commi s s 
rasburg 
'Secretary 
PITTSBURGH TESTING LABORATORY 
Cite as, UUh, 657 p 2 d l 3 6 7 
v. KELLER UUh 1367 
en identification as to deny the accused a 
fair trial. Where an identification proce-
dure, even though suggestive, does not 
give rise to a substantial likelihood of 
misidentification, no due process violation 
has occurred. In determining the relia-
bility of the identification under the to-
tality of the circumstances, the court 
must also consider the opportunity of the 
witness to view the criminal at the time 
of the crime, the witness's degree of at-
tention, the accuracy of any prior descrip-
tion of the criminal, the level of certainty 
demonstrated during the identification 
procedure, and the time between the 
crime and the identification. [Citations 
omitted.] 
[4] With respect to the identification by 
Malouf, defendant contends that the wit-
ness did not have an adequate Q^^ortunitY 
to view the man he saw running from the 
scene and that his original description of 
the man did not match the description of 
defendant at the time.10 Our review of the 
evidence reflects that Malouf viewed the 
individual later identified as defendant for 
approximately one minute under well-light-
ed circumstances. Malouf was able to ob-
serve relatively detailed characteristics as 
he described the clothing defendant wore, 
the car he was driving, and some physical 
characteristics. He described the defendant 
as 5'9" tall with very slumped shoulders, 
and with sideburns and messed-up collar-
length hair which was kind of bushy. 
Defendant also challenges as suggestive 
the photographic array. Malouf selected 
defendant's photo from the array, though 
he needed a larger "full length" photo to 
clarify some question in his own mind as to 
a physical characteristic (slumped shoul-
ders). Procedures used by the police were 
sound and acceptable. Multiple, nonrecur-
ring pictures were used, the subjects of 
which each had curly hair and a mustache. 
No single picture was emphasized by the 
officer. The procedure used was not un-
it. Defendant's appearance changed considera-
bly from the time the crime was committed 
july suggestive so as to invalidate the iden-
tification. 
15] Defendant also contends that Pleas-
ants' description was vague and inaccurate, 
that Pleasants did not participate in a line-
up, and that he did not identify defendant 
a t either the preliminary hearing or trial, 
although the State concedes that the iden-
tification by Pleasants was i^ ot as strong as 
that of Malouf, we are convinced that the 
''totality of the circumstances" test has 
been substantially met. Nevertheless, 
]? leasants' testimony as to defendant's pres-
ence at the scene on September 20, 1978 
v/as not necessary to the conviction. It is 
merely cumulative to be weighed along 
y/ith other evidence against defendant's as-
sertion that he had not been in Utah in 
gaveral years. 
The evidence adduced at trial is sufficient 
to sustain the jury's verdict of guilty. 
Affirmed. 
KEY NUMBER SYSTEM i STEM> 
PITTSBURGH TESTING LABORATORY 
and Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Marion B. KELLER, Widow of Sylvan R. 
Keller, Deceased, and the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Defendants. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 28, 1983. 
On writ of review to set aside order of 
Industrial Commission awarding workmen's 
(October, 1978) and the time of trial (April, 
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compensation death benefits, the Supreme 
Court, Durham, J., held that in view of 
competent and comprehensive medical evi-
dence in the record upon which Commission 
relied in arriving at its conclusions, despite 
contrary findings of medical panel, Commis-
sion's finding that there was causal connec-
tion between distress at place of work and 
worker's heart attack four days later was 
neither "arbitrary or capricious" nor "with-
out any substantial evidence to support it." 
Order of entitlement to death benefits 
affirmed; Commission's order respecting is-
sue of apportionment vacated, and matter 
remanded. 
1. Workers' Compensation <*=»515 
For eligibility for workmen's compen-
sation death benefits, Industrial Commis-
sion must determine that accident occurred 
and that accident resulted in injury causally 
related to work being done, and it is not 
sufficient merely to show injury. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-77. 
2. Workers' Compensation *=»1536 
In workmen's compensation proceed-
ing, in view of competent and comprehen-
sive medical evidence in record upon which 
Industrial Commission relied in arriving at 
its conclusions, despite contrary findings of 
medical panel, Commission's finding that 
there was causal connection between dis-
tress at place of work and worker's heart 
attack four days later was neither "arbi-
trary or capricious" nor "without any sub-
stantial evidence to support it." U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-77. 
3. Workers' Compensation <*=»1845 
Where, in proceeding for workmen's 
compensation, issue of apportionment of 
benefits between employer and Second In-
jury Fund was not addressed by Industrial 
Commission, though issue had apparently 
been presented to the Commission during 
hearing stage, issue of apportionment was 
not properly before reviewing court, and 
Commission's order respecting such issue 
would be vacated and matter remanded. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-68. 
Richard H. Moffat, John L. Young, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs. 
Ralph R. Tate, Jr., David L. Wilkinson, 
Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
REPLACEMENT OPINION 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory and Liber-
ty Mutual Insurance Company (plaintiffs) 
have filed this writ of review to set aside an 
order of the Industrial Commission which 
awarded Marion B. Keller, widow of Sylvan 
R. Keller, workmen's compensation death 
benefits. The order directed the plaintiffs 
to pay Marion Keller $52,104 plus medical 
expenses in accordance with the statutory 
fee schedule, and the statutory funeral al-
lowance of $1,000. Plaintiffs seek reversal 
of that order or, in the alternative, an ap-
portionment of the benefits to be paid to 
Mrs. Keller between the plaintiffs and the 
"second injury fund." See U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 3&-1--68, (1979 Supp.). " 
Sylvan Keller was employed by Pitts-
burgh Testing Laboratory as a structural 
steel inspector. At the direction of his em-
ployer, Mr. Keller made an inspection tour 
of the Weber College Special Events Center 
on August 29, 1978. He was accompanied 
by Mr. Hamp, an employee of Weber Col-
lege, who testified before the administra-
tive law judge concerning his and Mr. Kel-
ler's activities during the inspection. 
During the morning, they performed a visu-
al inspection of the structures immediately 
above the arena floor. In the afternoon, 
they moved up to the top level of the Spe-
cial Events Center. They, were able to wait 
in an area 3-5 feet in height which was 
immediately below the outer roof. They 
were required to apwl through a series of 
wooden A-frames, the tops of which were 
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which supported the structure upon which 
they walked. The building is basically 
round and they entered on one side and 
began to move in a circle around the perim-
eter. Mr. Hamp estimated that the inside 
temperature was 20-40° above the outside 
temperature, placing it in a range of 100-
125*. He described the area in which they 
moved as very warm and extremely stuffy. 
He said that they occasionally stopped at 
small openings in the structure in order to 
get a breath of fresh air. After two hours 
in this area, Mr. Hamp testified, their 
clothes were "wringing wet" and they were 
slowing down just to catch their breath. 
Mr. Keller experienced particular difficulty 
in breathing and stopped at a point where 
he found some fresh air leaking into the 
rafter space. Mr. Hamp moved on in a 
futile effort to find another exit, and by the 
time he finally concluded that they could 
only exit the way they had come in, Mr. 
Keller was physically unable to travel that 
distance. Paramedics were called and they 
cut a hole in the ceiling in order to remove 
Mr. Keller, who at that point had been in 
the enclosed area for nearly three hours. 
Oxygen was administered to Mr. Keller 
and, after resting in one of the offices of 
the Special Events Center, he drove himself 
back to Salt Lake City. He had complained 
to Mr. Hamp of being hot, tired, weak and 
short of breath, but had not complained of 
any particular pain. 
Mrs. Keller testified that over the next 
three days Mr. Keller exhibited exhaustion, 
was unable to engage in any activity and 
frequently requested cold drinks. She 
found him sitting up in bed the morning of 
September 2 experiencing severe chest 
pains and took him to Holy Cross Hospital. 
In the medical history provided by Mr. Kel-
ler to a doctor at Holy Cross Hospital, he 
stated that he had experienced chest pains 
while in the attic of the Special Events 
Center but had no nitroglycerin with which 
to relieve it He also stated that in the 
three days that followed, the pain occurred 
10-15 times a day and was precipitated by 
During this 
time, he had not mentioned any pain to his 
wife. 
In 1965, Mr. Keller had experienced an 
anterior myocardial infarction followed by 
exertional angina. He was hospitalized in 
Hawaii in 1973 for a suspected acute myo-
cardial infarction and after that he experi-
enced stable angina pectoris 1-3 times a 
day which was relieved by nitroglycerine. 
Upon his admission to Holy Cross Hospital 
in September of 1978, he was diagnosed as 
having an acute interior wall myocardial 
infarction. Further testing revealed severe 
coronary artery disease of long-standing 
which was treated three weeks later by 
extensive coronary bypass surgery and re-
moval of a ventricular aneurysm. Mr. Kel-
ler's recovery from the surgery was incom-
plete and he was later diagnosed to be 
suffering from pulmonary disease and gall-
bladder disease, which resulted in continu-
ing hospitalization. After experiencing 
progressively more severe congestive heart 
failure, plus pump failure and kidney fail-
ure, he developed bacteriemia and died in 
September of 1979. 
A hearing was held before the adminis-
trative law judge at which Mr. Hamp and 
Mrs. Keller testified, and Mr. Keller's medi-
cal records were introduced into evidence. 
The matter was then referred to a medical 
panel. See U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-77 (1979 
Supp.). The medical panel's report did not 
link Keller's heart attack of September 2, 
1978, with the stress he had experienced in 
the ceiling of the Special Events Center 
four days earlier. Mrs. Keller objected to 
the findings of the medical panel and intro-
duced the testimony of Dr. Frank Yanow-
itz, Chief of Cardiology, LDS Hospital in 
Salt Lake City. Dr. Yanowitz testified that 
the stress experienced in the ceiling of the 
Special Events Center affected Mr. Keller's 
heart and this subsequently led to the heart 
attack which he experienced 3-4 days later. 
After reviewing the evidence, including the 
testimony and opinions of the medical panel 
and Dr. Yahowitz, the administrative law 
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judge made the following order on Febru-
ary 10, 1981: 
The Administrative Law Judge adopts 
the findings of Dr. Frank Yanowitz as his 
own and finds that the decedent's death 
on September 22, 1979, was directly relat-
ed to the events at the Dee's Special 
Events Center on August 29, 1978, results 
of which produced a coronary insufficien-
cy which eventually led to the deceased's 
myocardial infarction on September 2, 
1978, and ultimately resulted in his death 
on September 22, 1979. 
On appeal to the Industrial Commission, 
the order of the administrative law judge 
was affirmed and the plaintiffs filed this 
writ of review. 
[1] We have recently had the opportuni-
ty to review the many authorities which 
define the scope of review in Industrial 
Commission cases and we have reaffirmed 
the limitations on this Court's inquiry: 
[The reviewing court's inquiry is] wheth-
er the Commissions' findings are "arbi-
trary and capricious," or "wholly without 
cause" or contrary to the "one [inevita-
ble] conclusion from the evidence" or 
without "any substantial evidence" to 
support them. Only then should the 
Commission's findings be displaced. 
Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, Utah, 642 
P.2d 722, 725 (1982) (quoting Kaiser Steel 
1. The plaintiffs repeatedly emphasize the lack 
of a causal link between the "incident" at the 
Special Events Center and Mr. Keller's heart 
attack four days later. Thus, they claim there 
was no "compensable accident/' without spe-
cifically analyzing whether the "incident" 
meets the threshold test of an accident. In 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 
140, 427 P.2d 740 (1967), a case involving a 
preexisting heart condition, we said: "The law 
is well settled that the aggravation or lighting 
up of a pre-existing disease by an industrial 
accident ia compensable and that an internal 
failure brought about by exertion in the course 
of employment may be an accident within the 
meaning of the act." Id. at 143, 427 ?2d at 
743. See also IGA Food Fair v. Martin, Utah, 
584 P.2d S2S (1978). This is consistent with 
our recent discussion of the, meaning of the 
'term "accident" in Sabo's Electronic Service v. 
Sabo, Utah, 642 P2d 111 (1982), a back injury 
case, where we said: "It [the term accidental] 
Corp. v. Monfredi, Utah, 631 P.2d 888, 890 
(1981)). In order to award compensation, 
the Commission must determine that an 
accident has occurred and that there is a 
causal connection between the accident and' 
the injury claimed. It is the second step in 
this determination which is called into ques-
tion by the plaintiffs in this case.1 Our 
comment in Sabo, concerning a back injury, 
is equally applicable to the questions gener-
ated by Mr. Keller's heart disease:2 
The accident must result in an injury 
which is causally related to the work be-
ing done. The mere showing of injury 
does not ipso facto mean that a compen-
sable accident has occurred. 
Sabo, supra, at 725. We also noted in Sabo 
that "[i]n difficult cases, the findings of a 
medical panel may assist in determining 
whether the injury was caused by an acci-
dent " Id. at 725. The findings of the 
medical panel, however, are not determina-
tive. "Essentially, they are reporters of the 
medical aspects of a given case in aid of the 
Commission's appraisal and weighing of all 
the facts." Redman Warehousing Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission, 22 Utah 2d 398, 402, 
454 P.2d 283, 285 (1969). See also Sabo, 
supra; IGA Food Fair, supra note 1. 
[2] In the case at bar, the Commission 
had before it conflicting medical testimony. 
The medical panel reported the following 
findings to the administrative law judge: 
simply means that the effort exerted, consider* 
ing the position m which the workman was put 
by the work being done at the instant of the 
injury, was such that an injury, unanticipated 
and unforeseen, resulted to the workman/* Id 
at 726 (quoting Continental Baking v. Industrial 
Commission, 92 Utah 438, 69 P2d 268 (1937)). 
2. We have previously affirmed the Commission 
when it has awarded benefits where the claim-
ant suffered from a preexisting heart condition 
which was aggravated by an employment-relat-
ed accident. See IGA Food Fair, supra note 1; 
Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction and Mining 
Corp.f Utah, 565 P.2d 1144 (1977). See also 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, supra note 1, 
where we reversed the Commission where it 
failed to award benefits to a claimant with a 
preexisting heart condition. 
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2. As a reasonable medical probability, 
the stress experienced by Mr. Keller in 
the Weber College Special Events Center, 
was in a nature of heat exhaustion with-
out symptoms that were clearly cardiac in 
nature. Therefore, the panel believes 
that the experience was at most a minor 
stress event and not a substantial contrib-
uting cause of the interior wall myocardi-
al infarction suffered by Mr. Keller on 
September 2, 1978. 
3. As a reasonable medical probability, 
the stress experienced by Mr. Keller on 
August 29, 1978 was not a substantial 
contributing factor to the need of a triple 
bypass surgery on September 21, 1978. 
In fact, the longstanding and progressive 
atherosclerotic disease of the coronary ar-
teries was the cause of the myocardial 
infarction leading to the triple bypass 
surgery. 
Dr. Yanowitz, the cardiologist called by 
Mrs. Keller, testified that there was in. fact 
a causal link between the stress event at 
the Special Events Center and the heart 
attack which occurred 4 days later. His 
findings are summarized in a letter sent to 
Mrs. Keller's attorney and entered into the 
record: 
The chest pain symptoms lasting one hour 
while in the rafters of the Special Events 
Center and relieved by oxygen adminis-
tration is by virtue of its duration not 
angina pectoris but coronary insufficien-
cy, a more serious chest pain syndrome in 
coronary diseases and one which is likely 
to be a prodrome or precipitating factor 
preceding a myocardial infarction. The 
majority of acute myocardial infarction 
have a several day prodrome of increas-
ing pain symptoms preceding the actual 
infarction. From all the information you 
provided me, I am of the opinion that the 
events of August 29, 1978 precipitated 
these symptoms which, in turn, led to his 
myocardial infarction. 
In the testimony before the administra-
tive law judge, a member of the medical 
panel stated that its conclusions were in 
part based upon Mr. Keller's failure to com-
plain of any chest pain to Mr. Hamp while 
in the Special Events Center and his subse-
quent failure to complain of any chest pain 
to his wife. The doctor testified that he 
considered the comment concerning chest 
pain to the receiving resident at Holy Cross 
Hospital on September 2 as "self-serving." 
On cross-examination, the doctor testified 
that the single primary factor the "panel 
relied upon in not linking the stressful 
event in the Special Events Center to the 
onset of the heart attack was a lack of 
significant pain on August 29 or the subse-
quent three days. 
Dr. Yanowitz testified that he based his 
findings on the pain which Mr. Keller expe-
rienced on August 29 and the repeated epi-
sodes of pain with increasing severity Mr. 
Keller experienced in the four-day interim 
before his heart attack. Dr. Yanowitz tes-
tified that he thought the reports of Mr. 
Keller to the resident at Holy Cross Hospi-
tal upon his admission were reliable. He 
also relied on Mrs. Keller's testimony that 
Mr. Keller did not report the pain to her 
because he did not want to worry her since 
she had recently experienced some heart 
trouble. He found this to be a credible 
reason for Mr. Keller not reporting the pain 
to his wife during the three days following 
the incident at Weber College, particularly 
in light of the fact that he did not even 
report the incident itself to his wife during 
that period. The medical panel and Dr. 
Yanowitz stated in their written reports 
and in testimony before the administrative 
law judge that Mr. Keller's death was due 
to the September 3, 1978, heart attack and 
subsequent deterioration of his coronary ar-
teries, and not the surgery or its complica-
tions. 
In view of the competent and comprehen-
sive medical evidence in the record upon 
which the Commission relied in arriving at 
its conclusions, despite the contrary find-
ings of the medical panel, we conclude that 
the Commission's finding that there was a 
causal connection between Mr. Keller's dis-
1372 Utah 657 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
tress in the Special Events Center and his 
subsequent heart attack four days later is 
neither "arbitrary or capricious" nor "with-
out any substantial evidence to support it." 
The Commission's order that Mrs. Keller is 
entitled to dependent's death benefits is 
therefore affirmed. 
[3] Plaintiffs also claim that the Com-
mission erred in refusing to apportion the 
benefits awarded to Mrs. Keller between 
the employer and the Second Injury Fund. 
It appears from the record that, despite 
plaintiffs' inclusion of the Industrial Com-
mission in the caption of its brief, neither 
the Commission nor the Second Injury 
Fund has been made a party to this appeal. 
The issue of apportionment was apparently 
presented to the Commission during the 
hearing stage of these proceedings, but not 
addressed by it. The issue of apportion-
ment is therefore not properly before us. 
The order of the Commission respecting 
that issue is vacated and the matter is 
remanded for further proceedings deemed 
appropriate by the Commission in light of 
this opinion. No costs awarded. 
HALL, CJ„ and STEWART, OAKS and 
HOWE, JJ., concur. 
Richard D COOPER, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Eugene & JONES, Sheriff of Washington 
County, State of Utah, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 18756. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 28, 1983. 
Pro se appeal was taken from judg-
ment of the Fifth District Court,, Wash-
ington County, J. Harlan Burns, J., which 
denied petition for habeas corpus relief 
from jail sentence on misdemeanor convic-
tion. The Supreme Court held that: (1) 
where habeas corpus petitioner did not pro-
vide appellate court with transcript of evi-
dence at habeas corpus hearing in district 
court, argument that district court's find-
ings were unsupported by evidence would 
not be entertained, and (2) district court did 
not err in denying habeas corpus relief on 
challenge to jurisdiction of circuit court 
which had convicted petitioner of misde-
meanor of failure to obtain building permit 
Motion denied and order affirmed. 
1. Habeas Corpus <*=>89 
Question of mootness of an appeal in a 
habeas corpus matter when petitioner ^as 
been unconditionally released from custody 
is open, and question is sufficiently difficult 
that it ought not to be decided in a case 
where it has not been briefed on both sides. 
2. Habeas Corpus «=> 113(9) 
Where habeas corpus petitioner did not 
provide appellate court with transcript of 
evidence at habeas corpus hearing in dis-
trict court, argument'that district court's 
findings were unsupported by evidence 
would not be entertained 
3. Habeas Corpus <*=»106 
District court did not err in denying 
habeas corpus relief to contemnor who had 
been imprisoned for failure to comply with 
terms of suspended sentence for violation of 
city's building permit regulations on con-
temner's challenge to jurisdiction of circuit 
court in which he had been convicted. 
Richard D. Cooper, pro se. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, T.W. Shumway, St George, for de-
fendant and respondent 
PER CURIAM: 
Petitioner has appealed pro se from the 
district court's deniaf of habeas corpus re-
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